oliver-kriska/claude-elixir-phoenix / targets/pi/skills/phx-deps-vet
phx-deps-vet
VerifiedRecord a vetted Hex package version in hex_vet.exs after a security review — manages the audit ledger, not the scanner. Use to approve a dep after /skill:phx-deps-audit findings or to initialize hex_vet.exs.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 7.0 KB |
| priv/hex_vet_seed.exs | other | 7.4 KB |
| references/hex-vet.md | markdown | 12.9 KB |
| references/seed.md | markdown | 4.4 KB |
references/seed.md
View on GitHub# Seed ledger — curated baseline of vetted Hex packages
`priv/hex_vet_seed.exs` ships with the plugin and provides a
**curated baseline of audits** for a hand-picked set of high-trust,
high-download Hex packages (currently ~30 — the monthly CI job in
"Regeneration" grows this toward the top-100).
It is a **provenance baseline, not certification of your project's
current `mix.lock`.** Seed versions are pinned; per `hex_vet.exs`
Iron Law #2 (lock wins), any locked version *newer* than the seed
entry stays unvetted. On an up-to-date stack the seed may certify
few or none of your actual locked deps — surface this to the user
*before* import, not after. The seed's lasting value is the trusted
provenance record + `:new_only` enforcement of *future* additions.
## Iron Laws (seed-specific)
1. **Seed entries are NOT a substitute for project-specific review.**
They're a baseline; project-aware audits still take precedence.
2. **Stale seeds warn.** If `reviewed_at` is more than 90 days old at
import time, emit a warning. Stale trust is more dangerous than
no trust.
3. **Seed import is opt-in.** `/skill:phx-deps-vet --seed` requires an
explicit `AskUserQuestion` confirmation; never silent.
## Schema
Same map shape as `hex_vet.exs`, but lives at
`../priv/hex_vet_seed.exs`:
```elixir
# Auto-generated by .github/workflows/seed-regen.yml on YYYY-MM-DD.
# Reviewer: <CI identity>.
%{
generated_at: ~D[2026-05-12],
source: "https://hex.pm/api/packages?sort=downloads",
audits: [
%{package: "jason", version: "1.4.4", criteria: :safe_to_deploy, ...},
%{package: "phoenix", version: "1.7.21", criteria: :safe_to_deploy, ...},
# ... ~28 more
]
}
```
## Import flow
```text
/skill:phx-deps-vet --seed
Step 1: Code.eval_file priv/hex_vet_seed.exs.
Step 2: Check generated_at; warn if > 90 days.
Step 3: COMPUTE before prompting (Iron Law #6):
- total = length(seed.audits)
- split = Enum.frequencies_by(seed.audits, & &1.criteria)
- vs existing ledger: new / overwrite / no-op counts
Step 4: AskUserQuestion (numbers are the computed values, never
estimates):
"Import <total> curated audits into hex_vet.exs?
- <split[:safe_to_deploy]> :safe_to_deploy,
<split[:safe_to_run]> :safe_to_run (+ any others)
- <new> new · <overwrite> overwrite · <no-op> no-op
Note: provenance baseline — seed versions are pinned;
newer locked versions stay unvetted (lock wins)."
Step 5: On Yes: dedupe + merge + write back via Code.format_string!.
On No: exit without modification.
Step 6: Confirm: "Imported <N> entries; ledger now has <total>."
```
Existing audits never get silently overwritten — overwrites surface
in the confirmation prompt.
## Regeneration
Monthly CI job (`.github/workflows/seed-regen.yml`):
1. Query `https://hex.pm/api/packages?sort=downloads` for top-100.
2. For each, run Phase 1 rules + check Hex retirement.
3. Compose audit entries (criteria: `:safe_to_deploy` if zero BLOCKs).
4. Open a PR to update `priv/hex_vet_seed.exs`.
The job runs under the plugin's CI identity; the PR is human-reviewed
before merge. No auto-merge for security artifacts.
### Org-policy 403 fallback
Some org GitHub policies deny `GITHUB_TOKEN` PR creation. The seed-
regen and cassette-regen workflows both apply the same fallback
pattern when `peter-evans/create-pull-request@v6` exits with 403:
1. Upload the regenerated artifact (`priv/hex_vet_seed.exs` for seed,
the cassettes tree for cassettes) as a workflow artifact.
2. Write a job summary explaining the policy and pointing to
`Settings → Actions → Allow GitHub Actions to create and approve
pull requests`.
3. Exit 0 — the regen succeeded even if the PR didn't.
Maintainers download the artifact, commit manually. The fallback is
the same in `cassette-regen.yml`; see `../../phx-deps-audit/references/cassettes.md`
"403 fallback".
## When to NOT use the seed
- Air-gapped or fork-restricted environments. The seed assumes
upstream Hex; if your registry is internal-only, audit your local
catalog instead.
- Hard-trust corporate-controlled packages — for those, project-level
audits with internal reviewer emails are more legible in PR review.
## Future: distributed imports
cargo-vet's `imports:` field lets organizations trust **each other's**
audits via signed bundles. Phase 2 stubs the `imports:` key in the
schema but ignores its contents. Phase 3+ wiring TBD.
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