samber/cc-skills-golang / skills/golang-security
golang-security
FlaggedSecurity best practices and vulnerability prevention for Golang — injection (SQL, command, XSS), cryptography, path traversal, SSRF and HTTP security headers, cookies, secrets management, memory safety, PII in logs, STRIDE/DREAD threat modeling, plus `gosec` SAST, race detection, and fuzz testing. Apply when writing, reviewing, or auditing Go code for security, or when touching crypto, file or network I/O, secrets, user input, or authentication. Not for non-exploitable defensive bugs such as nil panics or slice aliasing (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-safety` skill), dependency vulnerability scanning with govulncheck (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-dependency-management` skill), or wiring security scanners into CI pipelines (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-continuous-integration` skill).
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 14.0 KB |
| evals/evals.json | config | 49.0 KB |
| references/architecture.md | markdown | 10.4 KB |
| references/checklist.md | markdown | 4.0 KB |
| references/cookies.md | markdown | 4.8 KB |
| references/cryptography.md | markdown | 11.0 KB |
| references/filesystem.md | markdown | 6.8 KB |
| references/injection.md | markdown | 7.3 KB |
| references/logging.md | markdown | 3.9 KB |
| references/memory-safety.md | markdown | 5.1 KB |
| references/network.md | markdown | 6.3 KB |
| references/secrets.md | markdown | 4.8 KB |
| references/third-party.md | markdown | 4.9 KB |
| references/threat-modeling.md | markdown | 8.4 KB |
references/threat-modeling.md
View on GitHub# Threat Modeling Guide
Systematic methodology for identifying and prioritizing security threats in Go applications.
## Table of Contents
- [STRIDE Methodology](#stride-methodology)
- [STRIDE per Element Matrix](#stride-per-element-matrix)
- [Go-Specific STRIDE Analysis](#go-specific-stride-analysis)
- [DREAD Risk Scoring](#dread-risk-scoring)
- [Example: SQL Injection in Login Handler](#example-sql-injection-in-login-handler)
- [Trust Boundary Analysis](#trust-boundary-analysis)
- [OWASP Top 10 Mapping for Go](#owasp-top-10-mapping-for-go)
- [Conducting a Threat Model](#conducting-a-threat-model)
- [Vulnerability Severity Matrix](#vulnerability-severity-matrix)
## STRIDE Methodology
Apply STRIDE to every element in your system's data flow diagram. Each element type is susceptible to specific threat categories:
### STRIDE per Element Matrix
| DFD Element | S | T | R | I | D | E |
| ------------------------------------- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| External Entity (user, API client) | X | | X | | | |
| Process (HTTP handler, gRPC service) | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Data Store (database, cache, file) | | X | X | X | X | |
| Data Flow (HTTP, gRPC, message queue) | | X | | X | X | |
### Go-Specific STRIDE Analysis
**Spoofing** — Can an attacker impersonate a user or service?
```go
// Check: Is every endpoint behind authentication?
// Check: Are JWT tokens validated (algorithm, issuer, expiry)?
// Check: Is mTLS configured for service-to-service calls?
r.Use(authMiddleware) // every route group must have auth
```
**Tampering** — Can data be modified in transit or at rest?
```go
// Check: Are all external inputs validated?
// Check: Is HMAC used for webhook/callback verification?
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
mac.Write(payload)
expected := mac.Sum(nil)
if !hmac.Equal(signature, expected) {
return errors.New("tampered payload")
}
```
**Repudiation** — Can a user deny performing an action?
```go
// Check: Are all security-relevant actions logged with structured data?
logger.Info("action_performed",
"user_id", userID,
"action", "delete_account",
"ip", r.RemoteAddr,
"timestamp", time.Now().UTC(),
)
```
**Information Disclosure** — Can sensitive data leak?
```go
// Check: Are error messages generic to clients?
// Check: Are logs free of PII?
// Check: Is TLS configured (no InsecureSkipVerify)?
// Check: Are debug endpoints (pprof) disabled in production?
```
**Denial of Service** — Can the service be overwhelmed?
```go
// Check: Are timeouts set on the HTTP server?
// Check: Are request body sizes limited?
// Check: Is rate limiting in place?
server := &http.Server{
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
MaxHeaderBytes: 1 << 20, // 1MB
}
```
**Elevation of Privilege** — Can a user gain unauthorized access?
```go
// Check: Is authorization checked server-side on every request?
// Check: Are object references validated (no IDOR)?
// Check: Are admin routes properly protected?
if !user.HasPermission("admin:write") {
http.Error(w, "Forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
```
---
## DREAD Risk Scoring
Score each identified threat to prioritize remediation:
| Factor | 1-3 (Low) | 4-6 (Medium) | 7-10 (High) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **D**amage | Minor info disclosure | Partial data breach | Full system compromise, data destruction |
| **R**eproducibility | Timing-dependent, hard to reproduce | Reproducible with some effort | Always reproducible, automated tools exist |
| **E**xploitability | Custom exploit, advanced skills needed | Basic tools available | No skills required, public exploit exists |
| **A**ffected users | Individual user | Subset of users | All users |
| **D**iscoverability | Requires insider knowledge | Found via scanning | Publicly documented, obvious |
**Score** = (D + R + E + A + D) / 5. Risk levels: **8-10 Critical**, **6-7.9 High**, **4-5.9 Medium**, **1-3.9 Low**.
### Example: SQL Injection in Login Handler
| Factor | Score | Justification |
| --------------- | ----- | ------------------------------------------ |
| Damage | 9 | Full database access, credential theft |
| Reproducibility | 9 | Consistent, automated tools exist (sqlmap) |
| Exploitability | 8 | Well-documented attack, easy tooling |
| Affected Users | 10 | All users with accounts |
| Discoverability | 7 | Automated scanners detect easily |
**DREAD Score: 8.6 — Critical. Immediate remediation required.**
---
## Trust Boundary Analysis
Map where untrusted data enters your Go application:
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│ TRUST BOUNDARY │
│ │
Internet ──→ [LB/WAF] ──→ [Go HTTP Server] │
│ │ │
│ [Middleware] │
│ - Auth (JWT/session) │
│ - Rate limiting │
│ - Input validation │
│ - Security headers │
│ │ │
│ [Service Layer] ──→ [Cache] │
│ │ │
│ [Database] (parameterized queries) │
│ │
└──────────┬──────────────────────────┘
│
External APIs (mTLS)
```
Every arrow crossing the trust boundary needs:
1. **Authentication** — who is making this request?
2. **Input validation** — is the data well-formed and within bounds?
3. **Authorization** — is this caller allowed to perform this action on this resource?
---
## OWASP Top 10 Mapping for Go
| Rank | Vulnerability | STRIDE | Go Defense |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| A01 | Broken Access Control | E | Server-side authz middleware, RBAC, IDOR checks |
| A02 | Cryptographic Failures | I | `crypto/aes` GCM, `crypto/rand`, TLS 1.2+ |
| A03 | Injection | T, E | `database/sql` placeholders, `exec.Command` separate args, `html/template` |
| A04 | Insecure Design | All | Threat modeling with STRIDE, defense-in-depth |
| A05 | Security Misconfiguration | I, E | Server timeouts, TLS config, no `InsecureSkipVerify`, no exposed pprof |
| A06 | Vulnerable Components | All | `govulncheck`, Dependabot/Renovate, `go.sum` verification |
| A07 | Authentication Failures | S, E | Argon2id/bcrypt, JWT validation (algorithm pinning), MFA |
| A08 | Software/Data Integrity | T | Module checksums (`go.sum`), signed releases, CI verification |
| A09 | Logging Failures | R | Structured logging (`log/slog`), audit trails, no PII |
| A10 | SSRF | I, T | URL allowlists, block internal IPs and metadata endpoints |
---
## Conducting a Threat Model
1. **Scope** — identify system boundaries, assets to protect, and threat actors
2. **Diagram** — draw a data flow diagram with trust boundaries (external entities, processes, data stores, data flows)
3. **STRIDE** — apply STRIDE to each DFD element using the matrix above
4. **Score** — rate each threat with DREAD
5. **Prioritize** — fix Critical/High first; document accepted risks with explicit justification
6. **Verify** — run `gosec ./...`, `govulncheck ./...`, `go test -race ./...` to validate mitigations
7. **Iterate** — update the model when the system changes (new endpoints, new data flows, new integrations)
---
## Vulnerability Severity Matrix
Use when no DREAD data is available — cross-reference impact with exploitability:
| Impact \ Exploitability | Easy | Moderate | Difficult |
| ----------------------- | -------- | -------- | --------- |
| Critical | Critical | Critical | High |
| High | Critical | High | Medium |
| Medium | High | Medium | Low |
| Low | Medium | Low | Low |
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