llama-farm/llamafarm / .claude/skills/react-skills
react-skills
VerifiedReact 18 patterns for LlamaFarm Designer. Covers components, hooks, TanStack Query, and testing.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 3.1 KB |
| components.md | markdown | 5.9 KB |
| hooks.md | markdown | 6.8 KB |
| performance.md | markdown | 7.0 KB |
| security.md | markdown | 8.4 KB |
| state.md | markdown | 6.8 KB |
security.md
View on GitHub# React Security Best Practices
Guidelines for preventing XSS, injection attacks, and other security vulnerabilities.
## Core Principles
1. **Never trust user input** - Sanitize all data from users, URLs, and external sources
2. **Escape by default** - React escapes JSX by default, but edge cases exist
3. **Validate navigation state** - URL params and location.state can be manipulated
4. **Use allowlists** - Prefer allowlists over blocklists for validation
## XSS Prevention
### React's Built-in Protection
React automatically escapes values in JSX:
```typescript
// Safe - React escapes the content
const userInput = '<script>alert("xss")</script>'
return <div>{userInput}</div> // Renders as text, not HTML
```
### dangerouslySetInnerHTML
Avoid unless absolutely necessary:
```typescript
// DANGEROUS - only use with sanitized content
<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: sanitizedHtml }} />
```
If you must use it, sanitize with a library like DOMPurify or rehype-sanitize.
## Checklist Items
### 1. No Unsanitized dangerouslySetInnerHTML
| Attribute | Value |
|-----------|-------|
| Description | dangerouslySetInnerHTML must use sanitized content |
| Search Pattern | `grep -n "dangerouslySetInnerHTML" --include="*.tsx"` |
| Pass Criteria | All uses wrapped with sanitization (DOMPurify, rehype-sanitize) |
| Severity | Critical |
| Fix | Sanitize with `DOMPurify.sanitize(html)` or use rehype-sanitize |
### 2. URL Parameters Are Validated
| Attribute | Value |
|-----------|-------|
| Description | useParams values must be validated before use |
| Search Pattern | `grep -A5 "useParams" --include="*.tsx"` |
| Pass Criteria | Params validated with regex or allowlist before use |
| Severity | High |
| Fix | Validate with regex: `/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/` |
### 3. Navigation State Is Validated
| Attribute | Value |
|-----------|-------|
| Description | location.state can be manipulated and must be validated |
| Search Pattern | `grep -A10 "useLocation\|location\.state" --include="*.tsx"` |
| Pass Criteria | State validated with type guards and default values |
| Severity | High |
| Fix | Use validation function like `validateNavigationState()` |
### 4. URLs Are Protocol-Validated
| Attribute | Value |
|-----------|-------|
| Description | User-provided URLs must validate protocol (http/https only) |
| Search Pattern | `grep -E "new URL\(|href=\{" --include="*.tsx"` |
| Pass Criteria | URLs validated with isValidAndSafeURL or similar |
| Severity | Critical |
| Fix | Check `['http:', 'https:'].includes(url.protocol)` |
### 5. User Content Has Length Limits
| Attribute | Value |
|-----------|-------|
| Description | User input should have max length to prevent DoS |
| Search Pattern | `grep -E "maxLength\|substring\|slice" --include="*.ts"` |
| Pass Criteria | Text inputs have maxLength, displayed values truncated |
| Severity | Medium |
| Fix | Add maxLength to inputs, truncate display values |
### 6. Sensitive Data Not in URL
| Attribute | Value |
|-----------|-------|
| Description | Tokens, passwords, API keys must not appear in URLs |
| Search Pattern | `grep -E "token=\|password=\|api_key=" --include="*.ts" --include="*.tsx"` |
| Pass Criteria | No sensitive data in query params or path |
| Severity | Critical |
| Fix | Use headers or POST body for sensitive data |
### 7. External Links Use rel="noopener"
| Attribute | Value |
|-----------|-------|
| Description | Links to external sites need noopener to prevent tabnabbing |
| Search Pattern | `grep -E "target=[\"']_blank" --include="*.tsx"` |
| Pass Criteria | All target="_blank" links have rel="noopener noreferrer" |
| Severity | Medium |
| Fix | Add `rel="noopener noreferrer"` to external links |
### 8. Form Actions Are Protected
| Attribute | Value |
|-----------|-------|
| Description | Forms should prevent double submission and validate input |
| Search Pattern | `grep -E "<form|onSubmit" --include="*.tsx"` |
| Pass Criteria | Forms disable submit during loading, validate before submit |
| Severity | Medium |
| Fix | Add disabled state during submission, validate inputs |
## Sanitization Utilities
### Config Value Sanitization
```typescript
const MAX_CONFIG_VALUE_LENGTH = 100
export const sanitizeConfigValue = (value: unknown): string => {
if (!value) return 'Not set'
const str = String(value)
.replace(/[<>'"]/g, '') // Remove HTML/script injection characters
.trim()
return str.length > MAX_CONFIG_VALUE_LENGTH
? str.substring(0, MAX_CONFIG_VALUE_LENGTH) + '...'
: str
}
```
### URL Validation
```typescript
export const isValidAndSafeURL = (urlString: string): boolean => {
try {
const url = new URL(urlString)
// Only allow http and https protocols
if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(url.protocol)) {
return false
}
// Warn about localhost/private IPs in production
const hostname = url.hostname.toLowerCase()
const isLocalhost = hostname === 'localhost' ||
hostname === '127.0.0.1' ||
hostname.startsWith('192.168.') ||
hostname.startsWith('10.') ||
hostname.startsWith('172.')
if (import.meta.env.PROD && isLocalhost) {
console.warn('Localhost/private IP detected in production:', hostname)
}
return true
} catch {
return false
}
}
```
### Navigation State Validation
```typescript
export const validateNavigationState = (state: unknown): {
database: string
strategyName: string
strategyType: string
currentConfig: Record<string, any>
isDefault: boolean
} => {
const s = state as any
// Validate database name (alphanumeric and underscores only)
const database = typeof s?.database === 'string' &&
/^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$/.test(s.database)
? s.database
: 'main_database'
// Validate strategy name (alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores)
const strategyName = typeof s?.strategyName === 'string' &&
/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(s.strategyName)
? s.strategyName
: ''
// Validate against allowlist
const allowedTypes = ['BasicStrategy', 'AdvancedStrategy']
const strategyType = typeof s?.strategyType === 'string' &&
allowedTypes.includes(s.strategyType)
? s.strategyType
: 'BasicStrategy'
// Validate config is an object (contents still untrusted)
const currentConfig = s?.currentConfig &&
typeof s.currentConfig === 'object' &&
!Array.isArray(s.currentConfig)
? s.currentConfig
: {}
const isDefault = typeof s?.isDefault === 'boolean' ? s.isDefault : false
return { database, strategyName, strategyType, currentConfig, isDefault }
}
```
### Filter Key/Value Sanitization
```typescript
const MAX_FILTER_KEY_LENGTH = 50
const MAX_FILTER_VALUE_LENGTH = 200
export const sanitizeFilterKey = (key: string): string => {
return key.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/g, '').substring(0, MAX_FILTER_KEY_LENGTH)
}
export const sanitizeFilterValue = (value: string): string => {
return value
.replace(/[<>'"\\]/g, '')
.trim()
.substring(0, MAX_FILTER_VALUE_LENGTH)
}
```
## Markdown Rendering
Use rehype-sanitize when rendering user-provided markdown:
```typescript
import ReactMarkdown from 'react-markdown'
import rehypeSanitize from 'rehype-sanitize'
import remarkGfm from 'remark-gfm'
function SafeMarkdown({ content }: { content: string }) {
return (
<ReactMarkdown
remarkPlugins={[remarkGfm]}
rehypePlugins={[rehypeSanitize]}
>
{content}
</ReactMarkdown>
)
}
```
## Reserved Names
Prevent system name collisions:
```typescript
export const RESERVED_NAMES = [
'default',
'null',
'undefined',
'none',
'system',
'admin',
'root',
'all',
'any',
]
export const validateName = (name: string): string | null => {
const trimmed = name.trim()
if (!trimmed) return 'Name is required'
if (RESERVED_NAMES.includes(trimmed.toLowerCase())) {
return `"${trimmed}" is a reserved name`
}
if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(trimmed)) {
return 'Cannot contain special characters'
}
if (trimmed.length > 100) {
return 'Name must be 100 characters or less'
}
return null
}
```
## Clipboard API Security
```typescript
async function copyToClipboard(text: string) {
try {
// Sanitize before copying
const sanitized = text.replace(/[<>]/g, '')
await navigator.clipboard.writeText(sanitized)
return true
} catch (err) {
console.error('Failed to copy:', err)
return false
}
}
```
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