meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack / skills/analyzing-malicious-onenote-and-html-smuggling
analyzing-malicious-onenote-and-html-smuggling
VerifiedAnalyzes two modern delivery techniques: malicious OneNote (.one) attachments with embedded payloads behind fake buttons, and HTML smuggling pages that reconstruct payloads in the browser from embedded blobs. Activates for requests to analyze a malicious OneNote file, detect HTML smuggling, or extract a smuggled/embedded payload.
Analyzing Malicious OneNote and HTML Smuggling
When to Use
- You have a OneNote (
.one) attachment suspected of hiding an embedded executable/script behind a "click to view" lure. - You have an HTML/SVG page that reconstructs and auto-downloads a payload from an embedded blob (HTML smuggling).
- You need to extract the hidden payload without triggering the lure.
Do not use OneNote or a browser to open these files for analysis — that is exactly the delivery mechanism. Carve the embedded data statically.
Prerequisites
- A static carver (Python) for embedded file signatures; the sample handled inertly.
Safety & Handling
- Never open the
.onein OneNote or the HTML in a browser. - Defang URLs and store carved payloads password-protected.
Workflow
Step 1: For OneNote — carve embedded files
OneNote stores attached files in the document. Scan for embedded file signatures (MZ, script
headers, archives) and the FileDataStoreObject GUIDs, and carve them out.
python scripts/analyst.py carve sample.one
Step 2: For HTML smuggling — find the embedded blob
Look for large base64/Blob/Uint8Array constructions, data: URIs, and a JS routine that
builds a Blob and triggers a download (msSaveOrOpenBlob, anchor download, createObjectURL).
Step 3: Reconstruct the payload statically
Decode the embedded base64/byte array (and any XOR/char-code layer) to recover the payload as data — without executing the page.
Step 4: Analyze and extract IOCs
Hash carved payloads, identify their type, defang any URLs, and route executables/scripts to the appropriate analysis workflow.
Validation
- Embedded payloads are carved/reconstructed from the inert file, not by opening it.
- The recovered payload's type is identified and hashed.
- The lure/trigger mechanism (fake button, Blob download) is documented.
Pitfalls
- Opening the OneNote/HTML to "see" the lure and executing the payload.
- Decoding only the first layer when the blob is additionally XOR/char-code encoded.
- Missing multiple embedded objects in a single OneNote page.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the carver/decoder. - ATT&CK T1027.006 and MS-ONESTORE (linked in frontmatter).
Related skills
| Skill | Stars | Updated | Works with | Status | Install |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| slack-gif-creatoranthropics/skillsKnowledge and utilities for creating animated GIFs optimized for Slack. Provides constraints, validation tools, and animation concepts. Use when users request animated GIFs for Slack like "make me a GIF of X doing Y for Slack." | Stars: 197k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| ponytailDietrichGebert/ponytailLazy senior dev mode for any coding task: the smallest change that fully solves it, and a reply a busy human understands in one read. | Stars: 194k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| ponytail-debtDietrichGebert/ponytailHarvest every shortcut: comment into one debt ledger, so deferrals get tracked instead of forgotten. One-shot report. | Stars: 194k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| ponytail-debtDietrichGebert/ponytailList every `shortcut:` comment (and older `ponytail:` ones) as a debt ledger. One-shot report, changes nothing. Use for "ponytail debt", "what did ponytail defer", "list the shortcuts", /ponytail-debt. | Stars: 194k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |