SSZcreate/Pentab_server / .agents/skills/cybersecurity/skills/exploiting-active-directory-with-bloodhound
exploiting-active-directory-with-bloodhound
VerifiedBloodHound is a graph-based Active Directory reconnaissance tool that uses graph theory to reveal hidden and unintended relationships within AD environments. Red teams use BloodHound to identify attac
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| LICENSE | other | 11.0 KB |
| SKILL.md | skill md | 5.0 KB |
| assets/template.md | markdown | 1.8 KB |
| references/api-reference.md | markdown | 2.3 KB |
| references/standards.md | markdown | 3.4 KB |
| references/workflows.md | markdown | 6.1 KB |
| scripts/agent.py | script | 5.6 KB |
| scripts/process.py | script | 21.6 KB |
references/workflows.md
View on GitHub# BloodHound Active Directory Exploitation Workflows
## Workflow 1: Data Collection
### SharpHound Collection (Windows)
```powershell
# Basic collection - all methods
.\SharpHound.exe -c All
# DCOnly collection (less noise, requires domain user)
.\SharpHound.exe -c DCOnly
# Session collection with loop (continuous session data gathering)
.\SharpHound.exe -c Session --Loop --LoopDuration 02:00:00 --LoopInterval 00:05:00
# Collection from specific domain
.\SharpHound.exe -c All -d targetdomain.local
# Stealth collection (avoid noisy queries)
.\SharpHound.exe -c DCOnly,Session --Stealth
# Collection via LDAP with specific credentials
.\SharpHound.exe -c All -d targetdomain.local --LdapUsername user --LdapPassword pass
# Output to specific directory
.\SharpHound.exe -c All --OutputDirectory C:\Users\Public\
# Exclude domain controllers from session collection
.\SharpHound.exe -c All --ExcludeDomainControllers
```
### BloodHound.py Collection (Linux/Kali)
```bash
# Basic collection with username/password
bloodhound-python -d targetdomain.local -u user -p 'Password123' -c All -ns 10.0.0.1
# Collection with NTLM hash
bloodhound-python -d targetdomain.local -u user --hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:hash -c All -ns 10.0.0.1
# DNS resolution via domain controller
bloodhound-python -d targetdomain.local -u user -p 'Password123' -c All -dc dc01.targetdomain.local -ns 10.0.0.1
# Collection with specific methods
bloodhound-python -d targetdomain.local -u user -p 'Password123' -c Group,LocalAdmin,Session -ns 10.0.0.1
```
## Workflow 2: BloodHound CE Setup and Data Import
### Setup BloodHound Community Edition
```bash
# Docker Compose setup
curl -L https://ghst.ly/getbhce -o docker-compose.yml
docker compose pull
docker compose up -d
# Access at https://localhost:8080
# Default credentials in docker compose output
# Upload SharpHound ZIP files via UI
```
### Legacy BloodHound Setup
```bash
# Install Neo4j
sudo apt install neo4j
sudo neo4j console
# Download and run BloodHound
wget https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/releases/latest
chmod +x BloodHound
./BloodHound --no-sandbox
# Import data via drag-and-drop of ZIP files
```
## Workflow 3: Attack Path Discovery
### Pre-Built Queries
```cypher
-- Shortest Path to Domain Admins from Owned
MATCH p=shortestPath((n {owned:true})-[*1..]->(m:Group {name:"DOMAIN ADMINS@TARGETDOMAIN.LOCAL"}))
RETURN p
-- Find All Kerberoastable Users
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true}) RETURN u.name, u.serviceprincipalnames
-- Kerberoastable Users with Path to DA
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})
MATCH p=shortestPath((u)-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN ADMINS@TARGETDOMAIN.LOCAL"}))
RETURN u.name, LENGTH(p)
ORDER BY LENGTH(p) ASC
-- AS-REP Roastable Users
MATCH (u:User {dontreqpreauth:true}) RETURN u.name, u.displayname
-- Users with DCSync Rights
MATCH p=(n)-[:MemberOf|GetChanges|GetChangesAll*1..]->(d:Domain)
WHERE n.name IS NOT NULL
RETURN p
-- Computers with Unconstrained Delegation
MATCH (c:Computer {unconstraineddelegation:true})
WHERE NOT c.name CONTAINS "DC"
RETURN c.name
-- Find Users with Local Admin on Multiple Computers
MATCH (u:User)-[:AdminTo]->(c:Computer)
WITH u, COUNT(c) as adminCount
WHERE adminCount > 1
RETURN u.name, adminCount
ORDER BY adminCount DESC
-- GPOs Modifying Local Group Memberships
MATCH (g:GPO)-[:GpLink]->(ou:OU)-[:Contains*1..]->(c:Computer)
RETURN g.name, ou.name, COLLECT(c.name)
-- Find Shortest Path from Domain Users to DA
MATCH p=shortestPath((g:Group {name:"DOMAIN USERS@TARGETDOMAIN.LOCAL"})-[*1..]->(h:Group {name:"DOMAIN ADMINS@TARGETDOMAIN.LOCAL"}))
RETURN p
-- Accounts with Constrained Delegation
MATCH (c) WHERE c.allowedtodelegate IS NOT NULL
RETURN c.name, c.allowedtodelegate
```
### ACL-Based Attack Path Queries
```cypher
-- Find GenericAll Rights
MATCH p=(n)-[:GenericAll]->(m)
WHERE n <> m AND NOT n.name STARTS WITH "DVTA"
RETURN p
-- Find WriteDACL Rights to Domain Object
MATCH p=(n)-[:WriteDacl]->(d:Domain)
RETURN p
-- Find ForceChangePassword Paths
MATCH p=(n)-[:ForceChangePassword]->(m:User)
RETURN p
-- Find AddMember Rights to Admin Groups
MATCH p=(n)-[:AddMember]->(g:Group)
WHERE g.name CONTAINS "ADMIN"
RETURN p
-- Find WriteOwner Abuse Paths
MATCH p=(n)-[:WriteOwner]->(m)
WHERE m:Group OR m:User
RETURN p
-- Find LAPS Password Readers
MATCH p=(n)-[:ReadLAPSPassword]->(c:Computer)
RETURN p
```
## Workflow 4: Exploitation Chain Examples
### Chain 1: ACL Abuse to Domain Admin
```
Step 1: Owned user has GenericWrite on Service Account
-> Set SPN on service account (Targeted Kerberoasting)
Step 2: Crack service account Kerberos ticket
-> Obtain service account password
Step 3: Service account has GenericAll on admin group
-> Add ourselves to admin group
Step 4: Admin group is member of Domain Admins
-> Domain Admin achieved
```
### Chain 2: Session-Based Lateral Movement
```
Step 1: BloodHound shows Domain Admin session on WORKSTATION01
Step 2: Owned user has local admin on WORKSTATION01
Step 3: Lateral move to WORKSTATION01 via PsExec/WMI
Step 4: Dump credentials from LSASS
Step 5: Obtain Domain Admin NTLM hash or Kerberos ticket
```
### Chain 3: GPO Abuse Path
```
Step 1: Owned user has WriteDACL on GPO
Step 2: Modify GPO to add immediate scheduled task
Step 3: GPO is linked to OU containing Domain Controller
Step 4: Scheduled task executes payload on DC
Step 5: Domain compromise achieved
```
### Chain 4: Constrained Delegation Abuse
```
Step 1: Compromised service account with constrained delegation to DC
Step 2: Request TGT for compromised service account
Step 3: Use S4U2Self to get ticket for high-priv user
Step 4: Use S4U2Proxy to forward ticket to target service on DC
Step 5: Access DC as Domain Admin
```
## Workflow 5: Reporting with PlumHound
### Automated Report Generation
```bash
# Install PlumHound
git clone https://github.com/PlumHound/PlumHound.git
pip install -r requirements.txt
# Generate default reports
python PlumHound.py -x tasks/default.tasks -s "bolt://localhost:7687" -u neo4j -p password
# Generate specific report
python PlumHound.py --easy -s "bolt://localhost:7687" -u neo4j -p password
# Custom task file for red team reporting
python PlumHound.py -x tasks/redteam.tasks -s "bolt://localhost:7687" -u neo4j -p password
```
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