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owasp-stack-specific

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OWASP Top 10 mapped to our exact stack — Next.js + Supabase + TypeScript + Tailwind. Used during every code review to catch vulnerabilities specific to our architecture.

OWASP Top 10 — Our Stack

For each vulnerability: what it is, how it manifests in OUR stack, what to check in code review, and the exact fix.

A01: Broken Access Control

In our stack:

  • Missing RLS policies on Supabase tables (RLS is off by default on SQL-created tables)
  • API routes (Next.js Route Handlers) without auth middleware
  • IDOR via predictable IDs in Next.js routes — params.id used without ownership check
  • Missing .eq('user_id', session.user.id) on Supabase queries
  • Service role key (SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY) used in client-accessible code or Route Handlers that should use user-scoped client
  • select('*') leaking columns the user shouldn't see

WebSocket-specific A01 issues:

  • WebSocket connections bypass traditional HTTP auth middleware — Next.js middleware does NOT intercept WebSocket upgrades
  • No automatic CORS enforcement on WebSocket upgrade — must manually validate Origin header
  • Connection-level auth vs message-level auth — BOTH needed. Auth on connect doesn't mean every message is authorized.
  • Horizontal privilege escalation: accessing another user's agent session via crafted WebSocket messages (e.g., changing session ID in message payload)
  • CSWSH (Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking): attacker's site opens WebSocket to your server, browser sends cookies automatically → authenticated access without user consent

Review checklist:

  • Every table in public schema has RLS enabled?
  • Every API route checks session via supabase.auth.getSession() or auth.getClaims()?
  • Every query that returns user-specific data filters by auth.uid()?
  • Service role key ONLY in server-side code (never NEXT_PUBLIC_)?
  • No direct ID manipulation possible without ownership verification?
  • RLS policies use (select auth.uid()) pattern for performance?
  • WebSocket connections validate Origin header against allowlist?
  • WebSocket auth happens before any messages are processed?
  • Each WebSocket message checks authorization for the requested action?

Fix patterns:

-- RLS policy for user-owned data
create policy "Users can only access own data"
on my_table for all
to authenticated
using ((select auth.uid()) = user_id)
with check ((select auth.uid()) = user_id);
// Next.js: user-scoped Supabase client
import { createServerClient } from '@supabase/ssr'
// NOT: createClient(url, SERVICE_ROLE_KEY)

A02: Cryptographic Failures

In our stack:

  • NEXT_PUBLIC_ env vars exposing secrets (service role key, API keys)
  • Supabase service role key in client bundle
  • Sensitive data stored unencrypted in Supabase (PII, financial data)
  • Missing HTTPS (Vercel handles this, but custom domains need verification)
  • JWT secrets too short or predictable
  • Passwords stored in plaintext (Supabase Auth handles hashing, but custom auth might not)

Review checklist:

  • No SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY in any NEXT_PUBLIC_ variable?
  • No API keys or secrets in client-side code?
  • Sensitive columns (SSN, financial data) encrypted at rest?
  • Custom domains have SSL configured?
  • No secrets in git history (check .env not committed)?

A03: Injection

In our stack:

  • Supabase .rpc() with string concatenation in SQL functions
  • dangerouslySetInnerHTML in React rendering user-generated content
  • XSS via unsanitized user content rendered in JSX (React auto-escapes {} but NOT dangerouslySetInnerHTML)
  • SQL injection through raw queries in Supabase Edge Functions
  • Template literal injection in Supabase .or() or .filter() with user input

Review checklist:

  • No string concatenation in SQL queries or RPC calls?
  • No dangerouslySetInnerHTML with user content (or sanitized with DOMPurify)?
  • Zod validation on ALL inputs at API boundaries?
  • Parameterized queries only in Edge Functions?
  • No user input directly in .or(), .filter(), or .textSearch() without sanitization?

Fix pattern:

// BAD: string concatenation
const { data } = await supabase.rpc('search', { query: userInput })
// In SQL: EXECUTE 'SELECT * FROM items WHERE name = ' || query  ← INJECTION

// GOOD: parameterized
// In SQL: SELECT * FROM items WHERE name = $1 (using function params)

A04: Insecure Design

In our stack:

  • No rate limiting on Next.js API routes (Vercel has basic limits, but no per-endpoint control)
  • No account lockout after failed Supabase Auth attempts
  • Predictable auto-increment IDs instead of UUIDs (Supabase defaults to UUID, but custom tables might not)
  • No defense in depth — relying solely on RLS without application-level checks
  • Missing CSRF protection on Server Actions (Next.js handles some, but custom implementations may not)
  • No idempotency on financial or state-changing operations

Review checklist:

  • All primary keys are UUID, not sequential integers?
  • Rate limiting implemented on sensitive endpoints?
  • Financial operations have idempotency keys?
  • Defense in depth — both RLS AND application-level auth checks?

A05: Security Misconfiguration

In our stack:

  • RLS disabled on tables (Supabase default for SQL-created tables)
  • CORS set to * in Next.js config or Supabase
  • Detailed error messages/stack traces in production API responses
  • Debug logging enabled in production
  • Missing security headers (CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS) — Next.js next.config.ts headers
  • Supabase Dashboard access not restricted (weak passwords, no 2FA)
  • Default Supabase email templates exposing internal URLs

WebSocket-specific A05 issues:

  • Default ws:// instead of wss:// in development leaking into production
  • No message size limits (maxPayload) → memory exhaustion DoS
  • No connection rate limiting → connection flooding DoS
  • Exposed WebSocket debug endpoints in production
  • Missing Origin header validation → CSWSH vulnerability
  • Verbose error messages over WebSocket revealing internal state (stack traces, file paths, DB errors)
  • WebSocket compression enabled by default (perMessageDeflate) → potential CRIME/BREACH-style attacks

Review checklist:

  • All public schema tables have RLS enabled?
  • CORS configured for specific origins only?
  • API errors return generic messages, not stack traces?
  • next.config.ts includes security headers?
  • No console.log of sensitive data in production?
  • All WebSocket connections use wss:// in production?
  • WebSocket maxPayload set (≤64KB default)?
  • Connection rate limiting configured per IP/user?
  • WebSocket error messages sanitized (no internal details)?
  • perMessageDeflate disabled unless specifically needed?

Fix pattern:

// next.config.ts security headers
const securityHeaders = [
  { key: 'X-Frame-Options', value: 'DENY' },
  { key: 'X-Content-Type-Options', value: 'nosniff' },
  { key: 'Referrer-Policy', value: 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin' },
  { key: 'Strict-Transport-Security', value: 'max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains' },
]

A06: Vulnerable and Outdated Components

In our stack:

  • Outdated npm packages with known CVEs
  • Unaudited dependencies in package.json
  • Missing npm audit in CI pipeline (GitHub Actions)
  • No lock file (package-lock.json) committed
  • Using deprecated Supabase auth helpers instead of @supabase/ssr

Review checklist:

  • npm audit shows no high/critical vulnerabilities?
  • Lock file committed and up to date?
  • Using @supabase/ssr (not deprecated @supabase/auth-helpers-nextjs)?
  • No packages with known CVEs?
  • Dependabot or similar configured?

A07: Identification and Authentication Failures

In our stack:

  • Supabase getSession() used in server code (it doesn't validate JWT — use getClaims())
  • Missing session refresh in Next.js middleware
  • No MFA enforcement for sensitive operations
  • Weak password requirements (Supabase default: 6 chars)
  • Session tokens not properly invalidated on logout
  • Using getSession() instead of getClaims() in Proxy/middleware (JWT not validated)

Review checklist:

  • Server-side code uses getClaims() not getSession()?
  • Next.js Proxy refreshes auth tokens?
  • Password policy enforced (minimum 8 chars with MFA, 15 without)?
  • Logout properly clears session?
  • Session cookies have HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite flags?

Fix pattern:

// BAD: getSession doesn't validate JWT on server
const { data: { session } } = await supabase.auth.getSession()

// GOOD: getClaims validates JWT signature
const { data: { claims }, error } = await supabase.auth.getClaims()

A08: Software and Data Integrity Failures

In our stack:

  • CI/CD pipeline (GitHub Actions) without integrity checks
  • npm packages from untrusted sources
  • Missing Subresource Integrity (SRI) for CDN scripts
  • Supabase Edge Functions deployed without review gate
  • Auto-merge without code review (Forge should be in the loop!)

Review checklist:

  • All dependencies from trusted registries?
  • CI pipeline includes security checks?
  • No auto-merge without review?
  • Edge Functions reviewed before deploy?

A09: Security Logging and Monitoring Failures

In our stack:

  • No structured logging in Next.js API routes
  • No audit trail for sensitive operations (Supabase has auth.audit_log_entries but app-level logging often missing)
  • No alerting on failed auth attempts
  • Missing request logging in production
  • No monitoring of Supabase RLS policy violations

Review checklist:

  • Sensitive operations logged (auth, financial, admin actions)?
  • Structured logging format (JSON) for log aggregation?
  • Failed auth attempts tracked?
  • No sensitive data in logs (passwords, tokens, PII)?

A10: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

In our stack:

  • Next.js API routes fetching user-supplied URLs
  • Supabase Edge Functions making external requests based on user input
  • Image URL processing (Next.js Image component with remote patterns)
  • Webhook URLs provided by users

Review checklist:

  • No user-supplied URLs used directly in server-side fetch()?
  • next.config.ts remotePatterns restricted to known domains?
  • Webhook URLs validated against allowlist?
  • No internal network access possible via user-supplied URLs?

Fix pattern:

// next.config.ts - restrict image sources
images: {
  remotePatterns: [
    { protocol: 'https', hostname: 'specific-cdn.com' }, // explicit allowlist
    // NOT: { hostname: '**' }  ← allows ANY host
  ]
}

Sources

  • OWASP Top 10 (2025): https://owasp.org/Top10/
  • OWASP Node.js Security Cheat Sheet
  • OWASP REST Security Cheat Sheet
  • OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet
  • OWASP Authorization Cheat Sheet
  • OWASP Input Validation Cheat Sheet
  • OWASP CSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet
  • OWASP SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
  • OWASP JWT Cheat Sheet
  • Supabase RLS Documentation
  • Supabase Server-Side Auth (Next.js)
  • Next.js Authentication Guide
  • Snyk React Security Best Practices

Changelog

  • 2026-03-20: Initial skill — all 10 categories mapped to our stack with review checklists
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