ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge / skills/curated/mobile-network-security
mobile-network-security
VerifiedDetects insecure network communication in mobile apps (Android/iOS). Trigger on: cleartext HTTP, TLS misconfiguration, certificate pinning bypass, hostname verification disabled, allowCleartextTraffic, NSAllowsArbitraryLoads, ATS exceptions, custom TrustManager, ALLOW_ALL_HOSTNAME_VERIFIER, TLS 1.0/1.1, weak cipher suites, certificate pinning absent, Network Security Configuration, onReceivedSslError, SSLSocket, OkHttp, NSURL, URLSession, certificate transparency, HSTS, MITM. Covers MASVS-NETWORK-1 (TLS required) and MASVS-NETWORK-2 (certificate validation).
Mobile Network Security
What Is Broken and Why
Mobile apps fail network security when they allow cleartext HTTP traffic, disable TLS certificate validation, or implement certificate pinning incorrectly. Custom X509TrustManager implementations that accept all certificates (empty checkServerTrusted) are a common developer shortcut that makes the entire TLS layer useless. ATS exceptions in iOS Info.plist or Android Network Security Configuration that allow arbitrary cleartext expose all traffic to MITM. Apps that call onReceivedSslError().proceed() in WebViewClient bypass all certificate errors. Certificate pinning without key backup pins causes production outages, so developers remove pinning — leaving no protection.
Key Signals
- Android:
android:networkSecurityConfigpointing to XML with<domain-config cleartextTrafficPermitted="true"> - Android:
android:usesCleartextTraffic="true"in manifest - iOS:
NSAllowsArbitraryLoads: truein Info.plist ATS section - Custom
X509TrustManagerwith emptycheckServerTrusted()method body HostnameVerifierreturningtruefor all hosts:ALLOW_ALL_HOSTNAME_VERIFIERSSLContext.init(null, arrayOf(trustAllManager), null)- WebViewClient
onReceivedSslErrorcallinghandler.proceed() - TLS 1.0/1.1 explicitly enabled via
SSLParameters.setProtocols() - No
pin-setin Network Security Configuration for sensitive domains - iOS
NSURLSessionDelegatereturning no error for invalid certificates URLSession.sharedwith no custom delegate (no pinning) for high-value endpoints
Methodology
Setup MITM proxy:
- Install Burp/mitmproxy CA cert on device (Android: Settings > Security; iOS: Settings > General > VPN & Device Management)
- Configure device proxy to point at Burp listener
- Launch app — observe if traffic appears in proxy (cleartext) or throws certificate errors (pinning)
Android static analysis:
apktool d app.apk— checkAndroidManifest.xmlforusesCleartextTraffic,networkSecurityConfig- Review
res/xml/network_security_config.xmlfor cleartext rules and pin-set presence - Search decompiled source for
TrustManager,HostnameVerifier,ALLOW_ALL,onReceivedSslError - Search for
SSLContext.init,HttpsURLConnection.setDefaultHostnameVerifier - Check OkHttp client config:
OkHttpClient.Builder()for customsslSocketFactory
iOS static analysis:
- Extract IPA — inspect
Info.plistforNSAppTransportSecurityexceptions - Search source for
URLSession,NSURLConnection, customURLSessionDelegatemethods - Check
didReceiveChallengedelegate forcompletionHandler(.useCredential, ...) - Look for TrustKit, Alamofire, or custom pinning implementation
Dynamic analysis:
- With Burp proxy active — if app connects normally: no pinning or pinning bypass available
- Attempt SSL kill switch: objection
ios sslpinning disableor Androidandroid sslpinning disable - Use Frida script to hook
TrustManagerImpl.checkServerTrustedorSecTrustEvaluate
Payloads & Tools
# objection — disable SSL pinning (Android/iOS)
objection --gadget TARGET run android sslpinning disable
objection --gadget TARGET run ios sslpinning disable
# Frida — Android: bypass TrustManager
Java.perform(function() {
var TrustManager = Java.use("javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager");
var SSLContext = Java.use("javax.net.ssl.SSLContext");
var TM = Java.registerClass({
name: "FakeTrustManager", implements: [TrustManager],
methods: { checkClientTrusted: function(){}, checkServerTrusted: function(){},
getAcceptedIssuers: function(){ return []; } }
});
SSLContext.init.overload("[Ljavax.net.ssl.KeyManager;","[Ljavax.net.ssl.TrustManager;","java.security.SecureRandom")
.implementation = function(km, tm, sr) { this.init(km, [TM.$new()], sr); };
});
# iOS — SSL kill switch (jailbroken device)
# Install SSL Kill Switch 3 via Cydia/Sileo
# OR use Frida script ssl-kill-switch2.js
# Check ATS config in IPA
unzip app.ipa; grep -A20 "NSAppTransportSecurity" Payload/App.app/Info.plist
# Check Android Network Security Config
apktool d app.apk && cat app/res/xml/network_security_config.xml
Bypass Techniques
- objection sslpinning disable — hooks common pinning libraries (OkHttp, TrustKit, Alamofire) at runtime
- SSL Kill Switch 3 — jailbroken iOS; patches
SecTrustEvaluateat OS level - Frida TrustManager replacement — replaces the app's trust manager with one that accepts all certs
- MagiskTrustUserCerts — on rooted Android, installs CA cert as system cert (bypasses Android 14+ restrictions)
- apk-mitm — patches APK to disable pinning statically without needing runtime instrumentation
- Network Security Config override — repack APK with
cleartextTrafficPermitted="true"and custom trust anchors
Exploitation Scenarios
Scenario 1 — Empty TrustManager MITM
Setup: App uses SSLContext.init(null, arrayOf(TrustAllManager()), null) to avoid pinning errors in dev, shipped to production. → Trigger: Attacker on same Wi-Fi runs mitmproxy. → Impact: All HTTPS traffic decrypted — credentials, session tokens, PII visible.
Scenario 2 — ATS Exception Cleartext
Setup: iOS app sets NSAllowsArbitraryLoads: true for legacy API compatibility. → Trigger: Network interception on hotel Wi-Fi. → Impact: Plaintext auth tokens and API responses captured.
Scenario 3 — WebView onReceivedSslError Bypass
Setup: WebViewClient overrides onReceivedSslError and calls handler.proceed(). → Trigger: MITM proxy presents a self-signed cert to the WebView. → Impact: Victim navigates authenticated WebView session through attacker's proxy.
False Positives
cleartextTrafficPermitted="true"only for non-sensitive domains (analytics, CDN assets) with sensitive traffic separately pinned- Custom
URLSessionDelegatethat validates the cert chain manually and only accepts the prod CA - Debug-only bypass code that is stripped in release builds (
BuildConfig.DEBUGguard) - Certificate pinning disabled for localhost (test environment) — confirm production build behavior
Fix Patterns
<!-- Android Network Security Config — correct -->
<network-security-config>
<domain-config>
<domain includeSubdomains="true">api.TARGET</domain>
<pin-set expiration="2026-01-01">
<pin digest="SHA-256">SPKI_HASH_HERE</pin>
<pin digest="SHA-256">BACKUP_SPKI_HASH</pin> <!-- Always include backup pin -->
</pin-set>
</domain-config>
</network-security-config>
// iOS — URLSession pinning via TrustKit or manual
func urlSession(_ session: URLSession, didReceive challenge: URLAuthenticationChallenge,
completionHandler: @escaping (URLSession.AuthChallengeDisposition, URLCredential?) -> Void) {
guard let serverTrust = challenge.protectionSpace.serverTrust,
validateCert(serverTrust) else { // compare SPKI hash
completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil); return
}
completionHandler(.useCredential, URLCredential(trust: serverTrust))
}
Related Skills
[[cors-misconfig]] on mobile backend APIs mirrors the same trust boundary issue as missing certificate pinning — both allow a network-positioned attacker to intercept or manipulate authenticated traffic. An empty TrustManager is functionally equivalent to [[ssrf]] from the attacker's perspective: the server (or in this case the app) makes authenticated requests to an unverified destination. [[mobile-insecure-storage]] is the fallback attack when network interception fails — if TLS is properly pinned, credentials may still be extractable from local storage.
Related skills
| Skill | Stars | Updated | Works with | Status | Install |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| rea-analysis-optimizationmorluto/reaOptimize REA providers and shared analysis workflows for agent context, latency, CPU, and memory while preserving correctness and Evidence. Use for analysis bottlenecks and cache or query design; CI/test-suite optimization belongs to rea-ci-tests-audit. | Stars: 465k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| rea-ci-tests-auditmorluto/reaAudit REA CI and test suites for correctness, fixture drift, false passes, and measured performance; use for suite or workflow investigations and efficiency changes, rather than ordinary feature testing or a single test failure. | Stars: 465k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| rea-tool-designmorluto/reaAudit, investigate, design, or change REA investigation tools, CLI/MCP contracts, provider capabilities, and Evidence semantics. | Stars: 465k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| ponytail-auditDietrichGebert/ponytailQuality audit of the whole repo: bugs, security, real load, missing tests, speed, and what to delete. Most important first. | Stars: 192k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |