sno-ai/sno-station-skills / skills/J-peer-review-and-audit/cross-vendor-security-audit/skill
cross-vendor-security-audit
VerifiedSecurity guidance and vulnerability review for codebases, APIs, services, CLI tools, libraries, and daemons, in which a model from another vendor re-reads everything the audit set aside. Use for security questions, focused reviews, vulnerability research, security audits, or pen tests. Run the complete workflow only for explicit codebase audit or pen-test requests, full/comprehensive/end-to-end reviews, or requested report artifacts.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| AI-AND-LLM.md | markdown | 10.4 KB |
| ATTACK-CLASSES.md | markdown | 15.3 KB |
| CLIENT-SIDE.md | markdown | 8.4 KB |
| CLOUD-AND-DEPLOYMENT.md | markdown | 8.1 KB |
| DATA-ISOLATION-AND-LIFECYCLE.md | markdown | 7.6 KB |
| DESKTOP-MOBILE-AND-LOCAL-IPC.md | markdown | 8.5 KB |
| HUNTING.md | markdown | 21.9 KB |
| LICENSE-MIT-cloudflare | other | 1.1 KB |
| MEMORY-SAFETY-AND-BINARY.md | markdown | 10.3 KB |
| PROTOCOLS-RPC-AND-MESSAGING.md | markdown | 7.3 KB |
| RECONNAISSANCE.md | markdown | 15.5 KB |
| RESOURCE-EXHAUSTION-AND-AVAILABILITY.md | markdown | 7.3 KB |
| SKILL.md | skill md | 23.0 KB |
| SUPPLY-CHAIN-AND-RELEASE.md | markdown | 7.1 KB |
| VALIDATION-AND-REPORTING.md | markdown | 24.0 KB |
| WEB-PROTOCOL-AND-AUTH.md | markdown | 12.0 KB |
| report-schema.json | config | 14.2 KB |
| scripts/selftest/run-selftest.shexecutable | script | 5.2 KB |
| validate-coverage-ledger.cjsexecutable | script | 32.7 KB |
| validate-coverage-ledger.test.cjs | script | 27.8 KB |
| validate-findings.cjsexecutable | script | 28.1 KB |
| validate-findings.test.cjs | script | 25.8 KB |
| validate-second-look.cjs | script | 1.9 KB |
CLIENT-SIDE.md
View on GitHub# Client-Side and Browser Hunting
#### When to use this file
Reach for this file when meaningful trust decisions or untrusted rendering happen in a browser: single-page apps, browser extensions, embedded webviews, service workers, offline applications, and code that renders attacker-influenceable content into the DOM, receives cross-window messages, or uses browser storage. These paths include sources the server never sees, such as URL fragments, `window.name`, `postMessage`, and previously cached content.
Use alongside `ATTACK-CLASSES.md`. This file covers browser sources and sinks, origin boundaries, browser persistence, and cross-site state oracles. Use `DESKTOP-MOBILE-AND-LOCAL-IPC.md` for the native side of a webview bridge, and `WEB-PROTOCOL-AND-AUTH.md` for server-side CSRF, sessions, and auth callbacks.
## Core discipline (include in every agent prompt for this domain)
```
- A client-side candidate needs a controllable source and an executing or disclosing sink. Name both and show attacker-influenced data reaching the sink.
- The impact must reach a victim's session, another origin, or shared persistence. Self-injection and disclosure of the attacker's own data are not findings.
- Framework escaping, browser same-origin policy, CSP, COOP/CORP, service-worker scope, and modern noopener defaults are real controls. Verify them before assigning impact.
- Browser storage and caches are shared by origin and may outlive login state. Identify who writes, who reads, and which account, tenant, or worker lifecycle clears each record.
- Use `confirmed` only for complete source evidence plus bounded local browser tests. Use `needs_validation` when renderer, extension permission, deployed header, or browser-policy behavior is required but unavailable.
```
## DOM and object-state attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
**DOM-based XSS**
Trace `location` fields, `document.referrer`, `window.name`, message data, storage, and browser-controlled document state into `innerHTML`, `outerHTML`, `document.write`, string-evaluating APIs, executable URLs, jQuery HTML APIs, or framework escape hatches. Interpolation escaped by the framework is not a finding.
**DOM clobbering**
Attacker-injected `id` or `name` attributes shadow a global, form property, configuration object, or initialization flag later trusted by code. Require both a markup path that preserves the attribute and a security-relevant use of the clobbered value.
**Prototype pollution and gadget chain**
An attacker-controlled key reaches a recursive write such as deep merge or path assignment and modifies prototype state. Then a reachable gadget consumes the polluted property to change authorization, execution, navigation, or rendering. `JSON.parse`, a shallow copy, or pollution without a gadget is not enough.
## Cross-origin messaging and network attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
**`postMessage` origin and source trust**
A handler performs a sensitive action with `event.data` without an exact origin allowlist and, where multiple frames share an origin, the expected `event.source`. On the send side, sensitive data sent to `*` reaches an unintended embedder. Weak substring, prefix, suffix, or unanchored-regex origin matching is not an origin check.
**Cross-site WebSocket request use**
A WebSocket upgrade accepts ambient cookies from an untrusted origin without an `Origin` check or channel-specific token, allowing the victim's session to read or mutate data. Confirm both the upgrade behavior and a security-relevant message handler.
**Credentialed CORS trust**
The server reflects or weakly matches `Origin` while allowing credentials and returns sensitive responses. A bare wildcard with credentials is rejected by browsers; report only the actual reflected/allowed origin path and cross-origin data or mutation.
## Service-worker and browser-storage attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
**Service-worker registration and scope takeover**
Attacker-influenceable content can become the registered worker script, control a path that receives an over-broad `Service-Worker-Allowed` scope, or alter update imports without integrity control. Verify the final script URL, response MIME type, origin, scope, and who controls every imported script. A normal same-origin worker with intended scope is not a defect.
**Service-worker cache and identity confusion**
The worker caches personalized responses without including account, tenant, authorization state, or request mode in its policy, then serves them after account switch or logout. Review fetch-event routing, cache names and keys, navigation fallbacks, cache cleanup, and whether error/offline paths return another user's prior response.
**Browser-storage disclosure and stale authorization**
Tokens, private responses, draft data, or authorization decisions remain in `localStorage`, `sessionStorage`, IndexedDB, Cache Storage, extension storage, or client state and become readable by another account or less-trusted same-origin component. Storage of a token alone is not a finding; require a realistic reader with less authority, or continued use after revocation/logout.
**Cross-context storage and broadcast confusion**
`storage` events, `BroadcastChannel`, shared workers, or origin-wide caches carry identity or commands between tabs without binding them to the current session. Check account switching, private/public windows, tenant changes, and stale tabs that can overwrite newer auth state.
## Cross-site information leak classes (subagent_type: `general`)
**XS-Leaks and cross-origin state oracles**
An attacker page can distinguish protected cross-origin state through resource load/error events, frame or window state, redirect behavior, timing, cache state, or response size while the browser attaches victim credentials. Require one concrete secret-bearing predicate such as whether a private object, role, or account exists. Generic timing variance or public-resource availability is not a finding.
**Window and opener state disclosure**
A cross-origin window's permitted metadata or navigation result reveals protected state, or a retained opener/named-window relationship lets an attacker-controlled page influence a privileged navigation. Check COOP, frame protections, `noopener`, exact origin, and whether the observable state is confidential.
## UI-redress and navigation attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
**Clickjacking**
A framed, state-changing action lacks effective `frame-ancestors`, `X-Frame-Options`, or equivalent UI isolation. Require the sensitive action and confirm it can complete in the framed state; missing headers on read-only content are hardening notes.
**Client-side navigation confusion**
A client source controls redirect or navigation without scheme and destination policy, including executable `javascript:` or `data:` destinations. Reverse tabnabbing applies only where code explicitly keeps `window.opener`, uses `window.open` without isolation, or supports a browser without implicit `noopener`.
## Universal moves (apply across the above)
- Start from DOM, navigation, worker, message, and storage sinks, then trace backward to browser-only and server-controlled sources. Record the browser policy that should stop the path.
- Test account switch, logout, worker update, offline fallback, and stale-tab state with a local test origin and dummy accounts. Do not use production users, origins, or shared services.
- For XS-Leaks, list only predicates proved by source and local browser behavior. Then identify the response headers or rendering choice that would remove the oracle.
## Validation rules (apply before reporting ANY finding here)
1. Cite the source, sink, browser policy, affected origin/session, and observable mutation or disclosure.
2. For prototype pollution, prove the recursive write and a security-relevant gadget. For DOM clobbering, prove the markup survives and the shadowed value is used.
3. For service workers and storage, prove lifecycle reachability: an attacker-controlled write or cache entry must reach a different account, tenant, or later authorization state.
4. For messaging, CORS, WebSocket, and XS-Leaks, show exact origin/source validation and the protected state or action exposed. Confirm that CSP, COOP/CORP, cookies, and SameSite policy do not already block it.
5. Return `confirmed` findings only with a complete client path and bounded local evidence. Return `needs_validation` with the precise deployed header, extension permission, browser version, or renderer behavior an owner must verify.
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