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tanviet12/vbsec / skills/antigravity/vbs-scan-security

vbs-scan-security

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Use when scanning code for security vulnerabilities. Use when user says "scan security", "kiểm tra bảo mật", "security audit", "review security", or invokes `/vbs-scan-security`. For large scans (>20 main-language files OR >30 total OR >14 days) processes chunks sequentially. Outputs bilingual reports (vi/en). Optional `--auto-fix` (agentic patch + verify loop) and `--sca` (live CVE lookup via OSV.dev).

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SKILL.mdskill md28.2 KB
VERSIONother6 B
references/chunking-strategy.mdmarkdown7.2 KB
references/data-flow-classification.mdmarkdown9.5 KB
references/dependency-scan.mdmarkdown9.7 KB
references/i18n/en.mdmarkdown8.7 KB
references/i18n/vi.mdmarkdown9.4 KB
references/language-detection.mdmarkdown7.5 KB
references/load-rules.shexecutablescript5.2 KB
references/output-format.mdmarkdown26.1 KB
references/project-context.mdmarkdown2.7 KB
references/sub-agent-prompts.mdmarkdown16.5 KB
references/validate-report.pyexecutablescript8.7 KB
rules/generic/01-hardcoded-secret.mdmarkdown5.4 KB
rules/generic/02-sql-injection.mdmarkdown5.2 KB
rules/generic/03-xss.mdmarkdown4.9 KB
rules/generic/04-idor.mdmarkdown5.7 KB
rules/generic/05-slopsquatting.mdmarkdown6.1 KB
rules/generic/06-brute-force.mdmarkdown6.9 KB
rules/generic/07-mass-assignment.mdmarkdown6.3 KB
rules/generic/08-insecure-deserialization.mdmarkdown6.3 KB
rules/generic/09-ssrf.mdmarkdown6.7 KB
rules/generic/10-path-traversal.mdmarkdown6.3 KB
rules/generic/11-csrf.mdmarkdown7.8 KB
rules/generic/12-broken-access-control.mdmarkdown7.9 KB
rules/generic/13-weak-password-hashing.mdmarkdown5.2 KB
rules/generic/14-jwt-none-algorithm.mdmarkdown5.3 KB
rules/generic/15-cors-misconfig.mdmarkdown5.3 KB
rules/generic/16-unrestricted-file-upload.mdmarkdown5.9 KB
rules/generic/17-verbose-error-debug-mode.mdmarkdown5.8 KB
rules/generic/18-missing-rate-limit.mdmarkdown10.7 KB
rules/generic/19-race-condition.mdmarkdown11.5 KB
rules/generic/20-outdated-dependency.mdmarkdown7.2 KB
rules/generic/21-command-injection.mdmarkdown6.6 KB
rules/generic/22-vulnerable-dependency.mdmarkdown5.3 KB
rules/generic/23-llm-prompt-injection.mdmarkdown9.7 KB
rules/generic/24-excessive-agency.mdmarkdown10.1 KB
rules/generic/25-tenant-isolation.mdmarkdown10.1 KB
rules/generic/26-authz-path-parity.mdmarkdown10.9 KB
rules/generic/27-excessive-data-exposure.mdmarkdown10.4 KB
rules/generic/28-business-state-integrity.mdmarkdown9.5 KB
rules/generic/29-sensitive-data-in-logs.mdmarkdown9.1 KB
rules/generic/30-auth-session-lifecycle.mdmarkdown9.4 KB
rules/generic/31-resource-exhaustion.mdmarkdown9.0 KB
rules/languages/README.mdmarkdown8.5 KB
rules/languages/dart/01-hardcoded-secret.mdmarkdown7.9 KB
rules/languages/dart/03-xss.mdmarkdown5.2 KB
rules/languages/dart/05-slopsquatting.mdmarkdown4.6 KB
rules/languages/dart/10-path-traversal.mdmarkdown6.3 KB
rules/languages/dart/12-broken-access-control.mdmarkdown8.3 KB
rules/languages/dart/17-verbose-error-debug-mode.mdmarkdown6.7 KB
rules/languages/dart/20-outdated-dependency.mdmarkdown4.7 KB
rules/languages/dart/README.mdmarkdown3.7 KB
rules/languages/dotnet/02-sql-injection.mdmarkdown5.7 KB
rules/languages/dotnet/07-mass-assignment.mdmarkdown6.0 KB
rules/languages/dotnet/08-insecure-deserialization.mdmarkdown5.7 KB
rules/languages/dotnet/17-verbose-error-debug-mode.mdmarkdown5.0 KB
rules/languages/dotnet/21-command-injection.mdmarkdown5.3 KB
rules/languages/dotnet/README.mdmarkdown1.7 KB
rules/languages/go/02-sql-injection.mdmarkdown5.2 KB
rules/languages/go/08-insecure-deserialization.mdmarkdown5.0 KB
rules/languages/go/09-ssrf.mdmarkdown5.8 KB
rules/languages/go/17-verbose-error-debug-mode.mdmarkdown6.1 KB
rules/languages/go/21-command-injection.mdmarkdown5.2 KB
rules/languages/go/README.mdmarkdown2.7 KB
rules/languages/php/02-sql-injection.mdmarkdown5.8 KB
rules/languages/php/08-insecure-deserialization.mdmarkdown6.2 KB
rules/languages/php/11-csrf.mdmarkdown6.2 KB
rules/languages/php/17-verbose-error-debug-mode.mdmarkdown6.5 KB
rules/languages/php/21-command-injection.mdmarkdown6.7 KB
rules/languages/php/README.mdmarkdown2.9 KB
rules/languages/python/02-sql-injection.mdmarkdown7.2 KB
rules/languages/python/07-mass-assignment.mdmarkdown7.3 KB
rules/languages/python/08-insecure-deserialization.mdmarkdown7.3 KB
rules/languages/python/09-ssrf.mdmarkdown7.5 KB
rules/languages/python/11-csrf.mdmarkdown7.6 KB
rules/languages/python/14-jwt-none-algorithm.mdmarkdown7.5 KB
rules/languages/python/15-cors-misconfig.mdmarkdown8.0 KB
rules/languages/python/17-verbose-error-debug-mode.mdmarkdown8.4 KB
rules/languages/python/21-command-injection.mdmarkdown8.5 KB
rules/languages/python/README.mdmarkdown3.4 KB
rules/languages/typescript/02-sql-injection.mdmarkdown7.5 KB
rules/languages/typescript/03-xss.mdmarkdown6.7 KB
rules/languages/typescript/07-mass-assignment.mdmarkdown7.4 KB
rules/languages/typescript/08-insecure-deserialization.mdmarkdown7.0 KB
rules/languages/typescript/09-ssrf.mdmarkdown7.5 KB
rules/languages/typescript/11-csrf.mdmarkdown7.3 KB
rules/languages/typescript/14-jwt-none-algorithm.mdmarkdown7.0 KB
rules/languages/typescript/15-cors-misconfig.mdmarkdown7.2 KB
rules/languages/typescript/17-verbose-error-debug-mode.mdmarkdown7.2 KB
rules/languages/typescript/21-command-injection.mdmarkdown6.7 KB
rules/languages/typescript/README.mdmarkdown3.3 KB
workflows/auto-fix.mdmarkdown18.9 KB
workflows/large-review-sequential.mdmarkdown14.8 KB
workflows/small-review.mdmarkdown10.1 KB

rules/languages/python/08-insecure-deserialization.md

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---
id: INSECURE-DESERIALIZATION
severity_max: CRITICAL
applies_to: python
---

# Insecure Deserialization — Python Specialization

> Override cho rule chung `rules/generic/08-insecure-deserialization.md`. Áp dụng khi `primary_language: python`.

## Intent (Python-specific)

Python có **lớp lỗ hổng đặc biệt nguy hiểm hơn các ngôn ngữ khác**: `pickle.loads()` cho phép arbitrary code execution **by design** — chính Python docs có cảnh báo "WARNING: Never unpickle data received from an untrusted source". Cùng họ: `marshal`, `shelve`, `dill`, `jsonpickle`. `yaml.load()` không kèm `SafeLoader` cũng cho phép RCE qua `!!python/object/apply:os.system`. Vibe code rất hay dùng pickle để cache, session, queue (Celery), ML model — và load lại từ Redis/file/network mà không verify nguồn.

## Khi nào CRITICAL

- `pickle.loads(data)` / `pickle.load(file)` với data từ:
  - HTTP request (L1)
  - Redis/Memcached/queue không kiểm soát producer
  - File user upload
  - Cookie session (Django pre-default-JSON, Flask `pickle` session)
- `yaml.load(data)` KHÔNG có `Loader=SafeLoader` hoặc `yaml.safe_load`
- `marshal.loads`, `marshal.load` với input untrusted
- `dill.loads` / `dill.load` (siêu tập của pickle, còn permissive hơn)
- `jsonpickle.decode(data)` — mặc định cho phép `py/object` reference class
- `shelve.open(user_controlled_path)` — backing store là pickle
- `eval(user_input)` / `exec(user_input)` — RCE trực tiếp (cũng cross-ref `21-command-injection`)
- `compile(user_input, ...) + exec` — biến tướng eval
- Celery `task_serializer = 'pickle'` (default đã JSON từ 4.0+ nhưng vibe code có thể bật pickle)

## Khi nào HIGH (giảm cấp)

- Input từ trusted internal source có HMAC/signature verify trước khi unpickle
- `pickle.loads` trong test fixture rõ ràng
- `yaml.load` với `Loader=SafeLoader` (đây thực ra là SAFE — nếu code đã đúng thì không flag)

## Cách reasoning

1. **Grep** sink: `pickle\.loads?`, `marshal\.loads?`, `yaml\.load\(`, `dill\.loads?`, `jsonpickle\.decode`, `shelve\.open`, `\beval\(`, `\bexec\(`
2. **Read** function chứa call. Source của bytes/string là gì?
   - L1: `request.body`, `request.files`, `request.cookies`, request param
   - L2: Redis key, file path từ DB
   - L3: file config local
   - L4: hardcoded bytes
3. **Verify**:
   - `yaml.load` có `Loader=SafeLoader` hoặc `yaml.SafeLoader`?
   - pickle có HMAC sign verify trước không (`hmac.compare_digest`)?
   - Celery config có `accept_content = ['json']` không?
   - Session backend là gì? (`SESSION_ENGINE` Django, `SESSION_TYPE` Flask)

## Search patterns

```
# Pickle - CRITICAL by default
pickle\.loads?\s*\(
cPickle\.loads?\s*\(
_pickle\.loads?\s*\(

# Marshal - CRITICAL
marshal\.loads?\s*\(

# YAML không safe
yaml\.load\s*\((?![^)]*Loader\s*=\s*(yaml\.)?SafeLoader)
# (tìm yaml.load mà KHÔNG kèm SafeLoader)

# dill/jsonpickle
dill\.loads?\s*\(
jsonpickle\.decode\s*\(

# shelve
shelve\.open\s*\(

# eval/exec với khả năng L1
\beval\s*\(\s*(request\.|input\(|sys\.argv)
\bexec\s*\(\s*(request\.|input\(|sys\.argv)
compile\s*\([^)]*\)\s*\)\s*\)?[^;]*\bexec
__import__\s*\(\s*request\.

# Celery cấu hình pickle
task_serializer\s*=\s*["']pickle["']
accept_content\s*=\s*\[[^\]]*["']pickle["']
result_serializer\s*=\s*["']pickle["']

# Django session với pickle
SESSION_SERIALIZER\s*=\s*["'][^"']*PickleSerializer["']

# Flask session pickle hoặc itsdangerous unsafe
session_interface\s*=\s*[^J][^S][^O][^N]
```

## Examples

### CRITICAL — flag

```python
# Flask + pickle từ request body — RCE
@app.post('/import')
def import_data():
    data = pickle.loads(request.data)  # L1 → RCE
    return jsonify(ok=True)
# Exploit payload tạo bằng pickle.dumps(obj với __reduce__ chạy os.system)
```

```python
# Django + yaml.load không safe
def upload_config(request):
    config = yaml.load(request.FILES['config'].read())  # CRITICAL
    # Attacker upload YAML: !!python/object/apply:os.system ["rm -rf /"]
    return JsonResponse(config)
```

```python
# Cache pickle từ Redis không HMAC
def get_user_cache(user_id):
    raw = redis.get(f"user:{user_id}")  # L2 — kẻ tấn công ghi vào Redis
    if raw:
        return pickle.loads(raw)  # RCE nếu Redis bị compromise
```

```python
# FastAPI eval từ request
@app.post('/calc')
async def calc(expr: str):  # L1
    return {"result": eval(expr)}
# Exploit: expr = "__import__('os').system('id')"
```

```python
# jsonpickle decode mặc định cho phép class
@app.post('/restore')
def restore():
    obj = jsonpickle.decode(request.data.decode())  # py/object → RCE
    return jsonify(state=str(obj))
```

```python
# Celery với pickle serializer
# celery_config.py
task_serializer = 'pickle'  # CRITICAL nếu broker chia sẻ
accept_content = ['pickle', 'json']
# Bất kỳ ai publish vào queue đều có thể RCE worker
```

### NOT critical — không flag

```python
# yaml.safe_load — SAFE
data = yaml.safe_load(request.files['config'].read())

# Hoặc explicit SafeLoader
data = yaml.load(stream, Loader=yaml.SafeLoader)
```

```python
# ast.literal_eval thay cho eval — SAFE cho literal
import ast
result = ast.literal_eval(request.json['expr'])
# Chỉ parse được str/int/float/list/dict/tuple/None/bool
```

```python
# JSON serializer — SAFE
data = json.loads(request.data)
```

```python
# Pickle với HMAC verify — chấp nhận nếu key bí mật
data = request.data
sig = request.headers['X-Sig']
expected = hmac.new(SECRET, data, 'sha256').hexdigest()
if hmac.compare_digest(sig, expected):
    obj = pickle.loads(data)  # OK vì verify integrity
```

## Fix recommendation

1. **Thay pickle bằng JSON** cho mọi data đi qua network/storage không tin cậy:
   ```python
   # BAD
   pickle.dumps(obj) → pickle.loads(bytes)
   # GOOD
   json.dumps(obj.__dict__) → json.loads(s)
   # Hoặc msgpack, protobuf, flatbuffers cho hiệu năng
   ```
2. **YAML** — luôn dùng `safe_load`:
   ```python
   # BAD
   yaml.load(stream)
   # GOOD
   yaml.safe_load(stream)
   ```
3. **eval/exec** — không bao giờ với input user. Thay bằng:
   ```python
   import ast
   ast.literal_eval(s)  # cho literal
   # Cho expression toán: dùng asteval, simpleeval (sandboxed)
   ```
4. **Celery** — bắt buộc JSON:
   ```python
   task_serializer = 'json'
   accept_content = ['json']
   result_serializer = 'json'
   ```
5. **Django session** — KHÔNG dùng pickle serializer (default đã là JSON từ Django 1.6+):
   ```python
   SESSION_SERIALIZER = 'django.contrib.sessions.serializers.JSONSerializer'
   ```
6. **Nếu BẮT BUỘC pickle** (vd: ML model giữa trusted services) — kèm HMAC:
   ```python
   def safe_pickle_load(data: bytes, sig: bytes, key: bytes):
       expected = hmac.new(key, data, 'sha256').digest()
       if not hmac.compare_digest(sig, expected):
           raise ValueError("Signature mismatch")
       return pickle.loads(data)
   ```
7. **ML model loading**: nếu load model từ HuggingFace/internet → ưu tiên format `safetensors` thay pickle/torch `.pt`.

## Cross-references

- Python `21-command-injection`: `eval`/`exec`/`__import__` là biến thể RCE qua deserialization
- Generic `01-hardcoded-secret`: HMAC key cho pickle verify không được hardcode
- Generic `20-outdated-dependency`: PyYAML <5.1 có CVE-2017-18342, dill cũ có CVE
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