elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter / skills/hunt-llm-ai
hunt-llm-ai
FlaggedHunt LLM/AI feature bugs — prompt injection, indirect injection, exfiltration via tool-use/markdown, ASCII smuggling, agentic AI security (OWASP Agentic Apps 2026, ASI01-ASI10). Patterns: direct injection ('ignore previous instructions'), indirect injection via documents/web pages/email the model reads, ASCII smuggling (Unicode Tags block U+E0000-U+E007F, invisible to humans, decoded by the model), tool-use exfiltration (model has fetch/browse tool, attacker injects OOB URL, model exfils chat history/secrets), markdown-image zero-click exfil, system-prompt extraction, IDOR-via-AI (cross-tenant data). Targets: chatbots, RAG, summarizers, agentic copilots, MCP tools. Detection: any LLM-backed endpoint, doc upload triggering AI processing, autonomous agent with tools. Validate: OOB/Collaborator callback for exfil, verbatim-reproducible system-prompt leak (run twice), verifiable cross-tenant leak or RCE. Confabulation is NOT a finding. Use when hunting AI features, chatbots, RAG, agentic systems, MCP.
Security report
FlaggedStatic analysis of one exact version. It reduces risk and shows evidence; it does not certify that a skill is safe.
- Commit
2f9a226d38d35d28d06f1ed63753799d498a2b3d- Content hash
aa76017c1f071a3e11497413c1a2d9e24935f9795da5c1db86289c56162b71f0- Scanned
- 2026-11-17
- Scanner version
- skillxone-scan-1.0.0
- Policy version
- 0.1-draft
- Decision
- 2 open critical or high findings.
- Verification expires
- Not applicable
Findings (2 high, 1 low)
The cloud instance metadata service is contacted. On a cloud machine it hands out credentials.
fetch_url("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/")Suggested fix: Remove access to the metadata service.
The cloud instance metadata service is contacted. On a cloud machine it hands out credentials.
fetch_url("http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token") # needs Metadata-Flavor:GoogleSuggested fix: Remove access to the metadata service.
The text tells the agent to ignore or override its existing instructions, a common prompt-injection pattern. Severity lowered from high because the surrounding text warns against it.
description: "Hunt LLM/AI feature bugs — prompt injection, indirect injection, exfiltration via tool-use/markdown, ASCII smuggling, agentic AI security (OWASP Agentic Apps 2026, ASI01-ASI10). Patterns: direct injection ('ignore previous in…Suggested fix: Remove the instruction. A skill should add guidance for its task, not cancel the instructions the agent already follows.
Checks run
- prompt-injection
- dangerous-commands
- credentials
- network
- file-access
- integrity
Checks skipped
- dependencies: No dependency manifest in the skill directory.
- gitleaks: gitleaks is not installed on this host.
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