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golang-continuous-integration

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CI/CD pipeline configuration using GitHub Actions for Golang projects — testing, linting, SAST, security scanning, code coverage, Dependabot, Renovate, GoReleaser, code review automation, and release pipelines. Use when setting up or improving Go project CI, configuring GitHub Actions workflows, adding linters or security scanners, automating dependency updates, or adding quality gates.

references/repo-security.md

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# Repository Security Settings

After creating workflow files, repository security settings should be configured. These are not optional — they are the security foundation that makes the CI pipeline trustworthy.

The project's GitHub URL can be determined from its git remote (e.g., `git remote -v`). For a project hosted at `https://github.com/{owner}/{repo}`, the relevant settings links are:

- Branch protection: `https://github.com/{owner}/{repo}/settings/branches`
- Actions permissions: `https://github.com/{owner}/{repo}/settings/actions`
- Secrets: `https://github.com/{owner}/{repo}/settings/secrets/actions`
- Environments: `https://github.com/{owner}/{repo}/settings/environments`

These links allow direct navigation to the appropriate settings page.

## Branch Protection Rules

Configure a branch protection rule for `main` (or the default branch):

1. **Require a pull request before merging** — prevents direct pushes to main
2. **Require approvals** (at least 1) — no self-merging without review
3. **Dismiss stale pull request approvals when new commits are pushed** — prevents approving then sneaking in changes
4. **Require status checks to pass before merging** — add all CI workflow job names as required checks (e.g., `Test (Go 1.24)`, `Test (Go stable)`, `Lint`)
5. **Require branches to be up to date before merging** — prevents merging stale PRs that haven't been tested against latest main
6. **Do not allow bypassing the above settings** — applies rules to admins too

## Workflow Permissions

Set the default `GITHUB_TOKEN` to **read-only** at the repository level:

1. Go to **Actions permissions** (link above)
2. Workflow permissions MUST follow least privilege. Under **Workflow permissions**, select **"Read repository contents and packages permissions"**
3. Uncheck **"Allow GitHub Actions to create and approve pull requests"** (unless auto-merge is needed — then check it only for that purpose)

This means workflows start with no write access by default. Each workflow that needs elevated permissions must explicitly declare them in its `permissions:` block. This is defense-in-depth: if a workflow is compromised, it cannot write to the repository unless explicitly granted.

## Fork Pull Request Restrictions

For public/open-source repositories:

1. In **Actions permissions** (link above), set **"Fork pull request workflows from outside collaborators"** to **"Require approval for all outside collaborators"**
2. This prevents untrusted forks from running workflows that consume your Actions minutes or access secrets
3. NEVER use `pull_request_target` with untrusted code — it runs with write access to the base repo

## Secrets and Environments

- Never put secrets in workflow files — use **Secrets** settings (link above)
- For release workflows, create a **"release" environment** with required reviewers in **Environments** (link above) to add a manual approval gate before publishing
- Rotate `CODECOV_TOKEN` and other third-party tokens periodically

## Permissions Cheat Sheet

The security implications of every permission used are documented below:

| Permission | Workflows that need it | Risk |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `contents: read` | All workflows | **Low** — read-only, default safe |
| `contents: write` | Release, auto-merge | **High** — can modify repo contents, create releases |
| `packages: write` | Docker | **High** — can push container images to GHCR |
| `pull-requests: write` | Auto-merge | **High** — can merge PRs, approve changes |
| `attestations: write` | Docker | **Medium** — can create provenance/SBOM attestations |
| `id-token: write` | Docker | **Medium** — OIDC token for signing attestations |
| `security-events: write` | Security/SAST, Docker | **Medium** — can upload SARIF to Security tab |

Always prefer the narrowest permission scope. If a workflow only needs `contents: read`, do not grant `contents: write`.
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