pale-knight/redteam-skill / skills/service-attack
service-attack
Verified直连网络服务攻击链。用于已经识别/枚举的非专门领域服务,从数据库、数据存储、文件/远程访问、基础设施、消息队列、DNS/网络服务、打印机/MFP/NAS/BMC/网络设备等服务入口继续利用到凭据、代码执行、主机控制、横向能力或新的独立身份。由操作者选择具体攻击链;不自动切换模块。
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 7.3 KB |
| references/database-mssql.md | markdown | 3.3 KB |
| references/database-mysql.md | markdown | 2.5 KB |
| references/database-oracle.md | markdown | 1.7 KB |
| references/database-postgresql.md | markdown | 2.1 KB |
| references/datastore-nosql.md | markdown | 3.0 KB |
| references/dns-network-services.md | markdown | 1.9 KB |
| references/file-services.md | markdown | 2.3 KB |
| references/infrastructure.md | markdown | 2.8 KB |
| references/messaging.md | markdown | 2.4 KB |
| references/network-appliance-cves.md | markdown | 5.6 KB |
| references/network-devices.md | markdown | 9.8 KB |
| references/remote-access.md | markdown | 1.1 KB |
| references/vulnerability-intelligence.md | markdown | 535 B |
references/network-devices.md
View on GitHub# Network / Embedded Devices Attack Chains
覆盖:Printer/MFP、NAS、BMC/iLO/iDRAC、Router/Switch、Firewall、Camera/NVR、IT appliance。OT/ICS 不在本 reference。
> 这是利用 reference。`/recon` 已经完成 vendor/model/firmware/protocol 识别;这里从操作者选中的设备攻击面继续做到控制、凭据、执行、主机/设备控制或高影响 primitive。
---
# 1. Printer / MFP — 协议原生攻击
## 1.1 Gate
```text
9100 / 515 / 631 / vendor management reachable
vendor + model + firmware known
printer language / IPP capabilities known
management/auth state known
```
常见攻击面:
```text
PJL
PostScript
PCL
ESC/POS
IPP
RAW/JetDirect 9100
Embedded Web Server
SNMP
SMB/LDAP/SMTP/FTP/SFTP integration
local spool/storage
```
---
## 1.2 PRET — PJL / PostScript / PCL
PRET 是经典 Printer Exploitation Toolkit。项目较老、Python2,但它实现的 PJL/PostScript/PCL filesystem/job/config/device primitives 仍然是现实打印设备协议攻击面。
```bash
./pret.py TARGET pjl
./pret.py TARGET ps
./pret.py TARGET pcl
```
进入交互后先确认实现支持的命令:
```text
help
id
info id
info config
info filesys
pwd
ls
```
### Filesystem primitive — READ / WRITE
如果设备实现允许:
```text
ls <path>
cat <path>
get <remote> <local>
put <local> <remote>
delete <remote>
```
攻击目标不是“能 ls”本身,而是继续判断:
```text
configuration / address book
scan destinations
stored integration data
spool/job data
credential material
writable configuration/startup objects
```
若 `put` 可写到会被设备解释/加载的对象,继续验证其真实安全影响。
### Job primitive — CONTROL
根据 printer language / firmware 支持,PRET 可用于:
```text
capture / inspect jobs
manipulate print jobs
modify printer-side state
```
成功判据是**真实 job/control capability**,不是单纯 TCP/9100 可连接。
### High-impact primitives — DESTRUCTIVE
PRET 项目本身包含可能造成物理/持久状态影响的能力,例如 reset / format / destructive printer-language operations。
这些能力保留在攻击知识中,但执行前必须输出:
```text
Impact: DESTRUCTIVE
Target: exact device
Primitive: reset / format / erase / state damage
Expected outage/data loss: ...
Recovery: known / unknown / factory intervention
```
然后等待操作者选择。
**不要把“高影响”误写成“技术不存在”。**
---
## 1.3 RAW 9100 / PJL 直接协议
没有 PRET 兼容环境时,可直接使用 PJL/UEL 做 protocol-native 操作。首先确认语言和响应:
```bash
printf '\033%%-12345X@PJL\r\n@PJL INFO ID\r\n@PJL INFO CONFIG\r\n\033%%-12345X' | nc -w 5 TARGET 9100
```
如果设备返回 PJL filesystem/config capability,继续使用**该厂商实际支持**的 PJL FS 命令;不要假设所有打印机支持同一文件系统语义。
---
# 2. Epson 现实攻击链
## 2.1 CVE-2025-35970 — SNMP → 初始 WebConfig 管理员密码
**REAL / VENDOR-CONFIRMED / MODEL-GATED**
Epson 官方披露:部分产品的初始 WebConfig 管理员密码与序列号相关,而序列号可通过远程 SNMP 获取;如果初始管理员密码没有被修改,远程攻击者可能获得 WebConfig 管理权限。
链:
```text
Epson device
→ affected model/firmware
→ SNMP reachable
→ obtain serial/device information
→ derive/check initial admin credential per affected product behavior
→ WebConfig administrator access
```
成功判据:
```text
WebConfig administrator session established
```
不要把“能读 SNMP serial”直接写成“admin compromise”;必须验证管理员密码仍保持初始状态。
## 2.2 CVE-2025-66635 — WebConfig Admin → Command Execution
**REAL / VENDOR-CONFIRMED / AUTH-REQUIRED / MODEL-GATED**
Epson 官方把该问题定义为 WebConfig command execution vulnerability。只有当前产品/版本同时满足 advisory 条件且已经获得管理员凭据时才进入。
链:
```text
WebConfig admin
→ exact affected model/firmware
→ CVE-2025-66635 prerequisite satisfied
→ reliable public PoC/tool available?
├─ YES → operator-selected command marker → execution result
└─ NO → mark NO-STABLE-PUBLIC-POC; do not fabricate payload
```
如果与 CVE-2025-35970 条件重叠,可形成:
```text
SNMP
→ initial credential
→ WebConfig admin
→ command execution candidate
```
## 2.3 Epson POS TCP/9100 / ESC-POS
部分网络 POS printer 的 raw printing service 本身没有预定义的认证/加密,网络可达者可发送 ESC/POS printer commands。
```text
Impact: CONTROL
```
这代表**设备命令语言控制**,不是自动等价 OS shell。根据型号支持的 ESC/POS 功能评估真实设备动作。
---
# 3. HP LaserJet — PostScript / Print-job RCE Candidate
## CVE-2025-26506 / HPSBPI04007 family
**REAL / VENDOR-CONFIRMED / MODEL+FIRMWARE-GATED**
HP 官方安全公告 HPSBPI04007 对部分 LaserJet Pro / Enterprise / Managed 设备披露潜在 Remote Code Execution / Privilege Escalation,包含 CVE-2025-26506 等。
流程:
```text
HP LaserJet identified
→ exact product number / firmware
→ PostScript / relevant print path reachable
→ compare HPSBPI04007 affected/fixed table
→ public reliable exploit/PoC status
→ operator-selected execution marker if compatible
```
没有匹配 product/firmware 时不要根据“HP + 9100”盲打。
---
# 4. Lexmark — PJL / PostScript / IPP / EWS
Lexmark 官方历史/当前 advisory 明确覆盖过:
```text
PJL directory traversal / overwrite
PostScript buffer/memory corruption
IPP buffer overflow
Embedded Web Server RCE/command injection
SNMP input validation
firmware downgrade / persistence-related weaknesses
```
策略:
```text
model + firmware
→ identify attack surface (PJL/PS/IPP/EWS/SNMP)
→ exact advisory/fixed version
→ reliable exploit
→ selected primitive
```
Lexmark 设备不要只按 PRET;现代 firmware CVE 和 EWS/API 链应优先做精确版本匹配。
---
# 5. Printer / MFP Credential & Infrastructure Pivot
获得 printer/MFP admin 或 filesystem/config read 后,继续枚举:
```text
scan-to-SMB
LDAP directory integration
SMTP relay/auth
FTP/SFTP destination
address book
fleet/print management server
SMB share / file server hostname
service account username
certificate/private key material
```
攻击链目标:
```text
device control
→ stored/reusable credential or trust relationship
→ validate credential against its actual service
→ new identity / linked infrastructure control
```
如果凭据是可复用明文/token/key,成功条件应记录作用域和真实认证结果。
---
# 6. IPP / CUPS / Print Infrastructure
打印机本身也可能成为客户端/print server 的输入源。
经典现代案例:OpenPrinting cups-browsed / IPP attribute chain(CVE-2024-47176 family)展示了:
```text
attacker-controlled / malicious IPP printer data
→ vulnerable print discovery / PPD generation
→ client/server-side command execution condition
```
因此发现 CUPS/IPP infrastructure 时,不只看 printer device:
```text
printer
↔ IPP
↔ CUPS / print server / fleet manager
```
按目标系统的 CUPS/cups-browsed/libcupsfilters/libppd 版本和实际服务暴露判断,不把 2024 链写成现代 Linux 通杀。
---
# 7. NAS
NAS 是完整服务器/存储 appliance,不应只做到 share listing。
攻击面:
```text
SMB/NFS/rsync
vendor Web/API
SSH
package/app services
snapshot/backup
cloud sync
stored credentials
container/VM service
```
成功目标:
```text
admin/session
→ command execution
→ NAS OS shell
→ data / credential / backup control
```
QNAP 2026 现实 CVE 见 `network-appliance-cves.md`。
---
# 8. BMC / iLO / iDRAC / Redfish
## 8.1 已获 BMC Admin
```bash
curl -sk -u USER:PASS https://TARGET/redfish/v1/Systems/ | jq
curl -sk -u USER:PASS https://TARGET/redfish/v1/Managers/ | jq
```
BMC admin 的真实高价值能力包括:
```text
remote console
virtual media
boot override
firmware/config
power control
hardware inventory
host lifecycle control
```
其中:
```text
remote console / virtual media / boot control → CONTROL/HOST
power off/reset → DESTRUCTIVE/HIGH IMPACT
```
不要把 Power/VirtualMedia 从模块里删掉;执行前标明会不会中断目标业务。
## 8.2 IPMI RAKP
RAKP hash exposure 用于 credential chain:
```text
valid username
→ RAKP HMAC material
→ offline crack
→ BMC credential
→ BMC control plane
→ console/virtual media/host control
```
它与 Cipher 0 是不同 primitive。
Dell iDRAC 2026 version-gated CVE 见 `network-appliance-cves.md`。
---
# 9. Router / Switch / Firewall
获得管理权限后,不要停在 `show version`。
高价值链:
```text
running config
→ local/AAA/SNMP/VPN credentials
→ routing / ACL / NAT / DNS / proxy trust
→ config write
→ traffic/control plane impact
→ credential/pivot/lateral capability
```
可回滚的 config write 使用明确 marker;路由/ACL/VLAN/NAT 等业务影响操作标 `CONTROL/HIGH` 或 `DESTRUCTIVE`,由操作者决定。
2026 PAN-OS、QuNetSwitch 等真实 appliance CVE 见 `network-appliance-cves.md`。
---
# 10. Camera / NVR / VoIP / Other Embedded IT
获得 admin 后继续判断:
```text
media/control plane
stored NAS/FTP/SMTP/cloud credentials
user database
firmware/version RCE
ONVIF/RTSP/vendor protocol
network pivot relationship
```
对摄像机:云台/录制删除/格式化 storage 是高影响能力,不作为“默认 marker”,但保留为操作者可选的设备控制 primitive。
---
# 11. 成功输出模板
```text
Device:
Vendor / Model / Firmware:
Entry primitive:
Current identity:
Impact level:
Confirmed capability:
- READ / WRITE / CONTROL / EXECUTION / HOST / DESTRUCTIVE
Attack chain completed:
...
New credentials / relationships:
...
State changed:
...
Cleanup / restore:
...
```
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