rampstackco/claude-skills / skills/security-baseline
security-baseline
VerifiedEstablish a security baseline for a website or web app. Use this skill when configuring HTTPS and TLS, setting security headers, planning secrets management, evaluating CSP policies, doing a basic security audit, or hardening a site before launch. Triggers on security headers, HTTPS, TLS, CSP, content security policy, HSTS, secrets management, vulnerability scan, security audit, harden, OWASP, security baseline. Also triggers when a security review is required for compliance or before going live.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| README.md | markdown | 358 B |
| SKILL.md | skill md | 11.7 KB |
| references/headers-checklist.md | markdown | 7.9 KB |
references/headers-checklist.md
View on GitHub# Security Headers Checklist
Copy-paste reference for HTTP response headers that improve security. Organized by tier of importance.
Test current headers with: securityheaders.com or the MDN HTTP Observatory at developer.mozilla.org/en-US/observatory.
---
## Tier 1: Set on every site, no excuse
These are simple to deploy, low risk of breaking things, and material security improvements.
### Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS)
Forces browsers to use HTTPS for all future requests to this domain.
```
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
```
- `max-age`: lifetime in seconds (31536000 = 1 year, recommended for stable HTTPS deployments)
- `includeSubDomains`: applies to all subdomains. Only enable when every subdomain serves HTTPS reliably.
- `preload`: optional. Enables inclusion in browser preload lists. Once enabled, removal takes months to reach users through a Chrome update, with no guarantee for other browsers. Only add when committed.
**Common mistake:** Setting `includeSubDomains` before all subdomains are HTTPS-ready. Internal staging or admin subdomains break.
---
### X-Content-Type-Options
Prevents browsers from MIME-sniffing the content type, which can lead to confusion attacks.
```
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
```
No nuance. Set it everywhere.
---
### X-Frame-Options
Prevents your site from being framed by other sites (clickjacking defense).
```
X-Frame-Options: DENY
```
Use `SAMEORIGIN` instead if your own site uses iframes of itself.
`X-Frame-Options` is largely superseded by CSP's `frame-ancestors`, but setting both is fine for backward compatibility with older browsers.
---
### Referrer-Policy
Controls how much information is sent in the Referer header on outbound links and resource loads.
```
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
```
This sends full URL on same-origin requests, only the origin on cross-origin HTTPS-to-HTTPS, and nothing on HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrades.
For privacy-sensitive sites:
```
Referrer-Policy: no-referrer
```
---
## Tier 2: Material security improvements, requires planning
These add real protection but may require code changes or rollout planning.
### Content-Security-Policy
The most powerful header. Prevents most XSS attacks even when input handling has bugs.
**Strict CSP (recommended for new sites):**
```
Content-Security-Policy:
default-src 'self';
script-src 'self' 'nonce-{random}' 'strict-dynamic';
style-src 'self' 'nonce-{random}';
img-src 'self' data: https:;
font-src 'self';
connect-src 'self';
frame-ancestors 'none';
base-uri 'self';
form-action 'self';
object-src 'none';
upgrade-insecure-requests;
```
**Notes:**
- `nonce-{random}` is replaced per request with a fresh random token, included on legitimate inline scripts.
- `'strict-dynamic'` allows scripts loaded by trusted scripts (recursive trust). Most modern apps need this.
- `frame-ancestors 'none'` is the modern equivalent of `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and is more flexible.
- `object-src 'none'` blocks Flash and similar (still useful even though Flash is dead).
- `base-uri 'self'` prevents base tag hijacking.
**Allowlist CSP (if you can't do strict):**
```
Content-Security-Policy:
default-src 'self';
script-src 'self' https://trusted-cdn.com;
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
img-src 'self' data: https:;
...
```
This is weaker than strict CSP. Plan to migrate to strict.
**Roll out via Report-Only first:**
```
Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: ...; report-uri /csp-violation-report
```
Watch reports, tune, then switch to enforcing.
---
### Permissions-Policy
Controls which browser features (camera, microphone, geolocation, etc.) can be used.
Conservative default:
```
Permissions-Policy:
accelerometer=(),
camera=(),
geolocation=(),
gyroscope=(),
magnetometer=(),
microphone=(),
payment=(),
usb=()
```
This denies all listed features by default. Allow specific ones if needed:
```
Permissions-Policy: camera=(self), geolocation=(self "https://maps.example.com")
```
---
## Tier 3: Newer, useful in specific contexts
These provide additional isolation and protection. Some require more careful integration.
### Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy (COOP)
Isolates your site's window from cross-origin windows. Defends against cross-origin attacks like Spectre.
```
Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin
```
May break some popup-based OAuth flows. Test carefully.
---
### Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy (COEP)
Required for `SharedArrayBuffer` and high-resolution timers. Restricts what can be loaded.
```
Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp
```
Means every cross-origin resource you load must explicitly opt in via `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: cross-origin`.
Often impractical for sites with many third-party resources. Use `credentialless` as a softer option:
```
Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: credentialless
```
---
### Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy (CORP)
For your own resources (images, scripts, styles), declares who can include them.
```
Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-origin
```
For resources you want others to be able to embed (a public CDN, a sharing widget):
```
Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: cross-origin
```
---
### Reporting-Endpoints
Modern way to specify where violation reports go (replaces the older `report-uri`).
```
Reporting-Endpoints: csp-endpoint="https://example.com/csp", default="https://example.com/reports"
Content-Security-Policy: ...; report-to csp-endpoint
```
---
## Headers to remove or set carefully
### Server
The `Server` header reveals what server software is running.
```
Server: nginx/1.18.0
```
Reveals software and version. Helps attackers target known vulnerabilities. Set to a generic value or remove:
```
Server: web
```
(Or remove entirely if your stack allows.)
---
### X-Powered-By
Reveals the framework or language.
```
X-Powered-By: Express
X-Powered-By: PHP/8.0
```
Same issue as `Server`. Remove.
---
### X-AspNet-Version, X-AspNetMvc-Version
Same. Remove.
---
## What to skip
These are deprecated, not useful, or actively harmful:
- **`X-XSS-Protection`**: deprecated. Modern browsers ignore it. Use CSP instead.
- **`Public-Key-Pins`** (HPKP): removed from browsers. Don't bother.
- **`Expect-CT`**: deprecated. Certificate Transparency is enforced automatically.
- **`Feature-Policy`**: replaced by `Permissions-Policy`. Use the latter.
---
## Quick reference table
| Header | Tier | Default value |
|---|---|---|
| `Strict-Transport-Security` | 1 | `max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains` |
| `X-Content-Type-Options` | 1 | `nosniff` |
| `X-Frame-Options` | 1 | `DENY` (or `SAMEORIGIN`) |
| `Referrer-Policy` | 1 | `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` |
| `Content-Security-Policy` | 2 | Site-specific (see strict CSP example) |
| `Permissions-Policy` | 2 | Site-specific (deny by default) |
| `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy` | 3 | `same-origin` |
| `Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy` | 3 | `require-corp` or `credentialless` |
| `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy` | 3 | `same-origin` (resources), `cross-origin` (public) |
| `Server` | Remove | Set generic or remove |
| `X-Powered-By` | Remove | Remove |
---
## Verification
After deploying, verify:
```bash
curl -I https://example.com
```
Look for the headers in the response.
Test grade: securityheaders.com gives a letter grade. Aim for A or A+.
---
## Setting headers by stack
Where you set these depends on the stack. Common locations:
- **Reverse proxy (Nginx, Caddy, HAProxy):** in the proxy config
- **CDN (Cloudflare, Fastly, Akamai):** in the CDN's response header rules
- **Application (Express, Django, Rails, etc.):** middleware or filter
- **Hosting platform (Vercel, Netlify, Cloudflare Pages):** platform-specific config file (e.g., `vercel.json`, `_headers`)
Setting at the edge (CDN or proxy) is preferred when possible: applies to every response without depending on application code.
For dynamic values (like the CSP nonce), the header has to be set per-request from the application.
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