meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack / skills/hunting-ransomware-precursor-behavior
hunting-ransomware-precursor-behavior
FlaggedHunts for ransomware precursor behavior that precedes encryption — shadow-copy and backup deletion, recovery disabling, security-tool tampering, and mass file modification — so the attack can be stopped before payload detonation. Activates for requests to hunt ransomware precursors, detect shadow-copy deletion, or find pre-encryption recovery sabotage.
Hunting Ransomware Precursor Behavior
When to Use
- You have endpoint process/command telemetry and want to catch the steps ransomware takes before encrypting — deleting shadow copies, disabling recovery, killing security tools, and stopping backup/database services.
- You want early warning to intervene before payload detonation.
Do not use this as a substitute for blocking the encryption itself — it is an early-warning hunt for the preparation phase, not a recovery procedure.
Prerequisites
- Process-creation telemetry (with command line) and optionally service/file telemetry.
Workflow
Step 1: Hunt recovery-inhibition commands
python scripts/analyst.py hunt events.csv
Flags vssadmin delete shadows, wmic shadowcopy delete, wbadmin delete catalog,
bcdedit /set recoveryenabled no / bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures, and wevtutil cl.
Step 2: Detect defense and service tampering
Surface stopping/killing of AV/EDR and backup/DB services (net stop, taskkill,
sc stop) targeting veeam, sql, backup, sophos, defender, etc.
Step 3: Correlate and prioritize
A host showing recovery-inhibition + service-stop in a short window is a high-priority pre-encryption signal — escalate immediately.
Step 4: Operationalize
Write a high-severity detection for shadow-copy deletion and recovery disabling.
Validation
- Recovery-inhibition commands are detected with their specific syntax.
- Security/backup service tampering is identified by target service names.
- Findings map to ATT&CK T1490 / T1489 (and precede T1486).
Pitfalls
- Admins occasionally delete shadow copies legitimately — corroborate with co-occurring tampering.
- LOLBin variants (
wmic, PowerShellGet-WmiObject Win32_ShadowCopy | Remove) evadingvssadmin-only rules. - Fast attacks where precursor and encryption are near-simultaneous — alert must be real-time.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the hunter. - ATT&CK T1490 and T1486 (linked in frontmatter).
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