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ajtazer/heckit / skills/cve-hunting/entity-expansion

entity-expansion

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Detect XML/SVG/YAML entity expansion (Billion Laughs) vulnerabilities in parsers that allow unbounded entity definitions.

Entity Expansion (Billion Laughs) Detection

When to Use

Audit any package that parses XML, SVG, HTML with entity support, or YAML with alias/anchor support. This includes:

  • XML/SVG parsing libraries
  • Document processors (DOCX, XLSX, RSS, Atom, SOAP)
  • YAML parsers with alias expansion
  • Configuration file parsers

~90% CVE acceptance rate when confirmed.

Key Insight

Many parsers have NO default entity expansion limit. A 1KB XML payload with recursive entity definitions can expand to 1GB+ in memory, crashing the process with an OOM kill (uncatchable — process dies).

Entity Expansion Types

1. Billion Laughs (Internal Entity Recursion)

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
  <!ENTITY lol "lol">
  <!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
  <!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
  ...
  <!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>
<root>&lol9;</root>

Each level multiplies by 10. Level 9 = 10^9 = 1 billion "lol" strings.

2. Quadratic Blowup (Single Entity Repeated)

<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY a "AAAAAAAAAA..."> <!-- 50KB entity -->
]>
<root>&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;...&a;</root> <!-- 50000 references -->

Less dramatic but still effective — 50KB entity × 50000 refs = 2.5GB.

3. YAML Alias Expansion

a: &anchor
  x: *anchor
  y: *anchor

Recursive alias references can cause exponential expansion in some YAML parsers.

Process

Step 1: Find XML/YAML Parsing

# JavaScript
grep -rn "xml2js\|fast-xml-parser\|xmldom\|sax\|DOMParser\|cheerio" .
grep -rn "\.parseString\|\.parse(" . --include="*.js" --include="*.ts"
grep -rn "yaml\.load\|yaml\.parse\|YAML\.parse" .

# Python
grep -rn "xml\.etree\|lxml\|minidom\|xml\.sax\|defusedxml" .
grep -rn "yaml\.load\|yaml\.safe_load\|yaml\.unsafe_load" .

# Go
grep -rn "xml\.Decoder\|xml\.Unmarshal\|encoding/xml" .
grep -rn "yaml\.Unmarshal\|gopkg.in/yaml" .

# Ruby
grep -rn "Nokogiri\|REXML\|Ox\.\|LibXML" .

# PHP
grep -rn "simplexml\|DOMDocument\|XMLReader\|xml_parse" .

Step 2: Check Entity/DTD Configuration

For each parser found, check:

  1. Does it process DTD declarations by default?
  2. Is there a maxExpansion or maxEntitySize option?
  3. Is DTD processing explicitly disabled?
  4. Does it support custom entity resolution?

Step 3: Check for Expansion Limits

grep -rn "maxExpansion\|maxEntitySize\|entityExpansion\|ENTITY_EXPANSION" .
grep -rn "disableDTD\|forbidDTD\|dtd.*false\|FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING" .
grep -rn "noent\|resolve_entities\|processEntities" .

Step 4: Check YAML Alias Limits

grep -rn "maxAliasCount\|maxAliases\|aliasLimit\|MAX_ALIAS" .
grep -rn "anchorLimit\|maxAnchors" .

Step 5: Verify Exploitability

  1. Does the parser accept untrusted input? (user uploads, API requests, webhook payloads)
  2. Is there a file size limit that would prevent the payload from being processed?
  3. Is the process memory-limited (cgroups, ulimit)?
  4. Does the parser use streaming that could limit memory usage?

Known Parser Default Safety

ParserLanguageDTD/Entity DefaultSafe?
fast-xml-parserJSEntities processed, no limitUNSAFE
xml2jsJSEntities processed, no limitUNSAFE
xmldomJSEntities processed, no limitUNSAFE
saxJSNo entity expansionSAFE
cheerio (htmlparser2)JSNo DTD supportSAFE
xml.etree.ElementTreePythonEntities processed, no limitUNSAFE
lxmlPythonDTD disabled by defaultSAFE (default)
defusedxmlPythonAll dangerous features disabledSAFE
xml.saxPythonEntities processedUNSAFE
PyYAML yaml.loadPythonAliases processed, no limitUNSAFE
PyYAML yaml.safe_loadPythonAliases processed, no limitUNSAFE (aliases)
encoding/xmlGoNo entity supportSAFE
go-yaml v3GoAliases processed, limitedCHECK VERSION
NokogiriRubyDTD disabled by defaultSAFE (default)
REXMLRubyEntities processedUNSAFE
simplexml_load_stringPHPEntities processed by defaultUNSAFE
DOMDocumentPHPEntities processed by defaultUNSAFE

CVSS Guidance

  • Unauthenticated OOM crash (process dies): HIGH 7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)
  • Authenticated OOM crash: MEDIUM 6.5 (PR:L)
  • CPU exhaustion (recoverable): MEDIUM 5.3

References

rea-analysis-optimizationmorluto/reaOptimize REA providers and shared analysis workflows for agent context, latency, CPU, and memory while preserving correctness and Evidence. Use for analysis bottlenecks and cache or query design; CI/test-suite optimization belongs to rea-ci-tests-audit.Stars: 468kUpdated Claude CodeCodexVerifiedInstall
rea-ci-tests-auditmorluto/reaAudit REA CI and test suites for correctness, fixture drift, false passes, and measured performance; use for suite or workflow investigations and efficiency changes, rather than ordinary feature testing or a single test failure.Stars: 468kUpdated Claude CodeCodexVerifiedInstall
rea-tool-designmorluto/reaAudit, investigate, design, or change REA investigation tools, CLI/MCP contracts, provider capabilities, and Evidence semantics.Stars: 468kUpdated Claude CodeCodexVerifiedInstall
ponytail-auditDietrichGebert/ponytailQuality audit of the whole repo: bugs, security, real load, missing tests, speed, and what to delete. Most important first.Stars: 194kUpdated Claude CodeCodexVerifiedInstall