Adonis0123/adonis-skills / skills/open-code-review-loop
open-code-review-loop
UnverifiedRun a bounded OCR-delegation review-fix-re-review loop on a Git workspace until current evidence validates NO_FINDINGS. Use only when the user wants verified findings fixed and independently re-reviewed until clean with codex, claude-code, grok-build, or cursor-cli. Do not use for one-shot open-code-review-delegate or read-only review. A full loop request asks at most once for an unnamed Reviewer (recommending a product other than the host), then runs host mutation checks without further confirmation. Fail closed on missing ocr, reviewer mutation, skipped files, malformed output, stale evidence, or exhausted rounds.
Open Code Review Loop
ocr delegate is LLM-free: it selects files and resolves rules. Only a
validated reviewer result with full selected coverage may produce NO_FINDINGS.
OCR never decides that code is clean.
Fast Path
Do these in order. Later references stay closed until a step needs them.
- Git repository? Otherwise stop.
which ocr— missing →MISSING_DEPENDENCIES. Do not open adapter-contracts / review-contract / fix-contract, and do not install OCR without authorization. Stop before any Reviewer call.- Resolve Reviewer/Fixer product IDs, then open only those product sections in adapter-contracts.md.
- Open review-contract.md + review-schema.json only in Phase 2.
- Open fix-contract.md +
fix-schema.json only in Phase 4 for
independently verified
Fixrows. - Historical
--commit/--from/--to→HUMAN_GATEbefore any fix; do not load the fix contract.
Trigger and exclusions
Use this Skill only for an OCR-delegation loop (ocr delegate /
open-code-review) on a Git workspace with a supported reviewer (codex,
claude-code, grok-build, cursor-cli) when the request includes both
fixing verified findings and independent re-review until validated
NO_FINDINGS or CLEAN. Merely asking for one ocr delegate /
open-code-review-delegate pass is insufficient; route that request to
open-code-review-delegate. Skip other one-shot or read-only review,
non-Git files, commit/push/deploy, and destructive work.
Wrong skill. Packet protocol,
.review-handoff,review-loop run, or a Grok consult →agentic-review-handoff. Redirect; do not startocr delegate. Named path + architecture scan-fix-rescan until no architecture findings →architecture-hardening-loop. Do not claim OCRCLEAN. Do not copy those skills' packet or scanner logic.
Inputs and defaults
Resolve before the first model call:
- Repository: current Git root; never infer a broader repo
- Target: workspace changes; also OCR
--from/--toand--commit - Reviewer: user-selected product; when none is named, ask once and recommend a product other than the visible host; always use a real independent read-only product session
- Fixer: current visible host. An external Fixer needs a user-authorized
isolated checkout that becomes
$REPObefore round 1 - Paths/excludes: OCR preview; preserve user exclusions every round.
default_pathis OCR's built-in non-review scope anduser_excluderecords a supplied selector, so neither needs a second confirmation. OCR-excluded.md/.mdxfiles become mandatory supplemental Reviewer scope. Other reasons remain unaccepted unless the user already accepted that exact reason - Round budget / deadline: 3 rounds (a ceiling, not success permission) plus only the user grants recorded in the round ledger; 10 minutes per Reviewer/Fixer call. Run the loop through this Skill: calling a review CLI repeatedly outside it loses the round ceiling
- Background: user requirement or none; pass through preview/rule/prompt
Once the user has requested the full fix-and-re-review loop, explicit skill
invocation authorizes the reversible local workspace loop. Do
not ask whether to start, reconfirm OCR scope, or accept supplemental Markdown
review. One named product without roles → that product is Reviewer, current
host is Fixer. No named product → ask once with the host question tool,
recommending an installed capability-safe product other than the visible host
(a model reviewing its own host's work is the weakest independence); the host
product stays a valid answer in a separate session. Without a question tool, or
when the user asked for defaults, pick that recommendation and record it. If an
auto-selected Reviewer cannot satisfy the read-only adapter, try the next
installed capability-safe product and record the fallback; never replace a
product the user explicitly named. Missing ocr, historical-target fixes,
external actions, and destructive or security-sensitive choices still fail
closed. Same product in both roles always means separate sessions.
Capability preflight
Fast Path already covers Git, ocr, and product IDs. Before editing, also
inspect installed product help: a binary name does not prove read-only
review, structured output, scoped writes, or session recovery. Reviewer
inspects without editing. External Fixer: verify the isolated checkout
holds the intended snapshot, freeze that Git root as the only $REPO, and
never review one worktree while fixing another. No isolated target →
HUMAN_GATE (no patch-transfer protocol). Do not auto-create a worktree.
Record allowed source/test paths, prohibited Git/external actions, and already
accepted exclusion reasons. OCR default_path entries are not Reviewer
coverage and do not need a user gate; keep them in the evidence report. Run
relevant tests as host verification even when OCR excludes test files, but
never count test execution as Reviewer coverage. The builder promotes
unsupported_ext Markdown to supplemental_reviewable_files, captures its
content, and applies supplemental_rules; it remains visible in raw OCR
exclusions but no longer needs a question. Other unsupported extensions,
binary, or a missing reason remain incomplete coverage.
Partition sessions by repository, loop ID, role, and canonical product ID —
never resume a Reviewer as a Fixer. Reviewer invocations use the strongest
available read-only controls plus dontAsk; configured hooks/MCPs or lack of
an OS-perfect sandbox do not alone create a user gate. Freeze the subject Git
identity immediately before the call and recompute it afterward. Any mutation
caused during review returns UNVERIFIED: REVIEWER_MUTATED_SUBJECT, with the
actual diff reported and no automatic reset or retry. If a named product lacks
structured output or cannot run non-interactively, return HUMAN_GATE; an
automatic selection tries the next installed product without asking.
Loop contract
Freeze before round 1:
OCR Review Contract
- Repository / target:
- Reviewer / session policy:
- Fixer / session policy:
- Scope / exclusions:
- Accepted exclusion reasons:
- Background / acceptance checks:
- Write boundary:
- Round budget:
- Per-call deadline:
- Git and external actions: none
Reviewer owns findings and the clean verdict. Fixer owns source edits and verification. Visible host owns OCR evidence, schema validation, triage, round accounting, and the final result.
Phase 1: Build current evidence
ROUND_DIR="$(mktemp -d)"
python3 <skill-dir>/scripts/build_review_bundle.py \
--repo "$REPO" \
--output "$ROUND_DIR/bundle.json" \
[--from-ref <ref> --to-ref <ref>] \
[--commit <hash>] \
[--exclude <patterns>]... \
[--allow-excluded-reason <reason>] \
[--rule <rule.json>] \
[--background <text> | --background-file <path>]
Keep ROUND_DIR outside the repo so the next preview cannot select the
bundle and permanently drift evidence. --exclude may be repeated; the
script combines values into OCR's list and keeps that selection every
round. --allow-excluded-reason is not authority: pass it only after
recording the user's explicit acceptance of that exact non-default reason.
The builder accepts default_path and user_exclude automatically and routes
Markdown unsupported_ext entries into mandatory supplemental scope; do not
pause at round 0 to reconfirm either behavior. Zero OCR reviewable files, zero
supplemental reviewable files, and zero unaccepted exclusions → CLEAN with
0/0 coverage. Any remaining unaccepted exclusion →
UNVERIFIED: INCOMPLETE_COVERAGE. Do not invoke an AI just to manufacture a
verdict when the combined selected scope is empty.
Builder already fail-closes on (do not re-implement; read
scripts/build_review_bundle.py only if the builder fails):
- mid-build
HEAD/ binary-diff / untracked fingerprint drift - missing captured content vs a real zero-byte file (
empty_file: true) - first-parent merge selection and immutable ref resolution
- in-repository output
- background argv redaction and a private
0600snapshot
Prefer --background-file for non-trivial or sensitive background. Do not
commit the bundle. validate_round.py recomputes the canonical digest, so
editing bundle content (repository included) while keeping an old
evidence_id also fails closed.
Phase 2: Invoke the Reviewer
Give the Reviewer the frozen contract, background, whole bundle.json
(including evidence_id), nearby read-only context, non-mutating checks,
and the JSON contract from Fast Path step 4. The selected review set is the
union of reviewable_files and supplemental_reviewable_files; apply both
rules and supplemental_rules. Every selected (path, status) appears
exactly once as reviewed or skipped. Emit only evidence-backed, actionable
findings. Tests that need temporary writes belong to host verification and are
not a reason to weaken the Reviewer sandbox.
The round ledger is not a file you choose. validate_round.py keeps one per
repository checkout at
~/.local/state/open-code-review-loop/ledgers/<repository-hash>.json and
prints the path as ledger. That directory is fixed under the home directory
that the system account database lists for the current user: no argument or
environment variable (XDG_STATE_HOME, HOME) moves it, and a sandboxed host
needs it as an extra writable directory. When the account database has no
entry for the user, or Python has no fcntl file lock (native Windows), the
script returns UNVERIFIED (exit 2) and records nothing; there is no fallback
to HOME and no unlocked mode. bundle.repository is part of evidence_id,
and the script asks Git which checkout it is and whether bundle.base_sha is
its HEAD, so a stale bundle, or one edited to point at another checkout (a
worktree or clone on the same HEAD included), is refused instead of getting
another ledger. Each checkout has its own ledger and the script does not link
them, so build every bundle in the frozen $REPO; never build in another
worktree or clone to continue a loop. A handoff, a resumed session, a new
ROUND_DIR, or a new commit lands on the same ledger and the rounds already
used; never move, delete, edit, or recreate it. Omit --history: any other
path is refused.
Rounds add up across commits; the ledger lists every base_sha it saw. Only
a validated NO_FINDINGS closes the loop, and the next evidence then starts a
new budget. A loop that ended any other way stays open: the next loop in that
checkout continues its count until the user grants rounds.
Before every Reviewer call, run the gate and chain the call with &&, never
; or a new line, so a refused gate (exit 2) cannot be followed by a review:
python3 <skill-dir>/scripts/validate_round.py --check-call \
--bundle "$ROUND_DIR/bundle.json" \
&& <Reviewer command from the product's adapter section>
A passed gate records the round as started before the Reviewer runs. Run it
only immediately before a real Reviewer call, never to look at the count (earlier
output and the ledger file show it): a call that starts and is then interrupted has
used its round, and a relay session sees it. Passing the gate again for the
same evidence ID stays one round; a refused gate writes nothing.
A fresh evidence ID consumes one round of the budget; one same-session format
correction uses the same round. A timeout is UNVERIFIED and its round stays
used. Validate each raw envelope so the same ledger entry gets the result and
extraction failures are counted:
python3 <skill-dir>/scripts/validate_round.py \
--bundle "$ROUND_DIR/bundle.json" \
--review "$ROUND_DIR/raw-review.json" --product "$REVIEWER_PRODUCT" \
--output "$ROUND_DIR/validation.json" \
[--session-id "$RECORDED_SESSION_ID"]
--output must not be the ledger, its .tmp or .lock file, or any path
inside the ledger state directory: that is refused (exit 2) and nothing is
written. Keep it in ROUND_DIR. An error raised before that check finishes (an
unreadable bundle, no account home) is printed to stdout only, so a
validation.json left by an earlier run may be stale: trust the exit code and
this run's stdout, not the file, when the validator exits non-zero.
The validator reuses extract_product_output.py. Its gate stops a second
malformed result as UNVERIFIED and refuses a round beyond the budget: format
correction supplies no new evidence. A review obtained after a refused gate
is rejected the same way and never recorded. Every refusal carries a fix
or errors text; follow it instead of working around the ledger.
Phase 3: Detect evidence drift
Rebuild the bundle with the same target and exclusions. Compare
evidence_id. Equal → the result covers the current snapshot. Different →
discard the verdict, record evidence-drift, and review the new bundle.
Never carry findings or NO_FINDINGS across snapshots.
Phase 4: Triage and fix findings
For a valid FINDINGS result:
- Independently open each cited path and verify the evidence.
- Classify each item as
Fix,Reject, orHuman decision. - Give the Fixer only verified
Fixrows, target paths, required fix, acceptance check, current evidence ID, and the write boundary. Load the fix contract only now (Fast Path step 5). - Extract with
extract_product_output.py, thenvalidate_fix_result.py. One same-session correction for malformed output; a valid result is still only a claim. - Fixer re-reads current code and applies the smallest coherent change.
- Host recomputes Git status/diff, derives actual changed paths, rejects
out-of-scope writes, and runs listed checks. Never trust claimed
FIXED,changed_paths, or the Fixer's test summary. - Record rejected findings with counter-evidence. Do not edit code to satisfy a known false positive.
Fixer does not commit, push, merge, rebase, deploy, send messages, or edit
outside the frozen boundary. External Fixer writes only the authorized
isolated $REPO. Direct writes to the user's original worktree need
path-scoped enforcement, not a later diff check; the four documented CLI
adapters do not meet that bar. Range/commit review always returns
HUMAN_GATE before fixing — another writable branch cannot prove those
edits against the immutable target. Any source or test edit invalidates
the prior bundle, validation, tests, and verdict; return to Phase 1.
Fixer timeout or lost delivery after it could have written → recompute the
real Git diff and return UNVERIFIED: DELIVERY_UNKNOWN_WITH_MUTATION. Do
not retry blindly or reset user changes. FIXED with unchanged
Git/evidence and a still-reproducing finding → FIXER_NO_MUTATION.
Delivery is known, so allow one same-session correction. A repeated
no-mutation result is UNVERIFIED, never CLEAN.
Phase 5: Re-review and stop
Resume the Reviewer when the product supports reliable session recovery; otherwise start a fresh read-only session with the finding ledger and new bundle. The Fixer never supplies the terminal verdict.
CLEAN: validatedNO_FINDINGSwith 100% combined OCR + supplemental coverage, zero skipped files, zero unaccepted exclusions, and no drift; or the bundle provesreviewable_files,supplemental_reviewable_files, andunaccepted_excluded_filesare all empty (no Reviewer invoked).HUMAN_GATE: real product decision, writable-target choice, unavailable non-interactive capability, repeated disagreement, or round extension.MISSING_DEPENDENCIES: OCR or a required product capability unavailable before edits.UNVERIFIED: ambiguous delivery, malformed output after one correction, failed checks, repeated drift, or stale required evidence.
Round-budget exhaustion is never CLEAN, and only the user extends the
budget. The extension exists once it is recorded, with the user's words
verbatim:
python3 <skill-dir>/scripts/validate_round.py --bundle "$ROUND_DIR/bundle.json" \
--grant-rounds <N> --granted-by "<the user's own words about extra rounds>"
The budget is 3 plus the grants recorded in the open loop. A host's unattended
prompt (for example "go on with the recommended option" / 「按推荐继续」), a
handoff note, or your own judgment is not a grant; only what the user said
about adding rounds is. The script refuses the obvious non-quotes: a
placeholder (<...>, TODO, TBD), blank or invisible text, and a bare
go-ahead such as 「按推荐继续」 or 「都按推荐来」. Text that passes that check
is still a grant only when the user said it. A run is unattended when sideby is on PATH and
sideby unattended status --json reports "on": true, or the host has stated
that nobody is present and questions are refused. A missing or failing
sideby settles nothing; without that host statement the user is present.
Probe when the last budgeted round returns FINDINGS, before Phase 4, and
again when the gate refuses a call.
- User present: report the remaining ledger and ask whether to authorize another bounded set of rounds; record a yes with the command above before the next gate.
- Unattended: do not ask. Skip Phase 4 for the last budgeted round's
findings, since no round is left to re-review an edit; a fix already applied
when the gate refuses is reported as unreviewed. Record one item for the
user with
sideby unattended defer "<N> OCR findings open on <branch> after <rounds_used> rounds"(only the finding count, the branch or the short SHA on a detached HEAD, androunds_usedfrom the gate output); withoutsidebythe final report carries it alone. Code with open findings is not committed or merged by the surrounding task, which continues only with work that does not depend on it and lists the item in its final report.
Output contract
OCR Review Loop Result
- Result: CLEAN | HUMAN_GATE | MISSING_DEPENDENCIES | UNVERIFIED
- Repository / target:
- Scope / exclusions:
- Reviewer / Fixer:
- Rounds used / budget: <rounds_used>/<round_budget>; grants: none | <N> by "<granted-by words>"
- Round ledger:
- Final evidence id:
- Coverage: <reviewed>/<OCR + supplemental>; skipped: <count>; unaccepted excluded: <count>
- Fixed / Rejected / Open findings:
- Deferred user decision: none | <item and where it was recorded>
- Verification:
- Sessions / recovery:
- Git and external actions: none
Reviewer-backed CLEAN includes the final validate_round.py result and
the same-evidence comparison. Zero-file CLEAN includes the bundle summary
proving OCR scope, supplemental scope, and unaccepted exclusions are all
empty; no review response exists on that path.
Every other state names the exact stop point and does not claim OCR or the
AI approved the current code.
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