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detecting-serverless-function-injection

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Detects and prevents code injection attacks targeting serverless functions (AWS Lambda, Azure Functions, Google Cloud Functions) through event source poisoning, malicious layer injection, runtime command execution, and IAM privilege escalation via function modification. The analyst combines static analysis of function code, CloudTrail event correlation, runtime behavior monitoring, and IAM policy auditing to identify injection vectors across the expanded serverless attack surface including API Gateway, S3, SQS, DynamoDB Streams, and CloudWatch event triggers. Activates for requests involving Lambda security assessment, serverless injection detection, function event poisoning analysis, or serverless privilege escalation investigation.

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references/api-reference.md

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# API Reference: Serverless Function Injection Detection Agent

## Overview

Detects code injection vulnerabilities in AWS Lambda functions by scanning function code for dangerous sinks (eval, exec, os.system, child_process.exec), auditing Lambda layers for external account dependencies, identifying IAM privilege escalation paths through overprivileged execution roles, and monitoring CloudTrail for suspicious function modifications. For authorized security assessments only.

## Dependencies

| Package | Version | Purpose |
|---------|---------|---------|
| boto3 | >=1.26 | AWS API access for Lambda, IAM, CloudTrail |

## CLI Usage

```bash
# Full assessment with code scanning
python agent.py --region us-east-1 --scan-code --cloudtrail-days 14 --output report.json

# Scan specific functions only
python agent.py --functions payment-processor auth-handler --scan-code --output report.json

# Quick assessment without code download (IAM, layers, CloudTrail only)
python agent.py --region us-west-2 --output quick_report.json
```

## Arguments

| Argument | Required | Description |
|----------|----------|-------------|
| `--region` | No | AWS region to assess (default: us-east-1) |
| `--functions` | No | Specific function names to scan (default: all functions in region) |
| `--scan-code` | No | Download and scan function deployment packages for injection sinks |
| `--cloudtrail-days` | No | Number of days of CloudTrail history to search (default: 7) |
| `--output` | No | Output file path (default: `serverless_injection_report.json`) |

## Key Functions

### `enumerate_functions(lambda_client)`
Lists all Lambda functions with runtime, handler, execution role, layers, environment variable names, and function URL configuration. Flags functions with secrets in environment variables.

### `get_event_source_mappings(lambda_client)`
Enumerates all event source mappings (SQS, DynamoDB Streams, Kinesis, Kafka, MQ) to identify injection entry points where untrusted data enters function handlers.

### `download_and_scan_function(lambda_client, function_name, runtime_family, work_dir)`
Downloads the function deployment package, extracts it, and scans source files for injection sinks using regex patterns. Checks whether event data accessors (`event[`, `event.get(`) appear in the context around each sink to assess data flow confidence.

### `audit_layers(lambda_client, functions)`
Identifies Lambda layers from external AWS accounts and high-impact layers shared across 5+ functions. External layers can intercept function execution or override runtime dependencies.

### `detect_privilege_escalation_paths(iam_client, functions)`
Audits execution roles for dangerous permissions (iam:PassRole, lambda:UpdateFunctionCode, sts:AssumeRole) and administrative policies. Any function with UpdateFunctionCode + PassRole is a privilege escalation vector.

### `check_cloudtrail_for_modifications(cloudtrail_client, days_back)`
Searches CloudTrail for UpdateFunctionCode, UpdateFunctionConfiguration, PublishLayerVersion, and CreateFunction events. Flags modifications outside CloudFormation/console, role changes, layer additions, and off-hours activity.

### `check_function_url_security(lambda_client, functions)`
Identifies Lambda function URLs with `AuthType=NONE` that are publicly accessible without authentication.

## Injection Pattern Coverage

### Python Sinks
| Pattern | CWE | Severity |
|---------|-----|----------|
| `eval()` | CWE-95 | Critical |
| `exec()` | CWE-95 | Critical |
| `os.system()` | CWE-78 | Critical |
| `os.popen()` | CWE-78 | Critical |
| `subprocess.*(shell=True)` | CWE-78 | Critical |
| `pickle.loads()` | CWE-502 | High |
| `yaml.load()` without SafeLoader | CWE-502 | High |
| `jinja2.Template()` with event data | CWE-1336 | High |
| SQL via f-string with event data | CWE-89 | Critical |

### Node.js Sinks
| Pattern | CWE | Severity |
|---------|-----|----------|
| `eval()` | CWE-95 | Critical |
| `new Function()` | CWE-95 | Critical |
| `child_process.exec()` | CWE-78 | Critical |
| `child_process.execSync()` | CWE-78 | Critical |
| `vm.runInNewContext()` | CWE-95 | Critical |
| `vm.runInThisContext()` | CWE-95 | Critical |
| Template literal command injection | CWE-78 | Critical |

## Output Schema

```json
{
  "report_type": "Serverless Function Injection Assessment",
  "generated_at": "ISO-8601 timestamp",
  "summary": {
    "functions_analyzed": 0,
    "event_source_mappings": 0,
    "total_findings": 0,
    "critical_findings": 0,
    "high_findings": 0,
    "injection_sinks_found": 0,
    "layer_issues": 0,
    "escalation_paths": 0,
    "suspicious_modifications": 0
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "category": "code_injection|layer_security|privilege_escalation|suspicious_modification|function_url",
      "function_name": "",
      "severity": "critical|high|medium",
      "description": ""
    }
  ],
  "functions": [],
  "event_source_mappings": [],
  "cloudtrail_events": []
}
```

## Exit Codes

| Code | Meaning |
|------|---------|
| 0 | No critical findings |
| 1 | Critical injection sinks or privilege escalation paths detected |
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