zrwangems/dsh-zrwang-plugin / ars/skills/academic-paper-reviewer
academic-paper-reviewer
Flagged模拟同行评审:期刊匹配审稿人 + 3 位动态领域审稿人 + 魔鬼代言人,输出编辑决定(接收/小修/大修/拒稿)与返修路线图,可做方法论专项评审与再审核验。Triggers: review paper, peer review, manuscript review, check methodology, re-review | 审稿, 同行评审, 评审论文, 检查方法, 复审。只做评审,不改写稿件。
scripts/ars_write_scope_guard.py
View on GitHub#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""ARS write-scope guard — PreToolUse hook (#134 Slice 1, the MVP).
Spec: docs/design/2026-06-01-ars-134-conductor-rescope-deterministic-write-guard-spec.md
Blocks out-of-scope file writes by the 23 Bucket A single-phase agents, backed by
the machine-readable scope manifest at scripts/ars_phase_scope_manifest.json.
WHEN THE FENCE ENGAGES (#973): only when a Bucket A role runs as a separately dispatched
subagent whose payload `agent_type` maps to a manifest key, in an install that wires this
hook (the plugin install). Today that means the plugin-shipped `synthesis_agent` and
`research_architect_agent`. Most roles run inline in the main session by default; a
main-session payload carries no `agent_type`, so those writes are unconstrained here and
the prompt-level Phase Boundary blocks are the only fence
(scripts/fixtures/write_scope_guard/captured_payloads.json pins the real payload shapes).
COVERAGE CLAIM — stated precisely, NOT over-promised (spec §3.3 / §7):
* DETERMINISTIC for the structured editing tools (Write / Edit / MultiEdit): a write
outside the agent's declared scope is denied regardless of the agent's prompt. This is
the load-bearing win.
* Bash for Bucket A agents: DENIED WHOLESALE. A single-phase agent may not run any Bash;
it uses the Grep/Glob tools to search and Write/Edit/MultiEdit to write. Six review
rounds established WHY nothing finer is sound: neither "this Bash writes a file" (a
denylist — `python -c`/`sh -c`/`make`/custom scripts all write, unenumerable) nor "this
Bash is read-only" (an allowlist — `rg --pre`/`git grep -O`/`sort --compress-program`/
`GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF=…` all execute subprocesses, and "read-only" varies by flag, env, and
binary version) can be decided reliably from a command string without a sandbox. All-deny
is the only Bash policy that reaches ZERO fail-open by construction. The cost is a clean
false-deny of ad-hoc read-only Bash, which the agent does not need (it has Grep/Glob).
This is NOT "deterministic enforcement of all writes" — it is deterministic for the
structured tools plus a clean wholesale Bash deny for fenced agents. The honest win is
making the #133 shape (a helpful agent calling a write tool into a downstream phase dir)
deterministically impossible, and closing the direct-shell-write path for Bucket A entirely.
The testable core is `evaluate_decision(payload, manifest, workspace_root)` — a pure
function. `main()` only wires stdin -> evaluate_decision -> stdout JSON.
PAYLOAD CONTRACT (first-party verified against official Claude Code hook docs 2026-06-01):
Available: session_id, transcript_path, cwd, permission_mode, hook_event_name, effort,
tool_name, tool_input, plus subagent-conditional agent_id / agent_type. For an agent
defined in a project or user agents dir, `agent_type` equals its frontmatter `name`
(e.g. "bibliography_agent"); for an agent shipped by this plugin it is the plugin-scoped
identifier ("academic-research-skills:synthesis-agent", #971). The manifest keys the bare
name; `_manifest_key` maps the scoped form back to it, and maps a pre-#1037 underscore
name (LEGACY_AGENT_NAMES) to the current one. Captured payloads (Claude Code
2.1.296, #973) also carry `tool_use_id` and `prompt_id`; the guard does not read them, so
their presence or absence never changes a decision.
TOOL_INPUT SHAPES: Write / Edit / MultiEdit each carry a SINGLE top-level `file_path`.
Write: {file_path, content}; Edit: {file_path, old_string, new_string};
MultiEdit: {file_path, edits:[{old_string,new_string},...]} — edits[] is multiple
edits to that ONE file, NOT multiple distinct paths. Bash: {command}.
(Official hooks input table does not enumerate MultiEdit; the single-top-level-file_path
shape is taken from the tool definition. The path-extraction below reads ONLY the
top-level file_path and FAILS LOUD if a structured write tool ever lacks one — so a
schema drift cannot silently fail the guard open.)
TOOL-NAME BOUNDARY (#1022): the guard inspects a call only when `tool_name` is exactly
"Write", "Edit", "MultiEdit" or "Bash" (case-sensitive), the same four names as the
PreToolUse matcher in hooks/hooks.json. Any other name, `edit`, `apply_patch` and
`NotebookEdit` included, passes through with no permissionDecision: neither the scope
check nor the infrastructure self-protection runs for it, and the normal permission flow
still applies. Names are deliberately not casefolded or aliased. A host tool under another
name may carry another tool_input shape: read as Edit, a payload without a top-level
file_path would be denied for every caller once the manifest loads, the main session
included, and a patch that touches several files would be checked on one path at most.
A port that routes another write tool here adds its name to the matcher and to
INSPECTED_TOOLS together with a target extractor for that tool's verified payload shape,
and tests for both.
"""
import fnmatch
import json
import os
import sys
from pathlib import Path
MANIFEST_FILENAME = "ars_phase_scope_manifest.json"
# Structured editing tools: deterministic, single top-level file_path. The 23 Bucket A
# agents emit markdown / yaml / bib / txt into their phase dir via these three tools;
# NotebookEdit is deliberately out of Slice 1 scope (no Bucket A agent writes notebooks,
# and its hook input shape is unverified — adding it would be speculative coverage).
STRUCTURED_WRITE_TOOLS = {"Write", "Edit", "MultiEdit"}
# Tools the guard inspects at all. Everything else -> allow (out of scope).
INSPECTED_TOOLS = STRUCTURED_WRITE_TOOLS | {"Bash"}
# Claude Code reports an agent shipped by a plugin as "<plugin name>:<agent name>" (#971).
# Only THIS plugin's prefix is stripped: another plugin's agent that happens to share a
# manifest name is not an ARS agent and stays out of the fence. Pinned to the `name` in
# .claude-plugin/plugin.json by the guard tests.
PLUGIN_AGENT_NAMESPACE = "academic-research-skills:"
# The four plugin-exposed agents took hyphenated frontmatter names (#1037): claude.ai
# rejects an agent name with an underscore. An agent file copied into a project or user
# agents dir before #1037 still reports its old underscore name, so the guard maps each
# old name to the current one and keeps fencing it. The values must equal the current
# frontmatter names; the guard tests pin that.
LEGACY_AGENT_NAMES = {
"synthesis_agent": "synthesis-agent",
"research_architect_agent": "research-architect-agent",
"report_compiler_agent": "report-compiler-agent",
"screening_reviewer_agent": "screening-reviewer-agent",
}
# Step 2 infrastructure self-protection — normalized workspace-relative path patterns
# that NO agent (and not even the unconstrained main session) may write. These are the
# enforcement surface: tampering with them would fail the guard open.
INFRA_PROTECTED_GLOBS = [
"hooks/hooks.json",
"hooks/*.sh",
".claude-plugin/plugin.json", # declares the hook routing — disabling it neuters the guard
# The hook script, its manifest, and the cross-check lint, protected by filename both
# in any SUBDIR (`**/name`) AND at the workspace root (bare `name`). A deny-list
# widening only protects MORE paths, so it is safe — unlike a per-agent allow-glob
# widening, which would loosen scope. Covering both forms ensures a future directory
# move can't fail the guard open (spec §3.2: "the hook script and any helper modules
# it imports"). (`**/name` matches subdirs only, not root — see _matches_any — so the
# bare entries are load-bearing for a root-level copy, not redundant.)
"**/ars_write_scope_guard.py",
"ars_write_scope_guard.py",
"**/ars_phase_scope_manifest.json",
"ars_phase_scope_manifest.json",
"**/check_v3_10_134_write_scope.py", # the three-way name cross-check lint
"check_v3_10_134_write_scope.py",
# Agent definition files: the agent_type==name binding lives in their frontmatter;
# renaming an agent out of the manifest would fail the guard open. Covers the per-skill
# source dirs, the shared dir, AND the top-level plugin-shipped `agents/` dir (the
# #413-materialized byte-identical copies — these carry the same name binding and were
# previously unprotected; closed in #448 when the plugin-root anchoring re-established
# which files count as plugin infra).
"deep-research/agents/*.md",
"academic-paper/agents/*.md",
"academic-paper-reviewer/agents/*.md",
"academic-pipeline/agents/*.md",
"shared/agents/*.md",
"agents/*.md",
# CLAUDE.md / .claude/CLAUDE.md are DELIBERATELY NOT protected (#459). They were
# added to guard ARS's own repo CLAUDE.md, but two generic doc filenames collide
# with the user's own project under the clone+symlink install layout: there
# CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT is unset, the plugin_root fallback resolves to the cloned repo
# root, and a user working IN that repo has plugin_root == workspace_root — so their
# own CLAUDE.md sits at plugin_root and the infra glob re-denied it (the #448 bug
# resurfacing on a layout the #449 plugin-root anchoring can't distinguish, because
# home-turf and clone-as-user are the SAME runtime condition). Unlike every entry
# above, CLAUDE.md is NOT load-bearing: it documents the guard binding, it is not the
# binding — editing it cannot fail the guard open. So protecting it bought soft-policy
# comfort at the cost of a hard false-deny for real users. The right home for "don't let
# an agent rewrite ARS's own instruction doc" is review / CI, not the write-scope guard,
# which must protect ENFORCEMENT files only. See #459 (and #448/#449 for the history).
]
def _normalize_target(raw_path, cwd, workspace_root):
"""Step 1 — resolve to a workspace-root-relative canonical path.
Returns (rel_path, escaped_workspace). rel_path is None when the target escapes
the workspace root (path traversal); escaped_workspace is True then.
Resolves symlinks on the existing parent chain WITHOUT requiring the leaf to exist
(the write may create it), so a `phase2_x/../hooks/hooks.json` raw path is
canonicalized to `hooks/hooks.json` BEFORE any deny-list / glob match runs.
"""
if not os.path.isabs(raw_path):
raw_path = os.path.join(cwd, raw_path)
# CRITICAL: do NOT os.path.abspath() first — abspath collapses `..` LEXICALLY, which
# would resolve `symlinked_dir/../x` to a sibling of symlinked_dir's *name* before the
# symlink is followed, blinding the guard to the real target (caught in review). Instead
# os.path.realpath() resolves symlinks AND `..` together in true filesystem order. It
# tolerates a not-yet-created leaf (resolving the existing prefix and appending the
# rest), so a brand-new file path still canonicalizes correctly.
normalized = os.path.realpath(raw_path)
real_ws = os.path.realpath(workspace_root)
try:
common = os.path.commonpath([normalized, real_ws])
except ValueError:
# Different drives / mixed abs-rel — treat as escape.
return None, True
if common != real_ws:
return None, True
rel = os.path.relpath(normalized, real_ws)
# `commonpath(...) == real_ws` already proves the path did not escape; do NOT also
# reject `rel.startswith("..")` — that would false-deny a legitimate root-level file
# literally named `..foo` (caught in review). Only the workspace root itself (rel == ".")
# is not a writable target.
if rel == ".":
return None, True
return rel, False
def _match_segments(path_segs, pat_segs):
"""Path-segment-aware glob match. A `*` / `?` / `[...]` matches only WITHIN one
segment (never across `/`); the literal segment `**` matches ONE OR MORE whole
segments (a descendant — NOT zero, so `dir/**` covers files UNDER dir, not the bare
dir node itself). This gives `dir/**` and `**/name` their intended PATH semantics —
unlike bare fnmatch, whose `*` spans `/` and would let a root-level `phase2_x.md` match
`phase2_*` (the false-open regression caught at review).
ITERATIVE (NFA-style) matcher over (path_index, pattern_index) states — NOT recursive.
A `**` previously recursed once per consumed segment, blowing Python's recursion limit
(~1000) on a deep path and crashing the hook (caught in review). The worklist keeps a
visited set so it is O(len(path) * len(pattern)) and cannot stack-overflow at any depth.
"""
n, m = len(path_segs), len(pat_segs)
# State = (i, j): path_segs[i:] still to match against pat_segs[j:].
stack = [(0, 0)]
seen = set()
while stack:
i, j = stack.pop()
if (i, j) in seen:
continue
seen.add((i, j))
if j == m:
if i == n:
return True
continue # pattern exhausted but path remains -> this branch fails
head = pat_segs[j]
if head == "**":
# `**` consumes ONE OR MORE segments. So it requires >=1 remaining path segment,
# then may consume just that one (advance both) or keep consuming (advance path
# only). A trailing `**` (j == m-1) therefore needs >=1 remaining segment — so
# `dir/**` matches a descendant, never the bare `dir` node; a leading `**/name`
# matches name in any subdir but NOT at root (the bare INFRA pattern covers root).
if i < n:
stack.append((i + 1, j + 1)) # `**` ate exactly this segment
stack.append((i + 1, j)) # `**` keeps eating
continue
# A literal segment pattern: needs a path segment that fnmatches it.
if i < n and fnmatch.fnmatch(path_segs[i], head):
stack.append((i + 1, j + 1))
return False
def _matches_any(rel_path, globs):
"""Workspace-root-anchored glob match against the normalized relative path.
Path-segment-aware (a `*` never crosses `/`). Conventions:
* `dir/**` — anything strictly UNDER `dir` (>=1 segment below). The bare `dir`
node is intentionally NOT matched: every real Bucket A write is to a
FILE inside its phase dir, and matching the bare single-segment path
would let a root file `phase2_x.md` masquerade as the `phase2_*` dir
(the false-open caught at review).
* `**/name` — `name` in any subdirectory. For a file that may ALSO live at the
workspace root, the INFRA list carries both `**/name` and the bare
`name` (a deny-list, so widening is safe — see INFRA_PROTECTED_GLOBS).
"""
# Glob patterns are authored with `/`; segment-split the path on the same separator.
# On Windows, rel_path (from os.path.relpath) uses `\`, so normalize `\` -> `/` THERE.
# On POSIX this MUST stay a no-op: `\` is a LEGAL filename character, so an
# unconditional replace would rewrite a root-level file literally named
# `phase2_x\notes.md` (one segment) into `phase2_x/notes.md` (two segments) and let it
# masquerade as the `phase2_*` dir — a fence-escape false-allow (#330 PR #450 caught by
# cross-model review). Gate on os.sep so the rewrite only fires where `\` is a separator.
if os.sep == "\\":
rel_path = rel_path.replace("\\", "/")
segs = [s for s in rel_path.split("/") if s not in ("", ".")]
for g in globs:
pat = [s for s in g.split("/") if s != ""]
if _match_segments(segs, pat):
return True
return False
def _infra_protected_target(raw_path, cwd, plugin_root):
"""Step 2 — is the write target one of the ARS plugin's OWN enforcement files?
#448 root-cause fix: infra self-protection must be anchored to the PLUGIN root, not
the user's PROJECT root. The two enforcement surfaces have different anchors:
* Bucket A phase-scope (Step 4) fences agents to their phaseN_ dir inside the USER'S
project — anchored on workspace_root (= CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR).
* Infra self-protection (here) protects the ARS plugin's own files from tampering —
those live under the plugin install dir, so it MUST be anchored on plugin_root.
Conflating them was the bug: matching the plugin's infra filenames (`CLAUDE.md`,
`hooks/*.sh`, `shared/agents/*.md`, ...) against a user PROJECT path denied the user's
own same-named files — even from the trusted main session.
A target is an infra target IFF it resolves INSIDE plugin_root AND its plugin-root-
relative path matches INFRA_PROTECTED_GLOBS. A target outside plugin_root (the normal
case in a user project where plugin_root != workspace_root) is never an infra target.
A None plugin_root here returns False ("no infra root known -> not infra-protected").
evaluate_decision never calls in with None — it substitutes workspace_root first — so
this is a pure defensive guard, not a path any real caller exercises.
"""
if not plugin_root:
return False
# Resolve the target the SAME way _normalize_target does (realpath, tolerant of a
# not-yet-created leaf), but anchored on plugin_root instead of workspace_root.
rp = raw_path
if not os.path.isabs(rp):
rp = os.path.join(cwd, rp)
normalized = os.path.realpath(rp)
real_plugin = os.path.realpath(plugin_root)
try:
common = os.path.commonpath([normalized, real_plugin])
except ValueError:
return False # different drives -> cannot be inside plugin root
if common != real_plugin:
return False # target resolves OUTSIDE the plugin root -> not an infra file
rel = os.path.relpath(normalized, real_plugin)
if rel == ".":
return False # the plugin root dir itself is not an enumerated infra FILE
return _matches_any(rel, INFRA_PROTECTED_GLOBS)
def _manifest_key(agent_type):
"""The manifest key for a payload agent_type: this plugin's scoped identifier
("academic-research-skills:synthesis-agent") maps to the bare name the manifest keys
("synthesis-agent") (#971), and a pre-#1037 underscore name maps to its current
hyphenated name (#1037); anything else is returned unchanged."""
if not isinstance(agent_type, str):
return agent_type
if agent_type.startswith(PLUGIN_AGENT_NAMESPACE):
agent_type = agent_type[len(PLUGIN_AGENT_NAMESPACE):]
return LEGACY_AGENT_NAMES.get(agent_type, agent_type)
def _allow_unconstrained(agent_type):
"""The decision for an actor that Slice 1 does not fence (main session / Bucket B/C/D).
Single source for both the escaped-path allow (#302) and the Step-3 allow, so the two
can't drift. A write tool firing with NO agent_type still surfaces a fail-loud advisory
(spec §3.4) — do not silently no-op a possibly-regressed payload.
"""
result = {"decision": "allow", "reason": ""}
if not agent_type:
result["absent_agent_type_advisory"] = True
return result
def _extract_structured_target(tool_input):
"""Single top-level file_path for Write/Edit/MultiEdit.
Returns the file_path string, or None if absent (schema drift -> fail loud upstream).
"""
if not isinstance(tool_input, dict):
return None
fp = tool_input.get("file_path")
return fp if isinstance(fp, str) and fp else None
def evaluate_decision(payload, manifest, workspace_root, plugin_root=None):
"""Pure decision function implementing the spec §3.2 logic (Bash policy per §7, shipped).
Returns a dict: {"decision": "allow"|"deny", "reason": str, ...advisory flags}.
Two enforcement paths:
* Structured tools (Write/Edit/MultiEdit) — deterministic write-scope: extract the
single top-level file_path, run infra self-protection FIRST (anchored on plugin_root,
#448), then normalize against workspace_root for the escape check, then Bucket A glob.
* Bash — DENY ALL for a Bucket A agent (spec §3.2 Step-4 hardening: neither a denylist
of "mutation-capable" Bash nor an allowlist of "read-only" Bash is sound, because
neither property is stable across commands/flags/env/versions; only all-deny reaches
zero fail-open by construction). The agent uses the Grep/Glob tools for search and the
structured tools for writes. Non-Bucket-A Bash passes through.
plugin_root (#448): the ARS plugin install dir, used to anchor infra self-protection
(Step 2). main() ALWAYS supplies a concrete root (CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT or the resolved
repo root), so the None default exists only for the ARS-on-ARS unit tests and for any
caller that genuinely cannot determine a plugin root.
When None, infra protection falls back to workspace_root. This is correct ONLY when the
plugin and the workspace are the same tree (ARS developing ARS): it then reproduces the
pre-#448 behavior byte-for-byte. It is NOT a safe default under a real plugin install
(plugin_root != workspace_root) — there it would both re-deny the user's own CLAUDE.md
and FAIL to protect plugin infra (those files are mere workspace escapes). So a real
runtime caller MUST pass plugin_root; do not rely on this fallback off the home turf.
"""
if not plugin_root:
plugin_root = workspace_root
# The pure core defends itself too — not only main() — so a non-dict payload (`[]`,
# null, a string) passed straight to evaluate_decision can't crash on `.get` (review).
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
return {"decision": "allow", "reason": ""}
tool_name = payload.get("tool_name", "")
tool_input = payload.get("tool_input")
if not isinstance(tool_input, dict): # [] / null / str -> treat as empty (no crash)
tool_input = {}
cwd = payload.get("cwd") or workspace_root
agent_type = payload.get("agent_type")
agent_key = _manifest_key(agent_type)
agents = (manifest or {}).get("agents", {})
is_bucket_a = bool(agent_key) and agent_key in agents
# Tools we don't inspect (Read, Grep, WebFetch, ...) -> allow.
if tool_name not in INSPECTED_TOOLS:
return {"decision": "allow", "reason": ""}
# --- Bash path: DENY ALL Bash for a Bucket A agent. Non-Bucket-A Bash passes through. ---
if tool_name == "Bash":
if is_bucket_a:
return {
"decision": "deny",
"reason": (f"ARS scope guard: {agent_type} (a single-phase agent) may not use "
"Bash. Use the Grep/Glob tools to search and the Write/Edit/MultiEdit "
"tools to make file changes — those are scope-enforced deterministically. "
"Bash is denied wholesale because neither 'writes a file' nor 'is "
"read-only' is a property that can be decided reliably from a command "
"string (a tool can spawn a subprocess or be steered by an env var); "
"all-deny is the only policy that cannot fail open (spec §3.2/§3.3/§7)."),
"bash_denied": True,
}
# Non-Bucket-A (main session / Bucket B/C/D) Bash -> pass through unconstrained.
return {"decision": "allow", "reason": ""}
# --- Structured tools: Step 1 extract + normalize the single top-level file_path. ---
raw = _extract_structured_target(tool_input)
if raw is None:
# Schema drift: a structured write tool with no top-level file_path. Do NOT
# silently allow — fail loud (deny + advisory) so the guard cannot fail open.
return {
"decision": "deny",
"reason": (f"ARS scope guard: {tool_name} payload carried no top-level "
"file_path (unexpected schema) — denying to avoid silent "
"fail-open. Re-verify the tool_input shape."),
"schema_drift_advisory": True,
}
# --- Step 2: infrastructure self-protection (anchored on plugin_root). RUNS FIRST,
# BEFORE the user-workspace escape check. ---
# #448: anchored on the PLUGIN root, not the user's PROJECT root. Two reasons it must
# precede the escape check:
# (a) Under a plugin install, the plugin's own files live OUTSIDE the user workspace,
# so they are "escaped" relative to workspace_root — the escape branch would let a
# main-session write to them through. Checking infra first keeps them protected
# wherever they physically sit.
# (b) A target inside the USER's project that merely shares a filename with an ARS infra
# file (the user's own CLAUDE.md / hooks/*.sh / shared/agents/*.md) resolves OUTSIDE
# plugin_root, so _infra_protected_target returns False and it is left to Step 3/4 —
# which is exactly the #448 fix.
# _infra_protected_target resolves the target on its own (realpath, anchored on
# plugin_root) so it is correct regardless of the workspace-relative `escaped` flag.
if _infra_protected_target(raw, cwd, plugin_root):
return {
"decision": "deny",
"reason": (f"ARS scope guard: {raw} is part of the ARS plugin's enforcement "
"infrastructure and may not be written by any agent."),
}
rel, escaped = _normalize_target(raw, cwd, workspace_root)
if escaped:
# The escape / path-traversal deny is a BUCKET A FENCE, not a global one (#302).
# Slice 1's stated scope (§3.3) is confining the 23 Bucket A single-phase agents to
# their phase dir; the main session and Bucket B/C/D agents are unconstrained. A
# main-session write to a sibling git worktree (a mainstream layout) resolves outside
# the workspace root and MUST be allowed — fencing it here contradicted the Step-3
# "unconstrained by Slice 1" gate below. So: only a Bucket A agent is denied for an
# escape; a non-Bucket-A actor falls through to the Step-3 allow.
# Infra self-protection already ran above (anchored on plugin_root), so an escaped
# target that is an ARS plugin file was already denied; what remains here is a genuine
# non-infra escape (e.g. a sibling worktree), correctly allowed for non-Bucket-A.
if is_bucket_a:
return {
"decision": "deny",
"reason": (f"ARS scope guard: {agent_type} write target {raw!r} escapes the "
"workspace root (path traversal) — denied."),
}
return _allow_unconstrained(agent_type)
# --- Step 3: agent gating. ---
if not is_bucket_a:
# Main session or a Bucket B/C/D agent: unconstrained by Slice 1.
return _allow_unconstrained(agent_type)
# --- Step 4: Bucket A glob check (path already normalized in Step 1). ---
allowed = agents[agent_key].get("allowed_write_globs", [])
if not _matches_any(rel, allowed):
return {
"decision": "deny",
"reason": (f"ARS scope guard: {agent_type} may not write {rel} "
f"(outside allowed_write_globs {allowed})."),
}
return {"decision": "allow", "reason": ""}
def render_hook_output(decision):
"""Render the PreToolUse stdout JSON.
DENY -> explicit `permissionDecision: "deny"` (spec §3.2 first-party-verified schema).
Non-deny -> PASS-THROUGH: emit NO permissionDecision, so the call falls back to the
normal permission flow. Emitting `"allow"` here would be an explicit GRANT that skips
every other permission rule (review finding) — a guard that only ADDS denials must never
silently widen what the rest of the permission system would otherwise have asked about.
"""
if decision.get("decision") == "deny":
return json.dumps({
"hookSpecificOutput": {
"hookEventName": "PreToolUse",
"permissionDecision": "deny",
"permissionDecisionReason": decision.get("reason", ""),
}
})
# Pass-through: a bare hookSpecificOutput with no permissionDecision key.
return json.dumps({"hookSpecificOutput": {"hookEventName": "PreToolUse"}})
def _load_manifest():
here = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
path = os.path.join(here, MANIFEST_FILENAME)
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
return json.load(fh)
def main():
try:
payload = json.load(sys.stdin)
except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError):
# Malformed payload: do not block (avoid wedging the session); pass through.
print(render_hook_output({"decision": "allow", "reason": ""}))
return 0
# Valid JSON of the wrong SHAPE ([], null, a string) must not wedge the session either
# — only a JSON object carries a tool call (review finding: payload.get would crash).
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
print(render_hook_output({"decision": "allow", "reason": ""}))
return 0
# Hot-path early-exit: PreToolUse fires on EVERY tool call (Read, Grep, WebFetch...),
# not just writes. Bail before touching the manifest on disk for the common non-write
# case — the matcher in hooks.json already narrows to write tools, but defend here too.
if payload.get("tool_name", "") not in INSPECTED_TOOLS:
print(render_hook_output({"decision": "allow", "reason": ""}))
return 0
# Workspace root: prefer CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR, else the payload cwd. This anchors the
# Bucket A phase-scope check (Step 4) to the USER'S project.
workspace_root = os.environ.get("CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR") or payload.get("cwd") or os.getcwd()
# Plugin root (#448): anchors infra self-protection (Step 2) to the ARS plugin's OWN
# files, NOT the user's project. CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT is set on a plugin install; the
# git-clone+symlink track has no such env var, so fall back to this script's repo root
# (scripts/ -> repo root, where .claude-plugin/plugin.json lives). Use resolve() (NOT
# abspath) so a symlinked script / scripts dir — the norm for the ~/.claude/skills
# symlink install track — resolves to the REAL plugin tree, not the symlink's location
# (abspath would not follow the symlink and compute the wrong root).
plugin_root = os.environ.get("CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT") or str(
Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1])
try:
manifest = _load_manifest()
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError):
# Manifest unreadable: fail loud to stderr (advisory) but do not wedge writes.
sys.stderr.write("[ARS write-scope guard] manifest unreadable; passing through.\n")
print(render_hook_output({"decision": "allow", "reason": ""}))
return 0
decision = evaluate_decision(payload, manifest, workspace_root, plugin_root)
# Surface fail-loud advisories to stderr (visible to the user/transcript), never silent.
if decision.get("absent_agent_type_advisory"):
sys.stderr.write("[ARS write-scope guard] write tool fired with no agent_type; "
"allowed (main session) but surfaced per no-silent-no-op rule.\n")
if decision.get("schema_drift_advisory"):
sys.stderr.write("[ARS write-scope guard] structured write tool lacked a top-level "
"file_path; denied to avoid silent fail-open.\n")
print(render_hook_output(decision))
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
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