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analyzing-authenticode-signatures

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Analyzes Windows Authenticode signatures on PE files: checking for a signature, reading the signer certificate chain, detecting revoked/expired/stolen certs, and recognizing signature-stripping and catalog-signing abuse. Activates for requests to analyze a code signature, verify Authenticode, or assess signer trust on a PE.

Analyzing Authenticode Signatures

When to Use

  • You need to know whether a PE is signed and whether the signer is trustworthy.
  • You suspect a stolen/abused code-signing certificate or a forged/invalid signature.
  • You are distinguishing legitimately signed software from signed malware.

Do not use "is signed" as "is safe" — adversaries use stolen certs, abuse catalog signing, and append invalid signatures; a valid signature only attests the signer, not benignity.

Prerequisites

  • Access to the PE security directory (Python struct/pefile); on Windows, signtool/PowerShell Get-AuthenticodeSignature for authoritative verification.

Safety & Handling

  • Parse the signature statically; never execute the sample.
  • Keep the sample password-protected at rest and reference it by hash.

Workflow

Step 1: Check for a signature

Read the PE security directory (certificate table). Absent entry = unsigned; present = embedded PKCS#7. Note that valid signing can also be via a catalog file (not embedded).

python scripts/analyst.py check sample.exe

Step 2: Extract signer details

Parse the PKCS#7 to read the signer certificate: subject, issuer, validity dates, and serial. Cross-reference against known-abused/stolen certs.

Step 3: Verify, do not just read

On Windows, verify the signature cryptographically and check revocation (Get-AuthenticodeSignature). A present-but-invalid signature is a strong red flag.

Step 4: Assess trust in context

Weigh signer reputation, certificate age, and whether the signed file's behavior matches the purported publisher. Treat anomalies (recently issued cert, mismatched publisher) as suspicious.

Validation

  • Signature presence is determined from the security directory, and verified (not just read) on Windows.
  • Signer certificate details are extracted and checked against abuse intel.
  • The trust conclusion accounts for revocation/validity, not mere presence.

Pitfalls

  • Equating a present signature with safety; stolen-cert malware is common.
  • Missing catalog-signed files by only checking embedded signatures.
  • Reading the signature without cryptographically verifying it.

References

  • See references/api-reference.md for the signature checker.
  • Authenticode format and the PE/COFF security directory (linked in frontmatter).
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