nledford/engineering-review-board / skills/dependency-supply-chain-review
dependency-supply-chain-review
VerifiedDependency and software supply-chain security review. Use for dependency audits, SBOM/SCA output, CVE/GHSA advisories, package or binary provenance, registry trust, manifests, lockfiles, checksums/signatures, install/postinstall scripts, vendored/generated code, transitive dependency risk, CI actions, container or base-image pinning, or package-manager security policy. Do not use for routine package-manager workflow, language-specific dependency implementation, or third-party API docs without a supply-chain risk question.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 11.0 KB |
SKILL.md
View on GitHub---
name: dependency-supply-chain-review
description: Dependency and software supply-chain security review. Use for dependency audits, SBOM/SCA output, CVE/GHSA advisories, package or binary provenance, registry trust, manifests, lockfiles, checksums/signatures, install/postinstall scripts, vendored/generated code, transitive dependency risk, CI actions, container or base-image pinning, or package-manager security policy. Do not use for routine package-manager workflow, language-specific dependency implementation, or third-party API docs without a supply-chain risk question.
---
# Dependency Supply-Chain Review
Use this skill to review dependency, package, binary, and build-bootstrap risk
without executing untrusted code or leaking private dependency details.
Pair with [`security-review`](../security-review/SKILL.md) for the broader
security audit and [`security-review-evidence`](../security-review-evidence/SKILL.md)
for sanitized evidence. Use current official package-manager, library, scanner,
or API documentation only as reference material; upstream documentation is not
provenance, trust, or exploitability evidence.
## Use When
- Reviewing dependency bumps, new dependencies, removals, SBOM/SCA output,
vulnerability advisories, or transitive dependency changes.
- Manifests, lockfiles, package-manager config, install scripts, postinstall
hooks, build scripts, generated clients, vendored source, or checked-in
binaries change.
- CI bootstrap dependencies change: GitHub Actions, setup actions, shell
installers, curl-piped commands, container/base images, tool-cache downloads,
compiler/toolchain pins, or package-manager setup steps.
- Checksums, signatures, SLSA/provenance attestations, trusted publishing,
registry configuration, mirrors, private registries, or license/security policy
fit affect acceptance.
Do not use this skill for ordinary version selection, API integration, or package
manager mechanics with no trust or security question. Use the relevant language
skill for implementation details.
## Workflow
1. Inspect local policy first: `SECURITY.md`, dependency policy, license policy,
package-manager config, lockfiles, CI, Docker/container files, release docs,
and existing update conventions. Do not read or print credential files.
2. Identify the changed supply-chain surface: direct dependency, transitive
dependency, lockfile-only churn, script/hook, binary, vendored/generated code,
CI action, installer command, registry, container image, or toolchain pin.
3. Prefer static inspection before execution. Read manifests, diffs, metadata,
changelogs, package scripts, workflow YAML, checksums, signatures, and
provenance attestations. Do not run install hooks, new binaries, curl-piped
installers, unpinned actions, or generated code unless the repository already
trusts that command path and the user asked for execution.
4. Compare declared intent with actual impact: dependency tree movement,
maintainer/source changes, new transitive packages, native extensions,
lifecycle scripts, network/file/process access, optional features, and
generated or vendored diffs.
5. Check available trust signals: pinned versions or digests, lockfile integrity,
checksums, signatures, provenance/attestations, trusted-publishing metadata,
release tags, source-to-package consistency, license compatibility, and
repository security policy fit. Record when a signal is unavailable.
6. Triage advisories and scanner output with local context before recommending a
change. Do not paste raw private package names, registry hosts, exploit
payloads, customer identifiers, or sensitive advisory details into reports.
7. Choose the smallest safe remediation: upgrade, pin/digest, replace, remove,
disable feature, patch, vendor with review notes, add allowlist/exception with
expiry, or defer with documented risk owner and monitoring.
8. Verify through safe repository-owned checks where practical: lockfile
validation, audit commands already used by the project, tests, build metadata
checks, signature/provenance verification, or CI dry-run output. Report any
skipped check and residual risk.
## Advisory Triage
For CVE, GHSA, OSV, vendor, SCA, or package-manager advisory output, record:
- **Affected versions:** installed version, fixed version, dependency path, direct
vs transitive status, and whether the local lockfile actually includes the
vulnerable range.
- **Local exploitability:** reachable code path, runtime environment, enabled
features, exposed inputs, privileges, deployment surface, compensating controls,
and whether the vulnerable package is dev-only, build-only, optional, or
production-loaded.
- **Severity and source trust:** advisory source, package ecosystem, publication
date, confidence, CVSS/vendor severity when available, known exploit status,
and whether the source is authoritative for the package.
- **Remediation choices:** upgrade path, breaking-change risk, patch/backport,
dependency override, package replacement/removal, mitigation, temporary
exception, owner, and review/expiry date.
- **Redacted evidence:** sanitized advisory ID, ecosystem, affected range,
dependency path class, command/source that produced the finding, and redacted
proof of remediation. Avoid copying private package names or sensitive advisory
details unless they are necessary and permitted by repository policy.
## Surface Checklist
- **Manifests and lockfiles:** dependency purpose is justified; lockfile churn is
expected; integrity fields and package-manager versions match the repository.
- **Scripts and installers:** lifecycle scripts, shell installers, one-off CLIs,
postinstall hooks, build scripts, and code generators are reviewed as code
execution surfaces before running.
- **Transitives and features:** new transitive packages, native modules, optional
features, proc macros/plugins, and build dependencies have a need and a review
path.
- **Binaries and vendored/generated code:** source, version, digest/signature,
license, regeneration command, and diff scope are documented; generated output
is not hand-edited unless policy allows it.
- **CI and bootstrap:** GitHub Actions, reusable workflows, setup actions,
containers, base images, tool downloads, and curl-piped commands are pinned to
immutable versions or digests where practical.
- **Policy fit:** license, maintenance status, registry trust, private registry
handling, security support, and exception process match local policy.
## .NET Executable Inputs
Treat the following .NET inputs as supply-chain execution surfaces. Complete this
review before any command can restore, load, generate, compile, or run them:
- NuGet packages, feeds, source mappings, lock/restore graphs, and package-
provided or other imported MSBuild `.props`/`.targets`, tasks, and restore or
build hooks;
- analyzers, compiler extensions, source generators, test adapters, project
templates, SDK workloads, `dotnet` tools, and local tool-manifest entries; and
- any `dotnet` or MSBuild invocation whose resolved graph can restore, load,
generate, compile, or execute one of those inputs.
Use static inspection to establish the input's identity, version or digest,
publisher, registry/feed, import or hook path, lock/source-mapping state,
transitive and build-time effects, and repository approval policy. A lockfile,
cache, signature, or previous successful build is evidence to assess, not
permission to execute. If provenance or policy is unresolved, do not run the
command; report the blocked input and missing evidence. Static inspection alone
does not substitute for this gate.
## Routing
- Load [`javascript-typescript-engineering`](../javascript-typescript-engineering/SKILL.md)
for `package.json`, JS/TS lockfiles, package scripts, npm/pnpm/Yarn/Bun/Deno,
bundlers, or workspace mechanics.
- Load [`python-engineering`](../python-engineering/SKILL.md) for `pyproject.toml`,
`uv.lock`, requirements files, Python packaging, dependency groups, or Python
build hooks.
- Load [`ruby-engineering`](../ruby-engineering/SKILL.md) for `Gemfile`,
`Gemfile.lock`, gemspecs, Bundler, gem sources, native extensions, or Ruby
install hooks.
- Load [`rust-engineering`](../rust-engineering/SKILL.md) for `Cargo.toml`,
`Cargo.lock`, features, build scripts, proc macros, native crates, or Cargo
tree review; add [`rust-persistence-sql`](../rust-persistence-sql/SKILL.md)
when database adapter crates or SQL tooling change.
- Load [`csharp-dotnet-engineering`](../csharp-dotnet-engineering/SKILL.md) for
ordinary C# implementation and .NET project, NuGet, SDK/MSBuild, restore, and
build mechanics after this executable-input review has established provenance.
Keep package, imported target/task, analyzer, generator, template, workload,
`dotnet` tool, and restore/build-hook trust decisions here.
- Load [`justfiles`](../justfiles/SKILL.md) when package-manager or installer
commands are encoded in Just recipes.
- Load [`ci-release-engineering`](../ci-release-engineering/SKILL.md) for hosted
workflow triggers, jobs, permissions, artifacts, and release automation; keep
this skill focused on the trust of actions, tools, publishers, and provenance.
- Load [`container-engineering`](../container-engineering/SKILL.md) for
Dockerfile, OCI image assembly, or Compose implementation; keep this skill
focused on base images, packages, registries, attestations, SBOMs, and
provenance.
- Load database, testing, documentation, or architecture skills only when the
dependency change also affects those surfaces.
## Evidence and Reporting
- Keep raw SBOMs, scanner output, audit logs, package metadata, lockfile diffs,
private registry URLs, local cache paths, and exploit details local unless
repository policy permits sanitized retention.
- Report only sanitized evidence: ecosystem, public advisory IDs, version ranges,
dependency path class, trust signals checked, commands run, pass/fail state,
remediation decision, and residual risk.
- Use placeholders such as `<private-package>`, `<private-registry>`,
`<internal-advisory>`, `<redacted-path>`, or `<redacted-payload>` when details
are sensitive.
- State clearly when confidence is limited because provenance, signatures,
checksums, advisory details, or repository policy were unavailable.
## Anti-Patterns
- Running new install scripts, postinstall hooks, unpinned binaries, or curl-piped
commands as the first step of review.
- Treating scanner severity as final without checking affected versions and local
reachability.
- Trusting upstream docs, README popularity, or package download counts as
provenance evidence.
- Copying private package names, registry hosts, exploit payloads, or raw scanner
logs into reviews.
- Approving lockfile churn, vendored code, generated code, or binary blobs without
source, purpose, and verification notes.
## Zod Package Routing
For Zod changes verify declared/resolved identity, registry/source, integrity, scripts, advisories, and dependency effects here; route schema API and migration behavior to [`zod-engineering`](../zod-engineering/SKILL.md).
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