samber/cc-skills-golang / skills/golang-security
golang-security
FlaggedSecurity best practices and vulnerability prevention for Golang — injection (SQL, command, XSS), cryptography, path traversal, SSRF and HTTP security headers, cookies, secrets management, memory safety, PII in logs, STRIDE/DREAD threat modeling, plus `gosec` SAST, race detection, and fuzz testing. Apply when writing, reviewing, or auditing Go code for security, or when touching crypto, file or network I/O, secrets, user input, or authentication. Not for non-exploitable defensive bugs such as nil panics or slice aliasing (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-safety` skill), dependency vulnerability scanning with govulncheck (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-dependency-management` skill), or wiring security scanners into CI pipelines (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-continuous-integration` skill).
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 14.0 KB |
| evals/evals.json | config | 49.0 KB |
| references/architecture.md | markdown | 10.4 KB |
| references/checklist.md | markdown | 4.0 KB |
| references/cookies.md | markdown | 4.8 KB |
| references/cryptography.md | markdown | 11.0 KB |
| references/filesystem.md | markdown | 6.8 KB |
| references/injection.md | markdown | 7.3 KB |
| references/logging.md | markdown | 3.9 KB |
| references/memory-safety.md | markdown | 5.1 KB |
| references/network.md | markdown | 6.3 KB |
| references/secrets.md | markdown | 4.8 KB |
| references/third-party.md | markdown | 4.9 KB |
| references/threat-modeling.md | markdown | 8.4 KB |
references/network.md
View on GitHub# Network/Web Security Rules
Network and web security vulnerabilities can lead to data leakage and unauthorized access.
**Rules:**
1. Redirects MUST be validated against an allowlist of domains.
2. HTTP servers MUST configure `ReadTimeout`, `WriteTimeout`, and `IdleTimeout`.
3. Pprof endpoints MUST NEVER be exposed publicly.
4. XML parsers MUST disable XXE — reject `<!DOCTYPE` and `<!ENTITY` declarations.
---
## Table of Contents
- [Open Redirect Vulnerability — Medium](#open-redirect-vulnerability--medium)
- [Bind to All Interfaces — Medium](#bind-to-all-interfaces--medium)
- [Slowloris Attack Vulnerability — Medium](#slowloris-attack-vulnerability--medium)
- [Insecure HTTP Server Configuration — Medium](#insecure-http-server-configuration--medium)
- [Observable Timing (Timing Attacks) — Medium](#observable-timing-timing-attacks--medium)
- [Exposed pprof Profiling Endpoints — High](#exposed-pprof-profiling-endpoints--high)
- [XXE Vulnerability — High](#xxe-vulnerability--high)
- [Permissive Regex Validation — Low](#permissive-regex-validation--low)
- [CWE References](#cwe-references)
## Open Redirect Vulnerability — Medium
Redirects to unvalidated URLs can be used for phishing.
**Bad:**
```go
target := r.URL.Query().Get("url")
http.Redirect(w, r, target, http.StatusFound) // DON'T
```
**Good:**
```go
target := r.URL.Query().Get("url")
u, _ := url.Parse(target)
// Only allow http/https
if u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https" {
return errors.New("invalid scheme")
}
// Block javascript/data schemes
if strings.HasPrefix(target, "javascript:") || strings.HasPrefix(target, "data:") {
return errors.New("blocked scheme")
}
// Check against whitelist
if !isAllowedDomain(u.Host) {
return errors.New("invalid domain")
}
http.Redirect(w, r, target, http.StatusFound)
```
---
## Bind to All Interfaces — Medium
Binding to 0.0.0.0 exposes services to all network interfaces.
**Bad:**
```go
listener, _ := net.Listen("tcp", "0.0.0.0:8080") // DON'T: Exposes all interfaces
```
**Good:**
```go
// Bind only to localhost
listener, _ := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:8080")
// Or specific internal IP
listener, _ := net.Listen("tcp", "10.0.1.5:8080")
```
---
## Slowloris Attack Vulnerability — Medium
Slowloris attacks exhaust connection pools.
**Bad:**
```go
server := &http.Server{
Addr: ":8080",
// Missing ReadTimeout, WriteTimeout, IdleTimeout
}
```
**Good:**
```go
server := &http.Server{
Addr: ":8080",
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
IdleTimeout: 120 * time.Second,
MaxHeaderBytes: 1 << 20, // Limit header size to 1MB
}
```
---
## Insecure HTTP Server Configuration — Medium
Running HTTP servers without proper security settings.
**Bad:**
```go
http.ListenAndServe(":8080", handler) // DON'T: No security hardening
```
**Good:**
```go
server := &http.Server{
Addr: ":443",
ReadTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
IdleTimeout: 120 * time.Second,
MaxHeaderBytes: 1 << 20,
}
server.ListenAndServeTLS("cert.pem", "key.pem")
```
---
## Observable Timing (Timing Attacks) — Medium
Timing differences can leak sensitive information.
**Bad:**
```go
func checkPassword(input, secret string) bool {
return input == secret // DON'T: Short-circuit leaks length
}
```
**Good:**
```go
import "crypto/subtle"
// For comparing fixed-length tokens or hashes:
func checkToken(input, expected string) bool {
// ConstantTimeCompare already handles unequal lengths without leaking timing
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(input), []byte(expected)) == 1
}
// For passwords, use Argon2id (preferred) or bcrypt — they handle hashing
// and constant-time comparison internally:
// argon2: hash := argon2.IDKey([]byte(password), salt, 3, 64*1024, 4, 32)
// bcrypt: err := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(storedHash), []byte(password))
// For HMAC verification:
import "crypto/hmac"
func verifyHMAC(message, messageMAC, key []byte) bool {
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
mac.Write(message)
expectedMAC := mac.Sum(nil)
return hmac.Equal(messageMAC, expectedMAC) // Constant-time
}
```
---
## Exposed pprof Profiling Endpoints — High
Debug pprof endpoints expose sensitive runtime information.
**Bad:**
```go
import _ "net/http/pprof" // DON'T: Automatically registers /debug/pprof
http.ListenAndServe(":8080", handler)
```
**Good:**
```go
// Option 1: Use build tags to exclude pprof from production builds
// File: debug_pprof.go
//go:build !production
package main
import _ "net/http/pprof"
// Option 2: Serve pprof on a separate internal-only listener
func startDebugServer() {
debugMux := http.NewServeMux()
debugMux.HandleFunc("/debug/pprof/", pprof.Index)
debugMux.HandleFunc("/debug/pprof/cmdline", pprof.Cmdline)
debugMux.HandleFunc("/debug/pprof/profile", pprof.Profile)
debugMux.HandleFunc("/debug/pprof/symbol", pprof.Symbol)
debugMux.HandleFunc("/debug/pprof/trace", pprof.Trace)
go http.ListenAndServe("127.0.0.1:6060", debugMux) // localhost only
}
```
---
## XXE Vulnerability — High
XML parsers that process external entity references.
**Bad:**
```go
decoder := xml.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(xmlData))
decoder.Decode(&person) // DON'T: May process external entities
```
**Good:**
```go
decoder := xml.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(xmlData))
decoder.Strict = true
// Block DTD declarations
xmlStr := string(xmlData)
if strings.Contains(xmlStr, "<!DOCTYPE") || strings.Contains(xmlStr, "<!ENTITY") {
return errors.New("XML contains DTD - potential XXE")
}
decoder.Decode(&person)
```
---
## Permissive Regex Validation — Low
Weak regex validation can allow malicious input.
**Bad:**
```go
matched, _ := regexp.MatchString(`.+@.+\..+`, email) // DON'T: Too permissive
```
**Good:**
```go
var emailRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}$`)
if !emailRegex.MatchString(email) {
return errors.New("invalid email")
}
// Also block injection patterns
```
---
## CWE References
- **CWE-601**: Open Redirect
- **CWE-208**: Observable Timing Discrepancy
- **CWE-611**: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference
- **CWE-770**: Allocation of Resources Without Limits
- **CWE-20**: Improper Input Validation
- **CWE-200**: Exposure of Sensitive Information
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