reply-team/jason-ai / skills/business/sdr-operations
sdr-operations
Verifiedoperations/14-privacy.yaml
View on GitHub# Family 14 — Consent, suppression and privacy (23)
#
# The family that answers whether we may contact this person, on this channel, right now — and holds
# the evidence for the answer. Being wrong here is the most expensive kind of wrong in this domain,
# because the evidence is the defence, not the behaviour.
#
# Schema, the derivation table and the meters: families.yaml.
family: 14
operations:
- name: outreach.precheck
core: true
intent: >
"May I contact this person, on this channel, right now — and if not, when, and what would fix
it?"
reach: read
reversibility: reversible
approval: auto
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: >
nothing at stake where it costs nothing; where the register gate screens live, the screening
recorded under this key. In every case its result is stale the moment it returns.
idempotency_key:
value: required
conditional: true
detail: required where the register gate screens live.
per_item_results: required
cost:
value: metered
conditional: true
detail: >
none, unless the external-register gate performs a live screening rather than reading a
cached one inside its staleness allowance — then metered.
cost_basis: per identifier screened, where the external-register gate screens live
meter: screening
questions: []
- name: suppression.check
intent: >
"Is this address, number, profile, domain or account one we must not touch — and why?" — works
on a raw identifier that is not a person in our system yet.
reach: read
reversibility: reversible
approval: auto
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: nothing at stake
idempotency_key: none
per_item_results: required
cost: none
questions: []
- name: suppression.list
intent: >
"Show me the exclusion lists" — by scope, reason class and who put them there.
reach: read
reversibility: reversible
approval: auto
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: nothing at stake
idempotency_key: none
per_item_results: not_applicable
cost: none
questions: []
- name: suppression.add
core: true
intent: >
"Never contact this again, and here is why" — a person, an address, a number, a profile, a
domain or a whole account.
reach: control
reversibility: irreversible
approval:
value: confirm_once
conditional: true
detail: >
auto for a single verified identifier, which is protective; confirm_once for a domain, an
account pattern or a collection.
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: >
list first — adding a pattern that already exists is a refusal, so a blind retry is wrong.
idempotency_key: required
per_item_results: required
cost: none
questions: [8]
- name: suppression.remove
intent: >
"Lift this exclusion, and here is the evidence that lets me".
reach: control
reversibility: irreversible
approval: confirm_once
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: >
the entry's current state, its reason class, and whether a retention floor still applies — the
sends made during a wrongful lift cannot be restored by any second act.
idempotency_key: required
per_item_results: required
cost: none
questions: [26]
- name: optout.record
core: true
intent: >
"They said stop" — records the act itself: what they said, where it arrived, when they did it,
when we learned of it.
reach: control
reversibility: irreversible
approval: auto
approval_departs: true
protective_floor: true
approval_reason: >
the protective floor — recording that somebody said stop is an operation whose non-performance
is itself the harm, and waiting for permission to stop is the destructive choice.
before_repeating: >
the current opt-out state for this person and identifier, with its recorded event time.
idempotency_key: required
per_item_results: required
cost: none
questions: []
- name: optout.poll
intent: >
"What stop signals happened at the channel that we have not ingested yet?" — one-click
unsubscribes, list-unsubscribe requests, blocks, stop keywords, platform-side opt-outs.
reach: read
reversibility: reversible
approval: auto
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: nothing at stake
idempotency_key: none
per_item_results: required
cost: none
questions: []
- name: optout.confirm
intent: >
"Send the one confirmation of their opt-out that this channel permits" — exactly once,
non-promotional, and it may never require anything of the recipient.
reach: act
reversibility: irreversible
approval: confirm_each
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: >
the confirmation ledger for this person and channel: sent / not sent. A second one is a breach,
not a duplicate.
idempotency_key: required
accepts_collection: false
per_item_results: not_applicable
cost:
value: metered
conditional: true
detail: metered where the channel meters sending.
cost_basis: per confirmation sent, where the channel meters sending
meter: message
questions: []
- name: consent.record
intent: >
"Here is the permission we hold, what they were told, when, how it was captured, and what it
covers".
reach: control
reversibility: irreversible
approval: confirm_once
approval_artefact: preview
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: >
the current basis for this person, channel and purpose, with its as-of.
idempotency_key: required
per_item_results: required
cost: none
questions: []
- name: consent.revalidate
intent: >
"Has a time-limited permission quietly expired?" — recompute it and downgrade contactability
without waiting for a human.
reach: control
reversibility: reversible
approval: auto
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: >
the current basis state and the last revalidation as-of.
idempotency_key: required
per_item_results: required
cost: none
questions: []
- name: consent.prove
intent: >
"Show me the evidence that we were allowed to send this" — status plus the bundle.
reach: read
reversibility: reversible
approval: auto
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: nothing at stake
idempotency_key: none
per_item_results: required
cost: none
questions: []
- name: notice.send
intent: >
"Deliver the privacy notice to someone whose data we did not get from them, and record that we
did".
reach: act
reversibility: irreversible
approval: confirm_each
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: >
the notice-delivery record for this person: delivered or not, and when.
idempotency_key: required
accepts_collection: false
per_item_results: not_applicable
cost:
value: metered
conditional: true
detail: metered where the channel meters sending.
cost_basis: per notice sent, where the channel meters sending
meter: message
questions: []
- name: disclosure.check
intent: >
"Must this outreach say it was machine-generated — in what form, in which places, on this
channel?"
reach: read
reversibility: reversible
approval: auto
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: nothing at stake
idempotency_key: none
per_item_results: required
cost: none
questions: []
- name: disclosure.record
intent: >
"It did say so, here, in this message".
reach: control
reversibility: irreversible
approval: confirm_once
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: >
the disclosure record bound to this message.
idempotency_key: required
per_item_results: required
cost: none
questions: []
- name: dnc_registry.check
intent: >
"Screen these numbers or addresses against the external do-not-contact register this
jurisdiction requires".
reach: read
reversibility: reversible
approval: auto
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: nothing at stake
idempotency_key: required
per_item_results: required
cost: metered
cost_basis: per identifier screened
meter: screening
questions: []
- name: privacy_request.create
intent: >
"Someone has asked to see, correct, restrict, port or erase their data — start the clock".
reach: control
reversibility: irreversible
approval: auto
approval_departs: true
protective_floor: true
approval_reason: >
the protective floor — failing to open the record is itself the breach.
before_repeating: >
the open request for this subject and type.
idempotency_key: required
per_item_results: required
cost: none
questions: []
- name: privacy_request.update
intent: >
"Verify who they are, or extend the deadline with the reason recorded, because the reason has
to be told to them".
reach: control
reversibility: compensatable
approval: auto
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: >
the request's current state and its recorded due dates.
idempotency_key: required
accepts_collection: false
per_item_results: not_applicable
cost: none
questions: []
- name: privacy_request.refuse
intent: >
"Refuse it, with the demonstrable basis".
reach: control
reversibility: compensatable
approval: confirm_once
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: >
the request's state; a refused request may not be refused twice.
idempotency_key: required
accepts_collection: false
per_item_results: not_applicable
cost: none
questions: []
- name: privacy_request.fulfill
intent: >
"Export or erase against a recorded request — the only path to either".
reach:
value: act
conditional: true
detail: '`act` when it discloses data to the requester; `control` when it erases.'
reversibility: irreversible
approval: confirm_each
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: >
the per-store, per-identifier fulfilment ledger for this request.
idempotency_key: required
per_item_results: required
cost: none
questions: []
- name: deletion_feed.poll
intent: >
"Pull the erasure demands waiting on the external register and match them against what we
hold".
reach: read
reversibility: reversible
approval: auto
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: nothing at stake
idempotency_key: none
per_item_results: required
cost: none
questions: []
- name: deletion_feed.report
intent: >
"Tell the register what we did with each of its requests".
reach: control
reversibility: irreversible
approval: auto
approval_departs: true
protective_floor: true
approval_reason: >
the protective floor — the reporting deadline is the obligation, so not reporting is the harm.
before_repeating: >
the per-request report ledger: reported or not, with the reported outcome.
idempotency_key: required
per_item_results: required
cost: none
questions: [23]
- name: retention.apply
intent: >
"Enforce the storage limits — and stop at the floors that an erasure may not cross".
reach: control
reversibility: irreversible
approval: confirm_once
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: >
the last applied-through timestamp per data category and the pending count.
idempotency_key: required
per_item_results: required
cost: none
questions: []
- name: audit_log.search
intent: >
"Who changed what, when, on our side — and why was this person contacted at all?"
reach: read
reversibility: reversible
approval: auto
approval_departs: false
before_repeating: nothing at stake
idempotency_key: none
per_item_results: not_applicable
cost: none
questions: []
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