arbiterForge/codeArbiter / core/surface/skills/security-architecture
security-architecture
UnverifiedThreat-model a sensitive design with STRIDE on request. Read-only analysis of threats, controls, and implementation constraints.
security-architecture
For every security policy reference below, follow {{PLUGIN_ROOT}}/includes/knowledge.md
("Read security policy before a security decision"): select the repository's
context format, read the complete policy from exact CTX-SECURITY-CONTROLS
records in HTML mode or the full Markdown controls in Markdown mode, and read
operative scope blocks when applicable. Required policy that is missing or
unreadable blocks a security decision; scope blocks alone are not full policy.
Optional, lightweight threat-modeling pass over a design before it is built. Selected when the user deliberately requests threat modeling of a sensitive design, with or without {{CMD:threat-model}}. Never forced on an ordinary change. Reviews architectural intent before code exists; for code already written, dispatch security-reviewer instead.
Entry boundaries
Read-only: modify no project file, decision record, control or implementation. Optional reviewers inherit this read-only analysis scope. An explanation-only security question does not start the pass; mentioning authentication in an ordinary change does not opt in. The user need not repeat a slash command to request it. Missing required security-controls input is a prerequisite failure, separate from the severity of a finding. A lesser gap is a constraint, not blanket denied clearance.
Pre-flight
- Read the complete format-selected
security-controlspolicy — approved primitives, declared security boundaries and their permitted crossings, what is and is not allowed. If the required policy cannot be read, STOP and surface the gap; do not guess the boundary model. - Establish the scope from the user's request: the feature, component, or design under review.
- Read relevant security ADRs under
{{PROJECT_DIR}}/.codearbiter/decisions/; do not invent decisions or interpret their absence as approval.
Phase 1 — Attack surface · gate: BLOCK
Map what the change exposes. Name, for the scope:
- New or changed entry points — routes, endpoints, message consumers, CLI surfaces.
- New egress — outbound calls, external dependencies, new data sinks.
- Security boundaries crossed, as declared in
security-controls.md(trust transitions, privilege changes, data leaving a controlled zone). - The data handled and its sensitivity.
A boundary crossing not described in security-controls.md is a finding, not a silent pass. A finding outside this scope gets one line with an inline [NEEDS-TRIAGE] marker.
Gate: the attack surface and every boundary crossing in scope are enumerated.
Phase 2 — STRIDE pass · gate: STOP
Walk the surface from Phase 1 through STRIDE. For each relevant category, name the concrete threat and the control expected to mitigate it:
- Spoofing — identity/authentication of the actor at the boundary.
- Tampering — integrity of data in transit and at rest.
- Repudiation — whether actions are attributable.
- Information disclosure — exposure of sensitive data, including in logs and errors.
- Denial of service — exhaustion or availability impact.
- Elevation of privilege — privilege gained across the boundary.
Mark each threat's mitigation PRESENT, PLANNED, or GAP. Skip a category only with a one-line reason it does not apply.
If the threat depends on auth, crypto, key handling, or secrets, MAY dispatch {{PLUGIN_ROOT}}/agents/auth-crypto-reviewer.md. For broader boundary or surface concerns, MAY dispatch {{PLUGIN_ROOT}}/agents/security-reviewer.md. Both govern by security-controls.md.
Gate: STOP only on a genuinely critical unmitigated threat — a GAP that is exploitable now with high impact. Lesser gaps are surfaced as constraints, not stops.
Phase 3 — Report · gate: BLOCK
Produce a terse report:
- Surface — entry points, egress, boundaries crossed.
- Threats — the STRIDE findings; lead with
GAPs, thenPLANNED, summarizePRESENTin one line. - Verdict —
PROCEED(no open gap),PROCEED-WITH-CONSTRAINTS(gaps listed with owner), orSTOP(a critical unmitigated threat is present; name it).
A decision-worthy gap is escalated to the user or to {{PROJECT_DIR}}/.codearbiter/decisions/ via /adr — never authored as an ADR by this skill.
Gate: report delivered with a stated verdict; every STOP-level threat from Phase 2 is reflected in it.
Hard rules
- MUST NOT force this pass on an ordinary change. It is invoked deliberately for sensitive features only.
- MUST NOT guess the boundary model — read
security-controls.mdor STOP. - MUST NOT silently pass an undeclared boundary crossing — surface it.
- MUST NOT STOP on anything short of a critical, exploitable, unmitigated threat; lesser gaps are constraints.
- MUST NOT author an ADR — escalate decision-worthy gaps to the user or
/adr.
Related skills
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