pale-knight/redteam-skill / skills/k8s
k8s
FlaggedKubernetes and container exploitation: identity/RBAC, secrets, kubelet/etcd, managed-cloud workload identities, container-to-node escape including CVE-2026-31431 Copy Fail, and Kubernetes-native persistence. Use when already in a Pod/container or holding kubeconfig. Own the chain to cluster-admin, node root, or a usable cloud identity. Operator chooses next modules. Endpoint blocks after OS execution hand off to /edr-bypass then return.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 5.1 KB |
| references/cloud-identity.md | markdown | 1.8 KB |
| references/container-escape.md | markdown | 4.5 KB |
| references/k8s-persistence.md | markdown | 3.8 KB |
| references/k8s-tools.md | markdown | 1.8 KB |
| references/rbac-abuse.md | markdown | 3.1 KB |
| references/vulnerability-intelligence.md | markdown | 675 B |
SKILL.md
View on GitHub---
name: k8s
description: "Kubernetes and container exploitation: identity/RBAC, secrets, kubelet/etcd, managed-cloud workload identities, container-to-node escape including CVE-2026-31431 Copy Fail, and Kubernetes-native persistence. Use when already in a Pod/container or holding kubeconfig. Own the chain to cluster-admin, node root, or a usable cloud identity. Operator chooses next modules. Endpoint blocks after OS execution hand off to /edr-bypass then return."
---
# /k8s — Kubernetes / Container 攻击
> **scope:** 已在 Pod/Container 内或已有 Kubernetes API 凭据,打到 **cluster-admin / node root / 可用云身份**。K8s-native 持久化留本模块。▸ 云身份默认不要 `/cloud-attack`。候选只认 `~/.claude/skills/shared/modules.yaml`(`modules.py tail`)。
本模块是红队攻击模块。RBAC / badPods / 逃逸 / Copy Fail 门控满足就打。Admission/RBAC 拒绝不是 EDR。
---
## 开局与收尾
开局第一件事:Read `./notes.md`。没有则 `python ~/.claude/skills/bin/notes.py init`。只按已拿下/凭据继续。
走到哪条链,才 Read **一份** `references/<file>.md`。禁止开局全读、禁止凭记忆写 payload。
监听 / sudo / 输密码 / Permission denied:立刻停,说明等操作者做什么,等回报。不要假装已成功。
收尾:
1. 追加 `./notes.md`
2. `python ~/.claude/skills/bin/modules.py tail <本模块名>`
Read 备用:`~/.claude/skills/shared/modules.yaml`
禁止 `./modules.yaml` 和 `python ../bin/...`
3. 优先 `default_next`;`never_default` 不得当作默认(操作者点名除外)
4. 名册外的名字不许建议
5. 停。等操作者选 `/模块` 或 `/clear`
`/edr-bypass` 半条链未完:打通后回本模块,不要 /clear。
---
## 0. 成功条件
```text
Pod / kubeconfig
↓
身份 + can-i
↓
当前选中的 K8s 链(RBAC / Secret / 逃逸 / 云身份 / 平台持久化)
↓
cluster-admin 或 node root 或可验云身份
↓
/k8s COMPLETE
```
**不算:** 只 `kubectl get pods`、只 KubeHound 出图、只看到 SA token。
---
## 0.4 CVE
先拆 **精确组件版本**(kubelet / runtime / kernel / CNI),再 Read `../shared/cve-enrichment.md`。不要搜 “Kubernetes” dump 全部洞。Managed 看厂商 backport。
```bash
kubectl get nodes -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{"\t"}{.status.nodeInfo.kubeletVersion}{"\t"}{.status.nodeInfo.containerRuntimeVersion}{"\t"}{.status.nodeInfo.kernelVersion}{"\n"}{end}'
uname -r
```
---
## 0.5 EDR
RBAC / Admission / PSA / seccomp / OPA = **本模块**。
只有 container/node **已经在 OS 执行** 被 workload EDR 杀 → `/edr-bypass` → 回 `/k8s` 把链打完。
`kubectl exec Forbidden`、privileged 被 Admission 拒 = 不是 EDR。
---
## 1. 决策树
```text
cat token/namespace + kubectl auth whoami + can-i --list
↓
A. 能 create pods/controllers 或 bind RBAC
→ Read references/rbac-abuse.md → 打到更高身份或 node
B. 能 get secrets / create token
→ 本模块取证、换成可用身份,再回到 A 或云身份
C. privileged / hostPath / docker.sock / hostPID / 危险 cap
→ Read references/container-escape.md → node root
D. 同节点共享镜像层 + kernel 门控
→ Copy Fail:Read container-escape.md(不要当通杀)
E. IRSA / Azure WI / GKE WI / ACK RRSA 环境变量或 projected token
→ Read references/cloud-identity.md → 校验 sts/az,候选 /cloud-recon
F. kubelet 匿名/nodes/proxy 或 etcd 暴露
→ Read references/k8s-tools.md 对应节
G. 要平台持久化
→ Read references/k8s-persistence.md
H. 以上都弱
→ 版本指纹 → cve-enrichment → 有公开 PoC 再打
```
同一条链打穿再换。不要按课表把 A–H 全跑一遍。
---
## 2. 静默身份(本 SKILL 仅保留这组)
```bash
SA=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount
cat "$SA/namespace" 2>/dev/null
kubectl auth whoami 2>/dev/null
kubectl auth can-i --list
kubectl config current-context
```
现代 projected token 会过期,不要当永久 Secret。更多客户端/图 → 需要时再 Read `references/k8s-tools.md`(含 KubeHound)。
`list` 被拒就逐项 `can-i`,不要停。
---
## 3. 分支(命令在对应 reference)
**RBAC / 建工作负载:** 高价值不只是 `pods/create`(exec、ephemeral、secrets、token、webhook、controller)。→ `references/rbac-abuse.md`
**逃逸:** socket / privileged / hostPath / hostPID / cap / kubelet cred / 版本门控 CVE。docker.sock 在**这台 Linux**上逃到 host 也可走 `/privesc-linux`(操作者选)。集群内跨 Pod → 本模块。→ `references/container-escape.md`
**云身份:** token ≠ admin。校验后再候选 `/cloud-recon`,不要在这里做 IAM 提权。→ `references/cloud-identity.md`
**持久化:** SA+binding、DaemonSet、Admission Webhook。SSH/cron/C2 → `/post`。→ `references/k8s-persistence.md`
---
## 4. 完成后
```text
身份 / 是否 cluster-admin / 是否 node root
云身份线索:
RESTORE: 删的 Pod/binding/webhook
```
写入 `./notes.md`。候选只按「开局与收尾」跑 `python ~/.claude/skills/bin/modules.py tail`。
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