ThomasMoreAI/legal-skills-open / au/cybersecurity/skills/ism
ism
VerifiedExpert Australian Information Security Manual (ISM) advisor for government entities and their supply chains. Use for ISM control selection, gap analysis, system authorisation, IRAP assessment preparation, security documentation, and ASD compliance. Triggers on: ISM controls, ASD compliance, IRAP assessment, PROTECTED system scoping, Essential Eight vs ISM, system authorisation, NC/OS/ PROTECTED/SECRET/TOP SECRET classification markings, security objectives, ISM guidelines or chapters, control applicability markings, cybersecurity documentation for Australian government, the June 2026 ISM update, ISM AI application controls (ISM-2112/2113/2114), and any question about the ASD Information Security Manual framework or Australian government cybersecurity obligations.
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| LICENSE | other | 1.0 KB |
| SKILL.md | skill md | 14.5 KB |
| references/control-applicability.md | markdown | 8.7 KB |
| references/guidelines-overview.md | markdown | 11.0 KB |
references/control-applicability.md
View on GitHub# ISM — Control Applicability Framework
Source: Australian Information Security Manual, March 2026 edition
Published by: Australian Signals Directorate (ASD)
---
## Classification Levels & Applicability Markings
Each ISM control carries applicability markings indicating which system classification levels require that control.
| Marking | Classification Level | Description |
|---------|---------------------|-------------|
| **NC** | Non-Classified | General government information; no formal protective marking required |
| **OS** | OFFICIAL: Sensitive | Sensitive but unclassified; default baseline for most federal agency systems |
| **P** | PROTECTED | Classified information; compromise could damage national/organisational interests |
| **S** | SECRET | Highly sensitive; serious damage to national security if compromised |
| **TS** | TOP SECRET | Exceptionally sensitive; grave damage to national security if compromised |
### Stacking Rule
Higher classification systems must implement **all controls for lower levels plus their own level**:
- NC system → NC controls only
- OS system → NC + OS controls
- PROTECTED system → NC + OS + P controls
- SECRET system → NC + OS + P + S controls
- TOP SECRET system → NC + OS + P + S + TS controls
---
## Risk-Based Control Selection Process
The ISM does not mandate a one-size-fits-all approach. The selection process:
1. **Determine system classification** based on the highest sensitivity of information the system stores, processes, or communicates
2. **Define security objectives** — identify CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) requirements
3. **Select baseline controls** using applicability markings
4. **Tailor controls** — add controls for specific threats; document exclusions with risk justification
5. **Document in SSP** — all selected controls, exclusions, and justifications must be recorded in the System Security Plan
---
## System Security Plan (SSP) — Required Content
The SSP is the primary authorisation artefact. It must include:
| Section | Content |
|---------|---------|
| System overview | Name, owner, purpose, environment |
| System boundary | What is in scope (hardware, software, interfaces) |
| Classification level | Highest classification handled |
| Security objectives | Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability ratings (High/Medium/Low) |
| Control selection | All applicable ISM controls with applicability justification |
| Implemented controls | Evidence of implementation for each control |
| Excluded controls | Controls not implemented with documented risk acceptance |
| Risk register | Identified risks, likelihood, impact, treatment |
| Authorisation | Authorising Official signature and date |
| Review schedule | Next review date (minimum: every 24 months or after significant change) |
---
## IRAP Assessment Requirements
### Who Needs an IRAP Assessment?
- **Mandatory**: Systems handling PROTECTED and above
- **Strongly recommended**: Systems handling OFFICIAL: Sensitive
- **Government policy**: Any system used to deliver government services to citizens
### IRAP Assessor Requirements
- Must be listed on the ASD IRAP Assessors Register
- Must be independent of the system being assessed
- Must have current ASD-recognised qualifications
- Find assessors: https://www.cyber.gov.au/resources-business-and-government/assessment-and-evaluation-programs/irap/irap-assessors
### Assessment Cycle
- Initial assessment before system authorisation
- Re-assessment every **24 months** (minimum)
- Re-assessment required after **significant change** (major architecture change, new classification level, major new functionality)
### IRAP Assessment Artefact Checklist
- [ ] Current System Security Plan (SSP)
- [ ] Network architecture diagrams
- [ ] Asset register (hardware and software)
- [ ] Risk register with current risk ratings
- [ ] Policy suite (all security policies referenced in SSP)
- [ ] Evidence of implemented controls (configuration screenshots, logs, test results)
- [ ] Previous IRAP assessment report (if re-assessment)
- [ ] Plan of Action & Milestones (POA&M) for any outstanding findings
- [ ] Incident register (last 12 months)
- [ ] Patch management reports
---
## Essential Eight — ISM Relationship
The Essential Eight are **eight priority mitigation strategies** extracted from the broader ISM control set. They are not a separate standard but a prioritised subset.
| Essential Eight Strategy | Primary ISM Chapter(s) | Notes |
|-------------------------|----------------------|-------|
| Application control (allow-listing) | Ch. 13 System Hardening | Prevents execution of unapproved software |
| Patch applications | Ch. 14 System Management | Critical patches ≤14 days |
| Configure Microsoft Office macros | Ch. 13 System Hardening | Restrict macro execution |
| User application hardening | Ch. 13 System Hardening | Browser, Office, PDF hardening |
| Restrict administrative privileges | Ch. 13 System Hardening, Ch. 6 Personnel | Least privilege, PAM |
| Patch operating systems | Ch. 14 System Management | Critical OS patches ≤14 days |
| Multi-factor authentication (MFA) | Ch. 6, Ch. 9, Ch. 19 | MFA for all remote access, privileged accounts |
| Regular backups | Ch. 14 System Management | Tested, offline/offsite, 3-2-1 rule |
### Essential Eight Maturity Levels
| Level | Description | Who It Applies To |
|-------|-------------|------------------|
| **ML0** | Incomplete or ineffective implementation | Non-compliant |
| **ML1** | Partially aligned; addresses targeted attacks | Minimum for small/low-risk organisations |
| **ML2** | Mostly aligned; addresses sophisticated threats | ASD-recommended baseline for all government entities (2026 target) |
| **ML3** | Fully aligned; addresses advanced persistent threats | Required for critical infrastructure and high-risk sectors |
---
## Patch Management SLAs (Chapter 14)
| Patch Criticality | Maximum Remediation Timeframe |
|------------------|------------------------------|
| Critical (CVSS 9–10) | 48 hours for internet-facing; 14 days for internal |
| High (CVSS 7–8.9) | 14 days |
| Medium (CVSS 4–6.9) | 30 days |
| Low (CVSS < 4) | Within next maintenance window |
---
## Approved Cryptographic Algorithms (Chapter 20)
The ISM mandates ASD-approved algorithms. Key requirements for March 2026:
| Use Case | Approved Algorithm(s) | Notes |
|----------|----------------------|-------|
| Symmetric encryption | AES-128 minimum (AES-256 for PROTECTED+) | |
| Asymmetric encryption | RSA-2048 minimum; EC P-256 or above | RSA-4096 / P-384 for PROTECTED+ |
| Hashing | SHA-256 minimum (SHA-384 for PROTECTED+) | MD5 and SHA-1 prohibited |
| TLS | TLS 1.2 minimum; TLS 1.3 preferred | SSL and TLS 1.0/1.1 prohibited |
| Key exchange | ECDH or DHE (2048-bit minimum) | Static DH prohibited |
| SSH | SSH2 only; ED25519 or RSA-4096 | SSH1 prohibited |
---
## Log Retention Requirements (Chapter 15)
| System Classification | Minimum Log Retention |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| NC | 12 months |
| OFFICIAL: Sensitive | 18 months |
| PROTECTED | 18 months |
| SECRET / TOP SECRET | As directed by agency security policy (typically 7 years) |
Logs must be stored in a tamper-evident manner, separate from the system being monitored.
---
## Key Differences: ISM vs ISO 27001
| Aspect | ISM (ASD) | ISO 27001 |
|--------|-----------|-----------|
| Jurisdiction | Australia (government mandatory) | International (voluntary certification) |
| Structure | 22 guideline chapters + individual controls | 10 clauses + 93 Annex A controls (2022) |
| Assessment | IRAP (ASD-certified assessors) | Third-party certification bodies |
| Classification | NC / OS / P / S / TS markings | Not classification-based |
| Update cycle | Typically annually (March edition) | Major revision every ~7 years |
| Audience | Government entities + supply chain | Any organisation |
| Essential Eight | Subset of ISM; ASD-mandated for government | No direct equivalent |
---
## Useful Official References
| Resource | URL |
|----------|-----|
| ISM (March 2026 PDF) | https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-03/Information%20security%20manual%20(March%202026).pdf |
| ISM OSCAL releases | https://www.cyber.gov.au/business-government/asds-cyber-security-frameworks/ism/ism-oscal-releases |
| IRAP Assessors Register | https://www.cyber.gov.au/resources-business-and-government/assessment-and-evaluation-programs/irap/irap-assessors |
| Essential Eight | https://www.cyber.gov.au/business-government/asds-cyber-security-frameworks/essential-eight |
| Essential Eight to ISM mapping | https://www.cyber.gov.au/business-government/asds-cyber-security-frameworks/essential-eight/essential-eight-maturity-model-and-ism-mapping |
| ISM GitHub (OSCAL) | https://github.com/AustralianCyberSecurityCentre/ism-oscal |
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