Liberty91LTD/cti-skills / skills/lookup-sentinel
lookup-sentinel
VerifiedUse to hunt in the organisation's own Microsoft Sentinel workspace: sweep logs for IOC hits (IP, domain, hash, URL, account), hunt ATT&CK techniques, run KQL on live data, or check which tables are ingested. Discovers tables first and only writes KQL for ones that exist. Chained by the /*-investigation skills to answer "were we exposed?". Read-only. Reads $SENTINEL_TENANT_ID, $SENTINEL_CLIENT_ID, $SENTINEL_CLIENT_SECRET and $SENTINEL_WORKSPACE_ID.
lookup-sentinel
Query bridge to the organisation's own Microsoft Sentinel (Azure Log Analytics) workspace. Every other lookup in this pack asks the world about an indicator; this one asks your own telemetry: has this indicator been seen in our environment? Is this ATT&CK technique's behaviour present in our logs? It is scoping/exposure-checking, not enrichment — chain it after external lookups have told you what an indicator is, to establish whether it touched you.
Read-only. The CLI can only run queries and list schema — it cannot modify the workspace, close incidents, or create analytics rules.
The cardinal rule: discover before you query
No two Sentinel workspaces have the same tables. Table availability follows deployed connectors (Defender for Endpoint brings Device*, Entra ID brings SigninLogs, AMA/CEF brings CommonSecurityLog, …). A query referencing an absent table fails outright; worse, a hunt written for tables the environment doesn't ingest silently proves nothing.
So, in every session, before generating any hunt KQL:
- Run
tables(schema-known) and/oringestion(actually receiving data) once, and reuse the result for the rest of the session. probethe specific candidate tables for the hunt — schema-known tables can be empty.- Generate KQL only against tables the probe confirmed populated. When a preferred table is missing, walk the fallback ladder (below). When no suitable table exists, report the telemetry gap as a finding — do not fabricate a query, and do not quietly substitute a table that can't answer the question.
When to invoke
- An investigation skill (
/ip-investigationetc.) produced a malicious/suspicious verdict and you need the exposure answer: was it seen here? - The user asks to hunt for an ATT&CK technique, actor TTP set, or behaviour ("hunt for T1059 PowerShell abuse", "look for Kerberoasting")
- The user has IOCs (from a report, a feed,
/ioc-enrichment-workflow) and wants them swept across the environment - The user asks what telemetry/tables the Sentinel workspace has, or whether a planned detection would even have data
- The user asks to run or adapt a KQL query against live logs
Do NOT invoke for:
- Writing portable detection rules for later deployment — that's
/kql-writing(author) and/sigma-writing(vendor-neutral). This skill runs queries; compose with/kql-writingfor authoring conventions. - External reputation questions ("is this IP bad?") — that's the other
lookup-*skills. - Anything write-shaped (closing incidents, adding analytics rules, updating watchlists) — out of scope by design.
How to invoke
Single Python CLI (stdlib only — no install). Credentials setup: tools/integrations/sentinel.md.
# Connectivity + auth check (run once per session)
python3 tools/clis/sentinel.py check
# Discovery
python3 tools/clis/sentinel.py tables # all schema-known tables
python3 tools/clis/sentinel.py tables --filter Device # filter by substring
python3 tools/clis/sentinel.py ingestion --days 30 # which tables actually received data (with volume)
python3 tools/clis/sentinel.py probe DeviceNetworkEvents,SigninLogs,CommonSecurityLog --days 7
python3 tools/clis/sentinel.py schema DeviceNetworkEvents # column names + types
# Hunting — arbitrary KQL, always bounded by a server-side timespan
python3 tools/clis/sentinel.py query 'DeviceNetworkEvents | where RemoteIP == "203.0.113.42" | summarize hits=count(), first=min(TimeGenerated), last=max(TimeGenerated) by DeviceName' --timespan P30D
python3 tools/clis/sentinel.py query --file data/detection-rules/kql/t1059-encoded-powershell.kql --timespan P7D --max-rows 50
All commands accept --dry-run. The CLI exits 2 if any of the four env vars is unset (when not in dry-run) — report missing credentials and offer /cti-setup; do not fabricate results.
Workflow
intent (IOC sweep | TTP hunt | freeform query | table inventory)
↓
check → tables / ingestion (once per session) → probe candidates
↓
generate KQL per /kql-writing conventions, restricted to confirmed tables
↓
run: summarize-first pass (counts per device/user) → drill into hits only
↓
interpret → hits feed /*-investigation + rigor pipeline; misses reported with window + tables searched; gaps reported as findings
Query discipline: start with summarize/count per entity rather than raw rows; keep timespans as tight as the question allows (P7D default, widen deliberately); take/project when you do pull rows. Results are capped (500k rows / 64 MB server-side; --max-rows client-side, reported as truncated) — treat a truncated result as a signal to aggregate, not paginate.
IOC sweep — table candidates by indicator type
Probe in listed order; use every confirmed table, via union where sensible. Use let-bound dynamic lists for multi-IOC sweeps (see /kql-writing).
| IOC type | Preferred (EDR-rich) | Fallbacks | Match columns |
|---|---|---|---|
| IP | DeviceNetworkEvents | CommonSecurityLog, SigninLogs + AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs, AzureActivity, W3CIISLog, Syslog | RemoteIP/LocalIP; SourceIP/DestinationIP; IPAddress; CallerIpAddress; cIP |
| Domain | DeviceNetworkEvents | DnsEvents/ASimDnsActivityLogs, CommonSecurityLog, EmailUrlInfo | RemoteUrl has; Name/DnsQuery; RequestURL/DestinationHostName; UrlDomain |
| File hash | DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents | DeviceImageLoadEvents, EmailAttachmentInfo, DeviceEvents | SHA256/SHA1/MD5, InitiatingProcessSHA256 |
| URL | DeviceNetworkEvents | EmailUrlInfo, UrlClickEvents, CommonSecurityLog | RemoteUrl; Url; RequestURL |
| Account/UPN | SigninLogs | IdentityLogonEvents, DeviceLogonEvents, SecurityEvent (4624/4625), OfficeActivity, AuditLogs | UserPrincipalName; AccountUpn; AccountName; TargetUserName; UserId |
| Sender/email | EmailEvents | EmailPostDeliveryEvents, OfficeActivity | SenderFromAddress, SenderMailFromAddress; RecipientEmailAddress |
Also probe ThreatIntelligenceIndicator (or newer ThreatIntelIndicators) — if a TI connector feeds the workspace, the IOC may already be matched by built-in analytics; check SecurityAlert for prior alerts on the same indicator before declaring a novel finding.
Report every sweep with: tables searched, tables unavailable, window, and per-table hit counts. A miss means "not observed in collected telemetry over the window" — never "not compromised". Retention differs per table; note the window explicitly.
TTP hunt — mapping techniques to tables
For technique details and detection guidance, first resolve the technique via /mitre-attack (local dataset — data sources per technique). Then map data sources to this workspace's confirmed tables:
| Behaviour family (example techniques) | Preferred | Fallbacks when EDR absent |
|---|---|---|
| Process execution/command-line (T1059, T1047, T1204) | DeviceProcessEvents | SecurityEvent EventID 4688 (needs command-line auditing enabled), Syslog auditd execve |
| Persistence via registry (T1547, T1112) | DeviceRegistryEvents | SecurityEvent 4657 (needs SACL auditing) — often absent; report the gap |
| Lateral movement (T1021, T1570) | DeviceLogonEvents + DeviceProcessEvents | SecurityEvent 4624 LogonType 3/10, IdentityLogonEvents |
| Credential access (T1110, T1558) | IdentityLogonEvents | SigninLogs (ResultType != 0 bursts), SecurityEvent 4625/4768/4769 |
| C2 / exfil network activity (T1071, T1041, T1567) | DeviceNetworkEvents | CommonSecurityLog (proxy/firewall), DnsEvents, AzureNetworkAnalytics |
| Cloud/identity abuse (T1078.004, T1098, T1136) | AuditLogs + SigninLogs | AzureActivity, CloudAppEvents, OfficeActivity |
| Email initial access (T1566) | EmailEvents + EmailUrlInfo + EmailAttachmentInfo | UrlClickEvents, OfficeActivity |
| Defense evasion / log tampering (T1070, T1562) | DeviceEvents, SecurityEvent 1102 | the gap itself is the signal — sudden per-table ingestion drops in Usage |
/kql-writing holds the concrete query patterns for the common techniques — reuse them, then adapt the table references to what this workspace confirmed. When neither preferred nor fallback tables exist, the deliverable is the sentence "this environment cannot currently observe technique X because tables Y/Z are not ingested" — a telemetry-gap finding worth more than a query that runs on nothing.
Response format
source: sentinel
operation: check | tables | ingestion | probe | schema | query
workspace_id: <GUID>
query_time: <ISO8601>
# for hunts, the skill wraps CLI output as:
hunt:
intent: ioc-sweep | ttp-hunt | freeform
window: <timespan>
tables_searched: [<confirmed tables>]
tables_unavailable: [<candidates that were missing/empty>]
kql: <the query as run>
hits: <row_count, per-table counts, distilled rows>
truncated: <bool>
telemetry_gaps: [<behaviours this workspace cannot currently observe, and why>]
Source reliability (Admiralty default) and evidence grade
Two instruments apply to a hit, and neither is converted into the other.
Admiralty default: A1 for a hit. This is the frontmatter default, used when /source-assessment rates the lookup result as a single item.
Evidence grade: "direct, established" for a hit. A positive hit is a first-party observation: the organisation saw the indicator in its own environment. It enters the claim table as an evidence item with access level direct and claim support established, claim_type: observation, access: telemetry, source "user environment", provenance_basis: first-party (grading rubric rule R12 in /quality-of-information-check). It can be load-bearing and it can raise an assessment's confidence ceiling.
Two limits:
- A miss is not evidence. Absence of a hit is bounded by connector coverage, retention and logging depth. It is reported as "not observed in collected telemetry over this window" and never becomes a graded item.
- Logs are an adversary target (T1070, T1562). Where tampering is suspected, grade the hit "direct, firm" and set
deception_indicators_present.
Full reasoning: tools/integrations/sentinel.md.
Operational notes
- Session-cache the discovery.
tables/ingestiononce per session;probeper hunt. Don't re-discover before every query. - Rate limit is generous (200 requests/30s) but basic-tier tables bill per GB scanned — tight timespans are a cost control, not just hygiene.
- Custom tables (
*_CL) are first-class. Organisations route firewall, proxy, or SaaS logs into custom tables; if discovery shows a well-populated*_CLtable whose name suggests relevant telemetry,schemait and consider it in sweeps. - Results may contain personal data (UPNs, IPs, hostnames). Products built on them default to TLP:AMBER — apply
/apply-tlpbefore sharing. - Prior art check. Before hunting, a quick
SecurityAlert | where ...for the same indicator/technique avoids re-discovering what an analytics rule already alerted on.
Related skills
/kql-writing— query authoring conventions and per-technique patterns; this skill runs what that skill writes/mitre-attack— resolve technique → data sources before the table mapping/ip-investigation,/domain-investigation,/hash-investigation,/url-investigation— establish what an indicator is; this skill establishes whether it touched you; hits feed back into them for pivoting/ioc-enrichment-workflow— bulk IOC lists; sweep the high-confidence subset here/sigma-writing— a hunt that proves out here can graduate into a portable rule/score-source,/apply-tlp,/confidence-language— rigor pipeline on hunt products
See also
- Integration setup (app registration walkthrough, roles, sovereign clouds):
tools/integrations/sentinel.md - Python CLI source:
tools/clis/sentinel.py - Defender XDR advanced-hunting schema tables: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-xdr/advanced-hunting-schema-tables
- Sentinel data connectors reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/data-connectors-reference
- KQL language reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/kusto/query/
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