Liberty91LTD/cti-skills / skills/lookup-sentinel
lookup-sentinel
VerifiedUse to hunt in the organisation's own Microsoft Sentinel workspace: sweep logs for IOC hits (IP, domain, hash, URL, account), hunt ATT&CK techniques, run KQL on live data, or check which tables are ingested. Discovers tables first and only writes KQL for ones that exist. Chained by the /*-investigation skills to answer "were we exposed?". Read-only. Reads $SENTINEL_TENANT_ID, $SENTINEL_CLIENT_ID, $SENTINEL_CLIENT_SECRET and $SENTINEL_WORKSPACE_ID.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 12.8 KB |
SKILL.md
View on GitHub---
name: lookup-sentinel
description: "Use to hunt in the organisation's own Microsoft Sentinel workspace: sweep logs for IOC hits (IP, domain, hash, URL, account), hunt ATT&CK techniques, run KQL on live data, or check which tables are ingested. Discovers tables first and only writes KQL for ones that exist. Chained by the /*-investigation skills to answer \"were we exposed?\". Read-only. Reads $SENTINEL_TENANT_ID, $SENTINEL_CLIENT_ID, $SENTINEL_CLIENT_SECRET and $SENTINEL_WORKSPACE_ID."
metadata:
version: 1.1.0
tags: [lookup, hunting, kql, sentinel, telemetry, mitre-attack]
api: sentinel
default_source_reliability: A
default_information_credibility: 1
---
# lookup-sentinel
Query bridge to the organisation's own Microsoft Sentinel (Azure Log Analytics) workspace. Every other lookup in this pack asks the world about an indicator; this one asks **your own telemetry**: *has this indicator been seen in our environment? Is this ATT&CK technique's behaviour present in our logs?* It is scoping/exposure-checking, not enrichment — chain it **after** external lookups have told you what an indicator is, to establish whether it touched you.
Read-only. The CLI can only run queries and list schema — it cannot modify the workspace, close incidents, or create analytics rules.
## The cardinal rule: discover before you query
**No two Sentinel workspaces have the same tables.** Table availability follows deployed connectors (Defender for Endpoint brings `Device*`, Entra ID brings `SigninLogs`, AMA/CEF brings `CommonSecurityLog`, …). A query referencing an absent table fails outright; worse, a hunt written for tables the environment doesn't ingest silently proves nothing.
So, in every session, before generating any hunt KQL:
1. Run `tables` (schema-known) and/or `ingestion` (actually receiving data) once, and reuse the result for the rest of the session.
2. `probe` the specific candidate tables for the hunt — schema-known tables can be empty.
3. Generate KQL **only against tables the probe confirmed populated**. When a preferred table is missing, walk the fallback ladder (below). When *no* suitable table exists, report the telemetry gap as a finding — do not fabricate a query, and do not quietly substitute a table that can't answer the question.
## When to invoke
- An investigation skill (`/ip-investigation` etc.) produced a malicious/suspicious verdict and you need the exposure answer: was it seen here?
- The user asks to hunt for an ATT&CK technique, actor TTP set, or behaviour ("hunt for T1059 PowerShell abuse", "look for Kerberoasting")
- The user has IOCs (from a report, a feed, `/ioc-enrichment-workflow`) and wants them swept across the environment
- The user asks what telemetry/tables the Sentinel workspace has, or whether a planned detection would even have data
- The user asks to run or adapt a KQL query against live logs
**Do NOT invoke for:**
- Writing portable detection rules for later deployment — that's `/kql-writing` (author) and `/sigma-writing` (vendor-neutral). This skill *runs* queries; compose with `/kql-writing` for authoring conventions.
- External reputation questions ("is this IP bad?") — that's the other `lookup-*` skills.
- Anything write-shaped (closing incidents, adding analytics rules, updating watchlists) — out of scope by design.
## How to invoke
Single Python CLI (stdlib only — no install). Credentials setup: `tools/integrations/sentinel.md`.
```bash
# Connectivity + auth check (run once per session)
python3 tools/clis/sentinel.py check
# Discovery
python3 tools/clis/sentinel.py tables # all schema-known tables
python3 tools/clis/sentinel.py tables --filter Device # filter by substring
python3 tools/clis/sentinel.py ingestion --days 30 # which tables actually received data (with volume)
python3 tools/clis/sentinel.py probe DeviceNetworkEvents,SigninLogs,CommonSecurityLog --days 7
python3 tools/clis/sentinel.py schema DeviceNetworkEvents # column names + types
# Hunting — arbitrary KQL, always bounded by a server-side timespan
python3 tools/clis/sentinel.py query 'DeviceNetworkEvents | where RemoteIP == "203.0.113.42" | summarize hits=count(), first=min(TimeGenerated), last=max(TimeGenerated) by DeviceName' --timespan P30D
python3 tools/clis/sentinel.py query --file data/detection-rules/kql/t1059-encoded-powershell.kql --timespan P7D --max-rows 50
```
All commands accept `--dry-run`. The CLI exits 2 if any of the four env vars is unset (when not in dry-run) — report missing credentials and offer `/cti-setup`; do not fabricate results.
## Workflow
```
intent (IOC sweep | TTP hunt | freeform query | table inventory)
↓
check → tables / ingestion (once per session) → probe candidates
↓
generate KQL per /kql-writing conventions, restricted to confirmed tables
↓
run: summarize-first pass (counts per device/user) → drill into hits only
↓
interpret → hits feed /*-investigation + rigor pipeline; misses reported with window + tables searched; gaps reported as findings
```
Query discipline: start with `summarize`/`count` per entity rather than raw rows; keep timespans as tight as the question allows (P7D default, widen deliberately); `take`/`project` when you do pull rows. Results are capped (500k rows / 64 MB server-side; `--max-rows` client-side, reported as `truncated`) — treat a truncated result as a signal to aggregate, not paginate.
## IOC sweep — table candidates by indicator type
Probe in listed order; use every confirmed table, via `union` where sensible. Use `let`-bound `dynamic` lists for multi-IOC sweeps (see `/kql-writing`).
| IOC type | Preferred (EDR-rich) | Fallbacks | Match columns |
|---|---|---|---|
| IP | `DeviceNetworkEvents` | `CommonSecurityLog`, `SigninLogs` + `AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs`, `AzureActivity`, `W3CIISLog`, `Syslog` | `RemoteIP`/`LocalIP`; `SourceIP`/`DestinationIP`; `IPAddress`; `CallerIpAddress`; `cIP` |
| Domain | `DeviceNetworkEvents` | `DnsEvents`/`ASimDnsActivityLogs`, `CommonSecurityLog`, `EmailUrlInfo` | `RemoteUrl has`; `Name`/`DnsQuery`; `RequestURL`/`DestinationHostName`; `UrlDomain` |
| File hash | `DeviceFileEvents`, `DeviceProcessEvents` | `DeviceImageLoadEvents`, `EmailAttachmentInfo`, `DeviceEvents` | `SHA256`/`SHA1`/`MD5`, `InitiatingProcessSHA256` |
| URL | `DeviceNetworkEvents` | `EmailUrlInfo`, `UrlClickEvents`, `CommonSecurityLog` | `RemoteUrl`; `Url`; `RequestURL` |
| Account/UPN | `SigninLogs` | `IdentityLogonEvents`, `DeviceLogonEvents`, `SecurityEvent` (4624/4625), `OfficeActivity`, `AuditLogs` | `UserPrincipalName`; `AccountUpn`; `AccountName`; `TargetUserName`; `UserId` |
| Sender/email | `EmailEvents` | `EmailPostDeliveryEvents`, `OfficeActivity` | `SenderFromAddress`, `SenderMailFromAddress`; `RecipientEmailAddress` |
Also probe `ThreatIntelligenceIndicator` (or newer `ThreatIntelIndicators`) — if a TI connector feeds the workspace, the IOC may already be matched by built-in analytics; check `SecurityAlert` for prior alerts on the same indicator before declaring a novel finding.
Report every sweep with: tables searched, tables unavailable, window, and per-table hit counts. **A miss means "not observed in collected telemetry over the window" — never "not compromised".** Retention differs per table; note the window explicitly.
## TTP hunt — mapping techniques to tables
For technique details and detection guidance, first resolve the technique via `/mitre-attack` (local dataset — data sources per technique). Then map data sources to this workspace's confirmed tables:
| Behaviour family (example techniques) | Preferred | Fallbacks when EDR absent |
|---|---|---|
| Process execution/command-line (T1059, T1047, T1204) | `DeviceProcessEvents` | `SecurityEvent` EventID 4688 (needs command-line auditing enabled), `Syslog` auditd `execve` |
| Persistence via registry (T1547, T1112) | `DeviceRegistryEvents` | `SecurityEvent` 4657 (needs SACL auditing) — often absent; report the gap |
| Lateral movement (T1021, T1570) | `DeviceLogonEvents` + `DeviceProcessEvents` | `SecurityEvent` 4624 LogonType 3/10, `IdentityLogonEvents` |
| Credential access (T1110, T1558) | `IdentityLogonEvents` | `SigninLogs` (ResultType != 0 bursts), `SecurityEvent` 4625/4768/4769 |
| C2 / exfil network activity (T1071, T1041, T1567) | `DeviceNetworkEvents` | `CommonSecurityLog` (proxy/firewall), `DnsEvents`, `AzureNetworkAnalytics` |
| Cloud/identity abuse (T1078.004, T1098, T1136) | `AuditLogs` + `SigninLogs` | `AzureActivity`, `CloudAppEvents`, `OfficeActivity` |
| Email initial access (T1566) | `EmailEvents` + `EmailUrlInfo` + `EmailAttachmentInfo` | `UrlClickEvents`, `OfficeActivity` |
| Defense evasion / log tampering (T1070, T1562) | `DeviceEvents`, `SecurityEvent` 1102 | *the gap itself is the signal* — sudden per-table ingestion drops in `Usage` |
`/kql-writing` holds the concrete query patterns for the common techniques — reuse them, then **adapt the table references to what this workspace confirmed**. When neither preferred nor fallback tables exist, the deliverable is the sentence "this environment cannot currently observe technique X because tables Y/Z are not ingested" — a telemetry-gap finding worth more than a query that runs on nothing.
## Response format
```yaml
source: sentinel
operation: check | tables | ingestion | probe | schema | query
workspace_id: <GUID>
query_time: <ISO8601>
# for hunts, the skill wraps CLI output as:
hunt:
intent: ioc-sweep | ttp-hunt | freeform
window: <timespan>
tables_searched: [<confirmed tables>]
tables_unavailable: [<candidates that were missing/empty>]
kql: <the query as run>
hits: <row_count, per-table counts, distilled rows>
truncated: <bool>
telemetry_gaps: [<behaviours this workspace cannot currently observe, and why>]
```
## Source reliability (Admiralty default) and evidence grade
Two instruments apply to a hit, and neither is converted into the other.
**Admiralty default: A1 for a hit.** This is the frontmatter default, used when `/source-assessment` rates the lookup result as a single item.
**Evidence grade: "direct, established" for a hit.** A positive hit is a first-party observation: the organisation saw the indicator in its own environment. It enters the claim table as an evidence item with access level `direct` and claim support `established`, `claim_type: observation`, `access: telemetry`, source "user environment", `provenance_basis: first-party` (grading rubric rule R12 in `/quality-of-information-check`). It can be load-bearing and it can raise an assessment's confidence ceiling.
Two limits:
- **A miss is not evidence.** Absence of a hit is bounded by connector coverage, retention and logging depth. It is reported as "not observed in collected telemetry over this window" and never becomes a graded item.
- **Logs are an adversary target** (T1070, T1562). Where tampering is suspected, grade the hit "direct, firm" and set `deception_indicators_present`.
Full reasoning: `tools/integrations/sentinel.md`.
## Operational notes
- **Session-cache the discovery.** `tables`/`ingestion` once per session; `probe` per hunt. Don't re-discover before every query.
- **Rate limit is generous** (200 requests/30s) but basic-tier tables bill per GB scanned — tight timespans are a cost control, not just hygiene.
- **Custom tables (`*_CL`) are first-class.** Organisations route firewall, proxy, or SaaS logs into custom tables; if discovery shows a well-populated `*_CL` table whose name suggests relevant telemetry, `schema` it and consider it in sweeps.
- **Results may contain personal data** (UPNs, IPs, hostnames). Products built on them default to TLP:AMBER — apply `/apply-tlp` before sharing.
- **Prior art check.** Before hunting, a quick `SecurityAlert | where ...` for the same indicator/technique avoids re-discovering what an analytics rule already alerted on.
## Related skills
- `/kql-writing` — query authoring conventions and per-technique patterns; this skill runs what that skill writes
- `/mitre-attack` — resolve technique → data sources before the table mapping
- `/ip-investigation`, `/domain-investigation`, `/hash-investigation`, `/url-investigation` — establish what an indicator *is*; this skill establishes whether it *touched you*; hits feed back into them for pivoting
- `/ioc-enrichment-workflow` — bulk IOC lists; sweep the high-confidence subset here
- `/sigma-writing` — a hunt that proves out here can graduate into a portable rule
- `/score-source`, `/apply-tlp`, `/confidence-language` — rigor pipeline on hunt products
## See also
- Integration setup (app registration walkthrough, roles, sovereign clouds): `tools/integrations/sentinel.md`
- Python CLI source: `tools/clis/sentinel.py`
- Defender XDR advanced-hunting schema tables: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-xdr/advanced-hunting-schema-tables
- Sentinel data connectors reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/data-connectors-reference
- KQL language reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/kusto/query/
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