arbiterForge/codeArbiter / plugins/ca-codex/skills/ca-override
ca-override
UnverifiedSanctioned, logged bypass of a gate or hard rule — one audit line, then proceed.
$ca-override — logged bypass
The sanctioned escape hatch. Bypass is permitted only with an audit log entry. Overrides are always logged, always visible, never silent. Single identity, single confirm.
Flow
-
Validate
$ARGUMENTS— the reason names the gate being bypassed and a justification. Reject a vague reason ("just skip it") and ask for a specific one. -
Detect the operator identity from
git config user.emailonly. If it is unset, ask the user once to state their identity for the log. (No platform ladder, no second confirmation.) -
For an ordinary override, use the private locked audit helper from the repository root.
--gatetakes a compact gate identifier, not a description: it starts with an ASCII letter or digit and uses only ASCII letters and digits,.,_,:and-, with no spaces, up to 128 characters, for examplelint:max-line-lengthorcoverage-threshold. The helper refuses anything else. Put the human explanation in--reason. A security gate such as H-09b/H-10b never takes this path; see the security ceiling below.python3 "${PLUGIN_ROOT}/hooks/append-override.py" --gate "<gate-id>" --reason "<specific reason>"It appends one line to
<project-root>/.codearbiter/overrides.log:[ISO-8601 timestamp] | BY: <email> | GATE: <gate-id> | REASON: <reason>The log is append-only — never edited or deleted, committed as a permanent audit artifact. The helper fails closed if another official writer or conflict resolver owns the audit-path lock; the overridden action must not proceed unless the row lands. A guard-permitted raw append remains a cooperative operator escape hatch, but it must not run concurrently with conflict resolution.
-
A genuine three-stage Git conflict on an H-05 append-only path uses the dedicated helper instead of the ordinary step 3 append. Run it once from the conflicted repository, with the specific repo-relative path and the same reason:
python3 "${PLUGIN_ROOT}/hooks/resolve-append-only-conflict.py" ".codearbiter/overrides.log" --reason "<specific reason>"The helper derives the same
git config user.emailidentity, validates the merge-base and both append suffixes, writes the attributed H-05 record, and explicitly stages only the validated deterministic union. It refuses a missing or malformed three-stage conflict, any edit to prior bytes, unsupported paths, invalid encoding, dirty audit sink, or replay after resolution. This is scoped to the immediate action only; it creates no marker, standing exception, or general H-05 bypass. It takes canonical per-audit-path locks and supports onlyoverrides.logand the repository-ownedgate-events.logsink; official writers share those locks. Conflict resolution is an exclusive cooperative operation: do not start a raw append before or during it. Never hand-resolve the protected log with Write, patch, checkout, or restore. -
Proceed with the overridden action. Note in the response that the override is logged.
Security ceiling — heavier path for security-critical stops
A routine gate (lint, a style rule, a non-security review finding) takes the single-confirm path above. But a security-critical stop is NOT bypassable by a single confirm. The following require the heavier path below, never the one-line flow:
- a security CRITICAL finding;
- the crypto/secret commit gate (hook H-09b / H-10b — staged crypto/TLS or secret without a gate pass);
- an irreversible operation (data loss, a destructive migration, anything unrollbackable).
Heavier path (all required, in order):
-
Surface the specific finding verbatim — name the exact primitive/secret/operation and the concrete risk. A generic "security override" is rejected.
-
Explicit per-finding acknowledgement — the user must acknowledge that specific finding in their own words (a bare "yes"/"go ahead"/"I trust you" is declined — this mirrors
decision-variance). Detect identity fromgit config user.email; if unset, ask once. -
Choose the candidate route before writing the log. For reviewable text, use the same locked helper so the mandatory row cannot race conflict resolution:
python3 "${PLUGIN_ROOT}/hooks/append-override.py" --security-finding "<specific finding>" --reason "<reason>"It appends a line tagged
SECURITY-OVERRIDEthat records the specific finding, not just the gate name:[ISO-8601] | BY: <email> | SECURITY-OVERRIDE | FINDING: <specific finding> | REASON: <reason>If the gate explicitly reports a genuine binary whose text context is unavailable, skip this helper and use the combined producer in step 4; that producer writes this same row exactly once before it writes the distinct binary marker.
-
Only then record the bypass. For a reviewable-text crypto/secret commit gate, use the host's known Python 3 launcher in place of
pythonwhen its literal name differs, then run the producer as one standalone command from the exact reviewed checkout root:python "${PLUGIN_ROOT}/hooks/security-pass.py"Do not combine launcher discovery and the producer in one chained shell expression, and never use
python3 X || python X, which reruns X on any nonzero exit (#577). The producer writes<project-root>/.codearbiter/.markers/security-gate-passedbound to the sensitive lines it approves, so hook H-09b/H-10b allows the commit — recorded only after steps 1–3, never to skip the gate proper.If the gate explicitly reports a genuine binary whose text context is unavailable, run the combined audited producer below from the exact reviewed checkout root. It appends the mandatory
SECURITY-OVERRIDErow first and only then writes a distinct exact-candidate binary override marker; it never represents the bypass as an independent-review PASS:python "${PLUGIN_ROOT}/hooks/security-pass.py" --binary-override --security-finding "<specific finding>" --reason "<reason>"
Under $ca-sprint, a security-critical override is a hard-gate STOP: it surfaces to the user and is
never auto-decided, even in autonomous mode (SPRINT.md hard gates).
Hard gate
MUST write the log line before proceeding — it is not optional. MUST capture an operator identity —
"codeArbiter" or "automated" are not valid. MUST include a justification. The override is scoped to
the immediate action only; it creates no standing exception. MUST NOT edit or delete an existing
overrides.log entry. For an H-05 three-stage conflict, the dedicated helper's validated union and
audit write are the single immediate action; do not pre-edit the conflicted file. MUST route a
security-critical / crypto-secret / irreversible stop through the
Security ceiling path — never the single-confirm flow — and MUST NOT auto-decide such an override
under $ca-sprint.
When NOT to use
- Routine work that passes all gates — never needed.
- Reconciling two conflicting sources →
$ca-conflict.
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