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po4yka/llm-wiki-skills / skills/llm-wiki-threat-model

llm-wiki-threat-model

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Build a formal security architecture threat model for an LLM-Wiki system. Use when the user asks for STRIDE, LINDDUN, PASTA, data-flow diagrams, trust boundaries, attack-surface mapping, abuse cases, risk matrices, red-team scenarios, or control baselines; route existing-config safety reviews to llm-wiki-security-review.

LLM-Wiki Threat Model

Goal

Produce a threat model for an LLM-Wiki system that maps trust boundaries, attack surfaces, prioritized threats, controls, CI gates, red-team scenarios and incident response.

Use references/docs/19-security-threat-model.md as the reference architecture and control baseline.

When to use

  • The user asks for a STRIDE, LINDDUN, PASTA, or data-flow-diagram threat model of an LLM-Wiki system.
  • The user wants trust boundaries, attack-surface mapping, abuse cases, or a risk/severity matrix for ingestion, retrieval, MCP/API, or write paths.
  • The user is designing or hardening a new LLM-Wiki deployment (local-first, hosted, MCP/API server) and needs a control baseline and red-team scenarios before build-out.
  • The user asks for an incident-response plan or security scorecard tied to a threat model, not an ad-hoc config review.
  • Route requests to review an existing config or deployment for known weaknesses to llm-wiki-security-review instead; use this skill for building the formal model from scratch.

Inputs

  • Implementation family: local-first, desktop app, repo-docs, Obsidian, team wiki, hosted product, MCP/API server.
  • Data flows: capture, ingestion, raw storage, wiki compilation, indexing, retrieval, generation, MCP/API, writes, exports, observability.
  • Data classes: public, internal, sensitive, regulated, unknown.
  • Deployment: local stdio, localhost HTTP, remote MCP/API, CI, cloud models, cloud parsers, hosted search/vector DB.
  • Existing controls: CODEOWNERS, branch protection, scanners, auth, review queue, audit logs, redaction, eval/red-team.
  • Desired output: high-level model, detailed matrix, remediation plan, repo file changes or CI templates.

Procedure

1. Inventory components and data flows

Map:

sources -> ingestion/parsing -> raw store -> wiki pages -> indexes -> retrieval -> agent -> MCP/API tools -> proposals/PRs -> exports/traces

For each component, record:

component: ""
inputs: []
outputs: []
trusted: true|false
contains_sensitive_data: true|false
writes_durable_state: true|false
network_exposed: true|false
existing_controls: []
missing_controls: []

2. Mark trust boundaries

At minimum mark:

  • external source -> parser;
  • parser output -> raw store;
  • raw store -> index;
  • index -> model context;
  • model output -> proposal/write/export;
  • MCP/API -> tools and downstream systems;
  • wiki/export -> public or cross-team consumers;
  • CI runner -> repository writes or secrets.

3. Classify threats

Use STRIDE for system threats:

CategoryLLM-Wiki focus
Spoofingfake source identity, fake MCP server, forged reviewer.
Tamperingpoisoned source, forged citation, modified index/wiki page.
Repudiationmissing audit trail for generated proposal or approval.
Information disclosuresecrets/PII in retrieval, traces, exports.
Denial of servicehuge documents, graph explosion, expensive red-team jobs.
Elevation of privilegeprompt injection triggers admin tool or bypasses review.

Use LINDDUN-style checks for privacy:

  • linkability;
  • identifiability;
  • detectability of sensitive source existence;
  • disclosure;
  • unawareness of capture/indexing;
  • non-compliance with retention/export policy.

4. Prioritize LLM-Wiki-specific risks

Always assess:

ThreatDefault severity
Indirect prompt injection causing data exfiltration or unsafe tool useCritical
Corpus poisoning or durable wiki corruptionHigh
Parser exploitation during ingestionCritical when untrusted files are parsed
Secret/PII leakage through wiki, index, trace or exportHigh/Critical
Unauthenticated or overbroad MCP/APIHigh/Critical
Agent direct writes to durable knowledgeHigh
Cross-tenant or sensitivity-filter failureCritical
Supply-chain compromise in parser, scanner, MCP server or GitHub ActionHigh
Public export or trace oversharingMedium/High

5. Define control baseline

Minimum viable baseline:

  • parser sandboxing;
  • secret and PII scans;
  • reviewed-only production retrieval;
  • read-only MCP/API by default;
  • proposal-only agent writes;
  • CODEOWNERS and branch protection;
  • required CI checks;
  • export allowlist and redaction report;
  • audit logs for sensitive reads, proposals and admin tools.

Recommended production baseline:

  • signed/attributable commits;
  • append-only audit logs;
  • prompt/RAG/MCP red-team suite;
  • canary secrets and synthetic PII in isolated fixtures;
  • incident response playbook;
  • regular reindex/restore from known-good snapshots;
  • explicit exception register.

6. Build a security test plan

Include tests for:

  • hidden webpage prompt injection;
  • malicious PDF/email/parser fixture;
  • poisoned draft page excluded from production retrieval;
  • public-source attempt to trigger private MCP data read;
  • direct write/delete tool rejection;
  • admin tools disabled by default;
  • cross-tenant retrieval denial;
  • export blocked by sensitive page;
  • public trace/log oversharing;
  • GitHub workflow/action pinning and minimal permissions.

7. Recommend repo artifacts

Depending on the user's repo, propose or add:

  • references/docs/19-security-threat-model.md;
  • references/templates/security-scorecard.yaml;
  • references/templates/mcp-security-profile.yaml;
  • references/templates/promptfoo-llm-wiki-redteam.yaml;
  • references/templates/llm-wiki-security.github-actions.yml;
  • references/policies/redaction-retention-policy.md;
  • references/policies/review-incident-response.md;
  • .github/CODEOWNERS updates;
  • CI workflow or pre-commit hooks.

Output

## Threat model summary

## Scope and assumptions

## Component inventory

## Data-flow diagram

## Trust boundaries

## Threat matrix

## Priority risks

## Control baseline

## CI and red-team plan

## Incident response

## Security scorecard

## Recommended repo changes

Safety gates

  • Do not print secrets, PII or sensitive source contents verbatim.
  • Do not recommend unauthenticated remote MCP/API.
  • Do not rely on prompt wording as the only mitigation for prompt injection.
  • Do not let convenience override review-gated durable writes.
  • Do not recommend cloud parsing, cloud embeddings, tracing or eval on sensitive data without explicit policy approval.
  • Do not mark a system production-ready if production retrieval includes draft/rejected/quarantined content.
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