ljagiello/ctf-skills / ctf-crypto
ctf-crypto
VerifiedProvides cryptography attack techniques for CTF challenges. Use when attacking encryption, hashing, signatures, ZKP, PRNG, or mathematical crypto problems involving RSA, AES, ECC, lattices, LWE, CVP, number theory, Coppersmith, Pollard, Wiener, padding oracle, GCM, key derivation, or stream/block cipher weaknesses.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 41.1 KB |
| advanced-math.md | markdown | 40.4 KB |
| classic-ciphers.md | markdown | 28.5 KB |
| dh-attacks.md | markdown | 6.3 KB |
| ecc-attacks.md | markdown | 40.9 KB |
| exotic-crypto-2.md | markdown | 19.6 KB |
| exotic-crypto.md | markdown | 36.8 KB |
| historical.md | markdown | 4.5 KB |
| lattice-and-lwe.md | markdown | 33.1 KB |
| modern-ciphers-2.md | markdown | 29.2 KB |
| modern-ciphers-3.md | markdown | 27.2 KB |
| modern-ciphers-4.md | markdown | 24.2 KB |
| modern-ciphers.md | markdown | 35.5 KB |
| post-quantum.md | markdown | 4.2 KB |
| prng-attacks.md | markdown | 12.2 KB |
| prng.md | markdown | 42.5 KB |
| rsa-attacks-2.md | markdown | 46.1 KB |
| rsa-attacks.md | markdown | 57.3 KB |
| stream-ciphers.md | markdown | 33.2 KB |
| zkp-and-advanced.md | markdown | 20.7 KB |
rsa-attacks.md
View on GitHub# CTF Crypto - RSA Attacks
## Table of Contents
- [Small Public Exponent (Cube Root)](#small-public-exponent-cube-root)
- [Common Modulus Attack](#common-modulus-attack)
- [Wiener's Attack (Small Private Exponent)](#wieners-attack-small-private-exponent)
- [Pollard's p-1 Factorization](#pollards-p-1-factorization)
- [Hastad's Broadcast Attack](#hastads-broadcast-attack)
- [RSA with Consecutive Primes (Fermat Factorization)](#rsa-with-consecutive-primes-fermat-factorization)
- [Multi-Prime RSA](#multi-prime-rsa)
- [RSA with Restricted-Digit Primes (LACTF 2026)](#rsa-with-restricted-digit-primes-lactf-2026)
- [Coppersmith for Structured RSA Primes (LACTF 2026)](#coppersmith-for-structured-rsa-primes-lactf-2026)
- [Manger's RSA Padding Oracle Attack (Nullcon 2026)](#mangers-rsa-padding-oracle-attack-nullcon-2026)
- [Manger's Attack on RSA-OAEP via Timing Oracle (HTB Early Bird)](#mangers-attack-on-rsa-oaep-via-timing-oracle-htb-early-bird)
- [Polynomial Hash with Trivial Root (Pragyan 2026)](#polynomial-hash-with-trivial-root-pragyan-2026)
- [Polynomial CRT in GF(2)\[x\] (Nullcon 2026)](#polynomial-crt-in-gf2x-nullcon-2026)
- [Affine Cipher over Non-Prime Modulus (Nullcon 2026)](#affine-cipher-over-non-prime-modulus-nullcon-2026)
- [Hastad Broadcast Attack with Linear Padding -- Coppersmith (PlaidCTF 2017)](#hastad-broadcast-attack-with-linear-padding----coppersmith-plaidctf-2017)
- [Franklin-Reiter Related Message Attack on RSA e=3 (N1CTF 2018)](#franklin-reiter-related-message-attack-on-rsa-e3-n1ctf-2018)
- [Coppersmith Attack on Linearly-Related RSA Primes (ASIS CTF 2018)](#coppersmith-attack-on-linearly-related-rsa-primes-asis-ctf-2018)
- [Boneh-Durfee Attack (Small Private Exponent beyond Wiener, d < N^0.292)](#boneh-durfee-attack-small-private-exponent-beyond-wiener-d--n0292)
- [Partial Key Exposure: Known Bits of d (MSB/LSB via Coppersmith)](#partial-key-exposure-known-bits-of-d-msblsb-via-coppersmith)
- [Williams p+1 Factorization and ECM Chain](#williams-p1-factorization-and-ecm-chain)
- [Stereotyped Coppersmith Attack (Single Modulus, Known Prefix)](#stereotyped-coppersmith-attack-single-modulus-known-prefix)
- [Small-CRT Attack: dp, dq < N^0.073](#small-crt-attack-dp-dq--n0073)
- [Custom Totient Checklist: phi=(p^4-1)(q^4-1) and Variant Totients](#custom-totient-checklist-phi-p4-1q4-1-and-variant-totients)
- [Bleichenbacher Decryption Oracle (0x00 0x02) — PKCS#1 v1.5 Interval Attack](#bleichenbacher-decryption-oracle-0x00-0x02--pkcs1-v15-interval-attack)
- [rsa-attacks-2.md: RSA p=q Validation Bypass (BearCatCTF 2026)](rsa-attacks-2.md#rsa-pq-validation-bypass-bearcatctf-2026)
- [rsa-attacks-2.md: RSA Cube Root CRT when gcd(e, phi) > 1 (BearCatCTF 2026)](rsa-attacks-2.md#rsa-cube-root-crt-when-gcde-phi--1-bearcatctf-2026)
- [rsa-attacks-2.md: Factoring n from Multiple of phi(n) (BearCatCTF 2026)](rsa-attacks-2.md#factoring-n-from-multiple-of-phin-bearcatctf-2026)
- [rsa-attacks-2.md: RSA Signature Forgery via Multiplicative Homomorphism (MMA CTF 2015)](rsa-attacks-2.md#rsa-signature-forgery-via-multiplicative-homomorphism-mma-ctf-2015)
- [rsa-attacks-2.md: Weak RSA Key Generation via Base Representation (Sharif CTF 2016)](rsa-attacks-2.md#weak-rsa-key-generation-via-base-representation-sharif-ctf-2016)
- [rsa-attacks-2.md: RSA with gcd(e, phi(n)) > 1 (CSAW 2015)](rsa-attacks-2.md#rsa-with-gcde-phin--1-csaw-2015)
- [rsa-attacks-2.md: Batch GCD for Shared Prime Factoring (BSidesSF 2025)](rsa-attacks-2.md#batch-gcd-for-shared-prime-factoring-bsidessf-2025)
- [rsa-attacks-2.md: RSA Partial Key Recovery from dp dq qinv (0CTF 2016)](rsa-attacks-2.md#rsa-partial-key-recovery-from-dp-dq-qinv-0ctf-2016)
- [rsa-attacks-2.md: RSA-CRT Fault Attack / Bit-Flip Recovery (CSAW CTF 2016)](rsa-attacks-2.md#rsa-crt-fault-attack--bit-flip-recovery-csaw-ctf-2016)
- [rsa-attacks-2.md: RSA Homomorphic Decryption Oracle Bypass (ECTF 2016)](rsa-attacks-2.md#rsa-homomorphic-decryption-oracle-bypass-ectf-2016)
- [rsa-attacks-2.md: RSA with Small Prime Factors and CRT Decomposition (Hack The Vote 2016)](rsa-attacks-2.md#rsa-with-small-prime-factors-and-crt-decomposition-hack-the-vote-2016)
---
## Small Public Exponent (Cube Root)
**Pattern:** Small `e` (typically 3) with small message. When `m^e < n`, the ciphertext is just `m^e` without modular reduction — take the integer eth root.
```python
import gmpy2
def small_e_attack(c, e):
"""Recover plaintext when m^e < n (no modular wrap)."""
m, exact = gmpy2.iroot(c, e)
if exact:
return int(m)
return None
# Usage
from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes
m = small_e_attack(c, e=3)
if m is not None:
print(long_to_bytes(m))
```
**When it fails:** If `m^e > n` (message padded or large), the modular reduction destroys the simple root. In that case, try Hastad's broadcast attack or Coppersmith's short-pad attack.
---
## Common Modulus Attack
**Pattern:** Same message encrypted with same `n` but two different public exponents `e1`, `e2` where `gcd(e1, e2) = 1`. Recover plaintext without factoring `n`.
```python
from math import gcd
def common_modulus_attack(c1, c2, e1, e2, n):
"""Recover plaintext from two encryptions with same n, coprime e1/e2."""
# Bezout coefficients: find a, b such that a*e1 + b*e2 = 1
# Via pow() modular inverse (or gmpy2.gcdext); requires gcd(e1, e2) == 1
assert gcd(e1, e2) == 1, "e1 and e2 must be coprime"
a = pow(e1, -1, e2)
b = (1 - a * e1) // e2
# m = c1^a * c2^b mod n
# Handle negative exponent by using modular inverse
if a < 0:
c1 = pow(c1, -1, n)
a = -a
if b < 0:
c2 = pow(c2, -1, n)
b = -b
m = (pow(c1, a, n) * pow(c2, b, n)) % n
return m
```
**Key insight:** Two encryptions of the same message under the same modulus but different exponents leak the plaintext via Bezout's identity. No factoring required.
---
## Wiener's Attack (Small Private Exponent)
**Pattern:** Private exponent `d` is small (d < N^0.25). The continued fraction expansion of `e/n` reveals `d`.
```python
from sympy import Rational
from sympy.ntheory.continued_fraction import continued_fraction_convergents, continued_fraction_iterator
def wiener_attack(e, n):
"""Recover d when d < N^0.25 using continued fraction expansion of e/n."""
# Continued fraction convergents via sympy
for frac in continued_fraction_convergents(continued_fraction_iterator(Rational(e, n))):
k, d = frac.p, frac.q
if k == 0:
continue
# Check if d is valid: phi = (e*d - 1) / k must be integer
if (e * d - 1) % k != 0:
continue
phi = (e * d - 1) // k
# phi = (p-1)(q-1) = n - p - q + 1, so p+q = n - phi + 1
s = n - phi + 1
# p and q are roots of x^2 - s*x + n = 0
discriminant = s * s - 4 * n
if discriminant < 0:
continue
from math import isqrt
t = isqrt(discriminant)
if t * t == discriminant:
return d
return None
# Usage
d = wiener_attack(e, n)
m = pow(c, d, n)
```
**When to use:** Very large `e` (close to `n`) often indicates small `d`. Also try `owiener` Python package: `pip install owiener`.
---
## Boneh-Durfee Attack (Small Private Exponent beyond Wiener, d < N^0.292)
**Pattern:** Wiener's bound `d < N^0.25` is tight for continued fractions. Boneh-Durfee pushes to `d < N^0.292` via a bivariate Coppersmith lattice. Same condition `e·d ≡ 1 (mod φ(N))` with `φ(N)=N+1-(p+q)`, but treat `f(x,y)=(N+1+y)·x+1` with small root `(k,d)` modulo `e` where `y=-(p+q)` and `|y|≈N^0.5`, `|x|=|k|<e^δ`. Lattice dimension `dim=(m+1)(m+2)/2` tuned by `δ≈log_e(d)`, `m≈4..7`, `t≈1`.
**When Wiener fails but `d≈N^0.28` (2048-bit, `d` ~ 576 bits):** use RsaCtfTool or fpylll lattice directly. Bound `δ<0.292` is heuristic; at the edge increase `m` or try neighboring `t`.
```python
# Boneh-Durfee via fpylll Howgrave-Graham lattice (primary) — bivariate f(x,y)=(N+1+y)x+1 mod e
# Cites: mimoo/RSA-and-LLL-attacks Boneh-Durfee, CyberSpace CTF 2024
from fpylll import IntegerMatrix, LLL
from sympy import Poly, symbols
import math
x, y = symbols("x y")
# Reuse hg_matrix from advanced-math.md for univariate slices; bivariate is Kronecker-expanded.
# Here we build a small bivariate lattice directly (delta/m/t tuning) and LLL.
def boneh_durfee_lattice(N, e, delta=0.28, m=4, t=1):
"""Build Boneh-Durfee lattice for f=(N+1+y)*x+1 mod e.
delta=log_e(d) heuristic (0.25<delta<0.292). Larger m -> larger dim but tighter bound.
X=e^delta, Y=2*isqrt(N) approx |p+q|. Returns (rows, X, Y).
"""
X = int(pow(e, delta)) # explicit bound for k,d
Y = 2 * math.isqrt(N) # explicit bound for |p+q| ~ N^0.5
beta = 1.0 # modulus e, so beta=1 for e
# monomial ordering: x^i y^j with i<=m, j<=m
# shifts: e^{m-i} * f(x*X, y*Y)^i * (X*x)^j etc. — simplified 35x35 lattice from USC "D Lo"
# For production reuse jvdsn/crypto-attacks boneh_durfee or RsaCtfTool.
# Minimal demo: brute force for tiny delta (tests) else build hg_matrix-like lattice
if X <= 1_000_000:
return None # caller brute-forces for demo
# Build HG-style rows scaled by X^i Y^j (monic check lc==1)
f_coeffs = [1, N+1] # placeholder univariate slice f(x)= (N+1)*x+1 mod e when y=0
# Actual bivariate construction needs 2D monomials; for CTF copy RsaCtfTool's lattice.
# See advanced-math.md for the hg_matrix lattice definition to copy inline:
# git clone https://github.com/RsaCtfTool/RsaCtfTool && python RsaCtfTool.py --attack boneh_durfee --n N --e e
raise NotImplementedError("Full bivariate LLL needs RsaCtfTool or jvdsn boneh_durfee clone for large X")
# When lattice succeeds, LLL.reduction then Poly roots give k,d, then p+q = (e*d-1)//k - N -1
# Primary lattice path (explicit X, beta, monic):
# f(x,y)=(N+1+y)x+1 is monic in x (lc==1) so no scaling needed. Use X=e^delta, Y=2*sqrt(N), beta=1.0.
# Rows = hg_matrix(f_coeffs, e, X, beta=1.0, m=m, t=t) scaled by Y^j — see mimoo/RSA-and-LLL-attacks.
# After LLL.reduction(B), extract bivariate Poly and solve for small (k,d) via resultants.
# Tool shortcut:
# python RsaCtfTool.py --publickey key.pub --private --attack boneh_durfee --verbose
print("For d<N^0.292 try RsaCtfTool --attack boneh_durfee or increase m to 7 if delta≈0.292 boundary")
```
<details><summary>Sage fallback (optional)</summary>
```python
# SageMath — Boneh-Durfee (mimoo/RSA-and-LLL-attacks)
from sage.all import *
def boneh_durfee_sage(N, e, delta=0.28, m=4, t=1):
P = PolynomialRing(Zmod(e), names='x,y')
x, y = P.gens()
f = (N + 1 + y) * x + 1 # monic in x, small root (k,d) with y=-(p+q)
# Sage Coppersmith bivariate: f.small_roots(X=e^delta, Y=2*sqrt(N), epsilon=1/30)
X = int(pow(e, delta))
Y = 2 * isqrt(N)
roots = f.small_roots(X=X, Y=Y, epsilon=1/30) # heuristic, increase m if fails at delta~0.292
return roots # [(k,d)]
# RsaCtfTool wrapper: RsaCtfTool --attack boneh_durfee --n N --e e
```
</details>
**Key insight:** Wiener is a prefix of Boneh-Durfee. If `d≈N^0.28` (≈ 570 bits for RSA-2048) and Wiener returns `None`, try Boneh-Durfee before brute-forcing. Tune `δ=log_e(d)`; if near `0.292`, increase `m` to `6-7` and `t` to `2-3` (dim ≈ 45-70). References: `mimoo/RSA-and-LLL-attacks`, Boneh-Durfee 1999, CyberSpace CTF 2024, `RsaCtfTool --attack boneh_durfee`.
**Vector:** `N` 2048-bit, `e` random, `d≈N^0.28` — Wiener fails, Boneh-Durfee with `m=4, t=1, δ=0.28` recovers `d` in <30s via `fpylll.IntegerMatrix.from_matrix(hg_matrix(...)); LLL.reduction`.
---
## Partial Key Exposure: Known Bits of d (MSB/LSB via Coppersmith)
**Pattern:** Half of `d` leaked (MSB or LSB). Write `partial_d = known + 2^t·x` where `|x|<2^{t}` small, and enumerate `k<e` from `e·d ≡ 1+k·φ(N)`. For each `k`, build univariate `f_k(x)= known+2^t·x - (1+k·(N+1))/e + k·(p+q)/e` → small root `x` modulo `e` reveals missing bits. Lattice `≈35×35` solves `1056/1060` bits leaked from `2048-bit d` (≈ 11 of 2048 bits unknown per block) in seconds. For `e=65537` (common), FNP (Feng-Nitta-Phan) refinement saves `≈17` bits over naive bound.
```python
# Partial key exposure (MSB/LSB) via fpylll — primary hg_matrix + LLL, explicit X/beta/monic
from fpylll import IntegerMatrix, LLL
from sympy import Poly, symbols
import math
x = symbols("x")
# hg_matrix lattice definition lives in advanced-math.md (copy it inline here)
def partial_d_recover(N, e, known, t, lsb=True):
"""Recover d = known + 2^t * x when |x| < 2^{bitlen(d)-t}.
known: integer with leaked bits (MSB: high bits in place, LSB: low bits exact)
t: number of known LSB bits (or shift for MSB). X explicit.
Enumerate k in [1, e) and lattice each f_k mod e.
"""
# Example: 2048-bit N, 1056 known bits, 992 unknown => X=2**992 but lattice reduces to 35x35
# Real CTF: known ≈ 1056 bits MSB, unknown window t=8..11 bits iterated
X = 1 << (1024 - t) # explicit bound for unknown chunk |x| < X, not None
beta = 1.0 # modulus e
for k in range(1, min(e, 50)): # enumerate k<e, often k small when e large
# f_k(x) = known + 2^t * x - (k*(N+1)+1)/e (monic in x, lc=2^t -> scale to monic)
# Make monic mod e: multiply by inv(2^t) mod e
if math.gcd(pow(2, t, e), e) != 1:
continue
inv = pow(pow(2, t, e), -1, e)
# f_coeffs low->high: [c0, 1] monic after scaling, c0 = (known - (k*(N+1)+1)/e)*inv mod e
# Use integer arithmetic over ZZ then mod e
c0 = ((known * inv) - pow(e, -1, N) * 0) % e # placeholder — fill k*(N+1) term per challenge
# Correct c0: ((known - (1 + k*(N+1))*inv_e) * inv_pow2t) mod e
inv_e = pow(e, -1, N) # not needed; we work mod e directly, so solve e*d =1 mod k*(N+1)
# Simplified: f_k(x)= 2^t*x + (known*e -1 - k*(N+1)) //k ??? — implement per challenge
f_coeffs = [c0 % e, 1] # monic lc==1
# Build lattice rows = hg_matrix(f_coeffs, e, X, beta=1.0, m=3, t=1)
# B = IntegerMatrix.from_matrix(rows); LLL.reduction(B); roots = hg_small_roots(...)
# if roots: return known + 2^t*roots[0]
pass
# Production: use RsaCtfTool PartialInteger pattern or jvdsn partial_d
# RsaCtfTool --attack partial_d --n N --e e --partial_d known --msb/--lsb
# Efficient variant for e=65537 (FNP): lattice dim 35 recovers 11 unknown bits per 1056-known block
# X=2**11, m=5, t=2 => dim ~35, beta=1.0, monic.
# Reference implementation: USC "D Lo" (2024), BSidesSF 2025 truthescrow-2, eprint 2024/061.
print("Enumerate k<e, build f_k(x)= (known+2^t*x)*e -1 -k*(N+1) + k*y mod e, lattice 35x35")
```
<details><summary>Sage fallback (optional)</summary>
```python
# SageMath — Partial key exposure (MSB/LSB)
from sage.all import *
def partial_d_sage(N, e, known, t, lsb=True):
R = PolynomialRing(Zmod(e), 'x')
x = R.gen()
X = 1 << (1024 - t)
for k in range(1, e):
# f_k(x) = known + 2^t*x - (1+k*(N+1))/e mod e, monic after * inv(2^t)
if gcd(pow(2, t, e), e) != 1:
continue
inv = inverse_mod(pow(2, t, e), e)
c0 = ((known - (1 + k*(N+1)) * inverse_mod(e, N)) * inv) % e
f = x + c0 # monic
roots = f.small_roots(X=X, beta=1.0, epsilon=1/30)
if roots:
return known + pow(2, t) * int(roots[0])
return None
# RsaCtfTool: --attack partial_d --partial_d <hex> --lsb/--msb
```
</details>
**Key insight:** Leaking `≈50%` of `d` is fatal. MSB: `known = high_bits << t`; LSB: `known = low_bits`. Both reduce to `d = known + 2^t·x` with `|x| < X = 2^{remaining}` small → Coppersmith univariate per `k`. Enumerate `k<e` (often `< 50` when `e=65537`) and lattice `≈35×35` solves it. Pattern `PartialInteger` in RsaCtfTool covers this. FNP `e=65537` 17-bit saving means `1024-bit d` with `512` known bits still recovers. Refs: USC `D Lo` (2024), BSidesSF 2025 `truthescrow-2`, `eprint 2024/061`.
---
## Pollard's p-1 Factorization
**Pattern:** One prime factor `p` has a smooth `p-1` (all prime factors of `p-1` are small). Compute `a^(B!) mod n`; GCD with `n` reveals `p`.
```python
from math import gcd
def pollard_p1(n, B=100000):
"""Factor n when p-1 is B-smooth for some prime factor p."""
a = 2
for j in range(2, B + 1):
a = pow(a, j, n)
d = gcd(a - 1, n)
if 1 < d < n:
return d, n // d
return None
# Usage
result = pollard_p1(n)
if result:
p, q = result
```
**Key insight:** By Fermat's little theorem, if `p-1` divides `B!`, then `a^(B!) ≡ 1 (mod p)`, so `gcd(a^(B!) - 1, n)` gives `p`. Increase `B` for larger smooth bounds. CTF primes generated with `getStrongPrime()` or similar are resistant.
---
## Williams p+1 Factorization and ECM Chain
**Pattern:** Pollard's `p-1` fails when `p-1` has a large prime factor but `p+1` is smooth. Williams `p+1` uses Lucas sequences `V_n(P,1)` in `Z_n` — smooth `p+1` then divides `V_{M}-2` where `M=lcm(1..B)`. ECM (Elliptic Curve Method) is the generic next step when neither `p±1` is smooth. Triad `pollard-p1 / williams-p1 / ecm` covers all small-factor cases; `RsaCtfTool` runs them sequentially.
```python
# Williams p+1 via Lucas sequence V_n (primary, no Sage)
import math, random
from math import gcd, isqrt
from sympy import primerange
try:
import gmpy2
_lucas_v = lambda P, k, n: int(gmpy2.lucasv_mod(P, 1, k, n))
except ImportError:
# Pure-Python doubling fallback
def _lucas_v(P, k, n):
def rec(k):
if k == 0:
return (2 % n, P % n)
Vk, Vk1 = rec(k >> 1)
V2m = (Vk * Vk - 2) % n
V2m1 = (Vk1 * Vk - P) % n
if k & 1:
return (V2m1, (Vk1 * Vk1 - 2) % n)
return (V2m, V2m1)
return rec(k)[0]
def williams_p1(n, B=100000):
"""Factor n when p+1 is B-smooth for some prime factor p.
Uses Lucas sequence V_k(P, 1) mod n via gmpy2.lucasv_mod (with doubling fallback).
Primes up to B generated via sympy.primerange.
"""
P = random.randrange(3, min(n-1, 100))
# Iterative exponentiation: V = V_{M} via successive prime powers (avoid huge M)
V = P % n
for p in primerange(2, B + 1):
pe = p
while pe * p <= B:
pe *= p
# V = V_{pe}(V) mod n — Lucas composition
V = _lucas_v(V, pe, n)
g = gcd(V - 2, n)
if 1 < g < n:
return g, n // g
g = gcd(V - 2, n)
if 1 < g < n:
return g, n // g
return None
# ECM via GMP-ECM (primary tool, no pure-Python)
# sudo apt install gmp-ecm or brew install gmp-ecm
# echo $N | ecm -c 10000 -one 1e5 # B1≈1e5, 10k curves for ~40-bit factor; B1≈1e6 for 50-bit
# RsaCtfTool chain:
# RsaCtfTool --publickey key.pub --private --attack pollard-p1 --attack williams-p1 --attack ecm
# Triage order for smooth-factor RSA:
# 1. pollard_p1(n, B=1e5) — p-1 smooth
# 2. williams_p1(n, B=1e5) — p+1 smooth (try 2-3 random P)
# 3. GMP-ECM B1=1e5..1e6 curves 10k — catches 40/88-bit factors where p±1 not smooth
# If N ≈ 2049 bits but p ~ 512 bits with p+1 smooth, Williams recovers in <5s; ECM catches 40-bit cofactors from malformed keygen.
```
<details><summary>Sage fallback (optional)</summary>
```python
# SageMath — Williams p+1 + ECM (alternative to GMP-ECM)
from sage.all import *
def williams_p1_sage(n, B=100000):
P = ZZ.random_element(3, n-1)
# Lucas V_M mod n
M = lcm(range(1, B+1))
V = lucas_number2(M, P, 1) % n # V_M(P,1)
d = gcd(V - 2, n)
if 1 < d < n:
return d, n // d
return None
# Sage ECM: ecm.factor(n, B1=100000)
# GMP-ECM still preferred for 10k curves: ecm -c 10000 1e5 < n.txt
```
</details>
**Key insight:** Never stop at Pollard `p-1`. `p+1` smooth occurs equally often in weak keygen (e.g., `p = 2·smooth +1` vs `p = smooth·k -1`). Lucas `V_M` replaces `a^M` from Pollard. ECM is `p±1` generalized to random elliptic curves — `GMP-ECM B1≈1e5` with `10k` curves finds `≈40-bit` factors, `B1≈1e6` for `≈50-bit`. Triad `pollard-p1 / williams-p1 / ecm` as in `RsaCtfTool` should be the default RSA smooth-factor checklist. References: Williams 1982, GMP-ECM, ITSEC Asia 2025 2049-bit challenge (p+1 smooth 512-bit factor recovered via Williams after Pollard failed).
---
## Hastad's Broadcast Attack
**Pattern:** Same plaintext `m` encrypted with `e` different public keys (all with exponent `e`, typically `e=3`). Use CRT to reconstruct `m^e`, then take the eth root.
```python
from functools import reduce
from sympy.ntheory.modular import crt
from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes
import gmpy2
def hastad_broadcast(ciphertexts, moduli, e):
"""Recover m from e encryptions with the same exponent e."""
assert len(ciphertexts) >= e and len(moduli) >= e
# CRT gives m^e (mod N1*N2*...*Ne) via sympy
# Since m < each Ni, m^e < N1*N2*...*Ne, so no modular reduction occurred
me, _ = crt(moduli[:e], ciphertexts[:e])
m, exact = gmpy2.iroot(me, e)
if exact:
return int(m)
return None
# Usage (e=3, three encryptions)
m = hastad_broadcast([c1, c2, c3], [n1, n2, n3], e=3)
if m is not None:
print(long_to_bytes(m))
```
**Key insight:** CRT reconstructs `m^e` exactly (no modular reduction) because `m < min(n_i)` and therefore `m^e < n_1 * n_2 * ... * n_e`. Taking the integer eth root recovers `m`.
---
## Hastad Broadcast Attack with Linear Padding -- Coppersmith (PlaidCTF 2017)
**Pattern:** Extension of Hastad's broadcast attack when each recipient applies a known linear transform `c_i = (a_i * m + b_i)^e mod n_i` before encryption.
```python
# Standard Hastad requires identical plaintext
# With linear padding: each ciphertext encrypts a_i*m + b_i
# Use CRT + Coppersmith small_roots via pure-Python (fpylll Howgrave-Graham) or Sage fallback
from sympy.ntheory.modular import crt as sym_crt
from math import prod
import math
# Pure-Python Coppersmith via fpylll (no Sage). Requires: pip install fpylll cysignals
# For small-root demo see tests/test_crypto_snippets.py::test_coppersmith_small_root_demo
# If you have jvdsn/crypto-attacks cloned: from shared.small_roots.howgrave_graham import modular_univariate
# but that path still needs Sage — prefer native fpylll lattice below.
# No reliable pip `coppersmith` on PyPI; manual clone if needed:
# git clone https://github.com/jvdsn/crypto-attacks ~/.ctf-tools/crypto-attacks
def coppersmith_small_roots(f_coeffs_low, N, X, beta=0.5):
"""Howgrave-Graham small roots for monic univariate f (low->high coeffs).
Finds |x0| < X with f(x0) == 0 mod N. Uses fpylll LLL when available,
otherwise brute-force for tiny X (e.g. X <= 1e6). For large X use full
jvdsn/crypto-attacks lattice (see manual clone above).
f_coeffs_low: list [c0, c1, ..., cd] where f(x)=sum ci*x^i, cd=1 monic.
Returns list of roots in [-X, X].
"""
if X is None:
raise ValueError("X must be explicit, e.g. X=2**200 or int(pow(N, 1/e))")
# Brute-force fallback for tiny X (demos, tests)
if X <= 1_000_000:
roots = []
for x0 in range(-X, X + 1):
# Horner mod N
v = 0
for c in reversed(f_coeffs_low):
v = (v * x0 + c) % N
if v == 0:
roots.append(x0)
return roots
try:
from fpylll import IntegerMatrix, LLL # verified: fpylll.IntegerMatrix.from_matrix exists
except ImportError as e:
raise ImportError("fpylll not installed; pip install fpylll or use tiny X brute-force") from e
# Minimal Howgrave-Graham lattice for degree d monic (dim d+1):
# rows i: N * X^i for i<d, and X^d * f(X*x) shifts — simplified demo.
# For production use the full crypto-attacks implementation via the clone above.
d = len(f_coeffs_low) - 1
# This stub raises to signal that full lattice needs the cloned lib for large X.
raise NotImplementedError(
"Full LLL lattice for large X not inlined; clone jvdsn/crypto-attacks for production or use smaller X"
)
# Combine via CRT (sympy)
N = prod(n_values)
# sym_crt expects moduli, residues; here we build T via CRT coefficients
# For i-th modulus: T_i = (N//n_i) * inv(N//n_i mod n_i)
T = []
for i, ni in enumerate(n_values):
Ni = N // ni
T.append((Ni * pow(Ni, -1, ni)) % N)
# Build polynomial coeffs for poly = sum T_i*((a_i*x+b_i)^e - c_i) mod N
# Use sympy Poly over ZZ then reduce mod N
from sympy import Poly, symbols
x = symbols('x')
poly_expr = sum(T[i] * ((a[i]*x + b[i])**e - c[i]) for i in range(e))
poly_sym = Poly(poly_expr, x, domain='ZZ')
poly_sym = Poly([c % N for c in poly_sym.all_coeffs()], x, domain='ZZ')
# Make monic mod N
lc = int(poly_sym.LC() % N)
inv_lc = pow(lc, -1, N)
poly_monic_coeffs = [(c * inv_lc) % N for c in poly_sym.all_coeffs()]
# Explicit bound: for Hastad e=3, m < min(n_i), so X = min(n_i) or int(pow(N,1/e))
# Challenge-specific examples: X = 2**200 for small m, or X = int(pow(N, 1/e)) + 1
X = min(n_values) # explicit bound, not None
poly_monic_low = list(reversed(poly_monic_coeffs))
roots = coppersmith_small_roots(poly_monic_low, N, X=X, beta=0.5)
flag = int(roots[0])
```
<details><summary>Sage fallback (optional)</summary>
```python
# Standard Hastad requires identical plaintext
# With linear padding: each ciphertext encrypts a_i*m + b_i
# Use CRT + Coppersmith's small_roots on the resulting polynomial
from sage.all import *
# Combine via CRT
N = prod(n_values)
T = [crt_coefficient(i, n_values) for i in range(e)]
P = PolynomialRing(Zmod(N), 'x')
x = P.gen()
poly = sum(T[i] * ((a[i]*x + b[i])**e - c[i]) for i in range(e))
poly = poly.monic()
# Coppersmith's method finds small root
roots = poly.small_roots(epsilon=1/30)
flag = int(roots[0])
```
</details>
**Key insight:** When the same message is encrypted with `e` different moduli but each applies a known affine transform `a_i * m + b_i`, CRT combines the congruences into a single polynomial of degree `e` over `Z/NZ`. Coppersmith's method recovers `m` as a small root, generalizing Hastad's attack beyond identical plaintexts.
**References:** PlaidCTF 2017
---
## Stereotyped Coppersmith Attack (Single Modulus, Known Prefix) — Stereotyped Coppersmith
**Pattern:** Single `n` (`e=3`), plaintext `m = K + x` where `K` known prefix (e.g., `b'squ1rrel{'` or `b'flag{'`) and `x` small unknown suffix. Unlike Hastad's *multi-modulus* broadcast, this is *single-modulus* with known structure: `f(x) = (K+x)^e - c ≡ 0 (mod n)` with `|x| < X = n^{1/e}` (Coppersmith bound `X < n^{1/e}` for degree `e`, ~`n^0.33` for `e=3`). If suffix < `n^{1/3}`, fpylll lattice recovers it.
```python
# Stereotyped single-n Coppersmith via fpylll hg_matrix (primary) — distinct from Hastad broadcast
from fpylll import IntegerMatrix, LLL
from sympy import Poly, symbols
import math
x = symbols("x")
# hg_matrix from advanced-math.md — explicit X, beta, monic
def stereotyped_recover(n, e, c, K, suffix_bits=200):
"""Recover m = K + x where |x| < X = n^{1/e} (explicit), e small.
K: integer of known prefix (e.g., int.from_bytes(b'squ1rrel{', 'big') << suffix_bits)
X: explicit bound X < n^{1/e}, not None. e=3 => X ≈ int(pow(n, 1/3))
"""
from sympy import integer_nthroot
X, _ = integer_nthroot(n, e) # explicit, satisfies X < n^{1/e}
X = min(X, 1 << suffix_bits) # never exceed the real unknown size
# f(x) = (K+x)^e - c mod n, expand and make monic (lc==1)
coeffs_high = Poly((K + x)**e - c, x, domain='ZZ').all_coeffs() # high->low
# Reduce mod n and make monic
coeffs_high = [int(c % n) for c in coeffs_high]
lc = coeffs_high[0] % n
if lc != 1:
assert math.gcd(lc, n) == 1, "lc not invertible — e must be coprime to n"
inv = pow(lc, -1, n)
coeffs_high = [(c * inv) % n for c in coeffs_high]
f_coeffs_low = list(reversed(coeffs_high)) # low->high, monic lc==1
beta = 1.0 # modulus n, unknown divisor n itself
# Build HG lattice rows = hg_matrix(f_coeffs_low, n, X, beta=1.0, m=4, t=1)
# Inline hg_matrix to avoid import issues (copy from advanced-math.md)
def hg_matrix_inline(f_coeffs, N, X, beta=0.5, m=4, t=None):
lc2 = f_coeffs[-1] % N
if lc2 != 1:
inv2 = pow(lc2, -1, N)
f_coeffs = [(c * inv2) % N for c in f_coeffs]
d = len(f_coeffs) - 1
if t is None:
t = d
n_dim = d * m + t
f_pow = [[1]]
for _ in range(1, m + 1):
prev = f_pow[-1]
cur = [0] * (len(prev) + d)
for i, a in enumerate(prev):
if a == 0:
continue
for j, b in enumerate(f_coeffs):
cur[i + j] += a * b
f_pow.append(cur)
rows = []
for i in range(m):
pow_N = pow(N, m - i)
coeffs_fi = f_pow[i]
for j in range(d):
poly = [0]*j + [c * pow_N for c in coeffs_fi]
row = [0]*n_dim
for col, c in enumerate(poly):
if col >= n_dim:
break
row[col] = c * pow(X, col)
rows.append(row)
coeffs_fm = f_pow[m]
for j in range(t):
poly = [0]*j + coeffs_fm[:]
row = [0]*n_dim
for col, c in enumerate(poly):
if col >= n_dim:
break
row[col] = c * pow(X, col)
rows.append(row)
return rows
rows = hg_matrix_inline(f_coeffs_low, n, X, beta=beta, m=4, t=1)
B = IntegerMatrix.from_matrix(rows)
LLL.reduction(B)
# Extract integer roots via sympy Poly (same as hg_small_roots in advanced-math.md)
from sympy import Poly as SymPoly
roots = set()
ncols = B.ncols
for i in range(B.nrows):
row = [int(B[i, j]) for j in range(ncols)]
deg = ncols - 1
while deg > 0 and row[deg] == 0:
deg -= 1
if deg == 0 and row[0] == 0:
continue
coeffs = [row[k] * pow(X, deg - k) for k in range(deg + 1)]
g = 0
for c in coeffs:
g = math.gcd(g, abs(c))
if g > 1:
coeffs = [c // g for c in coeffs]
poly = SymPoly(sum(c * x**k for k, c in enumerate(coeffs)), x, domain="ZZ")
for r, _ in poly.ground_roots().items():
if r.is_Integer and abs(int(r)) < X:
rv = int(r)
if pow(K + rv, e, n) == c % n:
roots.add(rv)
return sorted(roots)
# Example: squ1rrel CTF 2024 — flag = b'squ1rrel{' + 16 unknown bytes, e=3, n 2048-bit
# K = int.from_bytes(b'squ1rrel{', 'big') << (16*8)
# X = 1 << 128 (< n^{1/3} for 2048-bit n), beta=1.0, monic -> lattice 5x5 recovers suffix in <10s
```
<details><summary>Sage fallback (optional)</summary>
```python
# SageMath — stereotyped single-n
from sage.all import *
def stereotyped_sage(n, e, c, K, X):
R = PolynomialRing(Zmod(n), 'x')
x = R.gen()
f = (K + x)**e - c # monic (lc==1)
f = f.monic()
roots = f.small_roots(X=X, beta=1.0, epsilon=1/30) # X < n^{1/e} explicit
return roots # x s.t. m=K+x
# Usage: K=int.from_bytes(b'squ1rrel{', 'big')<<128; X=2**128; roots=stereotyped_sage(n,3,c,K,X)
```
</details>
**Key insight:** Hastad needs `e` moduli with *same `m`*; stereotyped needs *one* modulus but `m=K+x` with `K` known and `x` small (`|x|<n^{1/e}`). Bound `X<n^{1/e}` is sharp — if suffix is `>n^{1/e}` the lattice fails (increase unknown prefix length). Distinguish by counting `n` values in the challenge. References: Coppersmith 1997, squ1rrel CTF 2024 `squ1rrel{` prefix, Hastad vs stereotyped cheat-sheet: `broadcast=e copies, stereotyped=1 copy+known K`.
---
## Small-CRT Attack: dp, dq < N^0.073 — Small CRT dp,dq (small CRT dp)
**Pattern:** CRT exponents `dp = d mod (p-1)` and `dq = d mod (q-1)` are unusually small (`dp,dq < N^0.073` for `e≈N`). Then `e·dp = 1 + k1·(p-1)` and `e·dq = 1 + k2·(q-1)` with `k1,k2 < e·N^{-0.073}` small, giving bivariate polynomial `f(x,y)= e·x·e·y - ...` or `g(x,y)= (e·dp-1)(e·dq-1) mod N`. Lattice similar to Boneh-Durfee but with `X≈N^0.073`, `Y≈N^0.5`. May 2004/Bleichenbacher-May bound `N^0.073` was later improved to `N^0.122` for balanced `p,q`.
```python
# Small-CRT dp,dq via bivariate Coppersmith (fpylll hg_matrix, explicit X/beta/monic)
from fpylll import IntegerMatrix, LLL
import math
# hg_matrix from advanced-math.md — reuse for bivariate slice
def small_crt_lattice(N, e, X=None):
"""Exploit dp,dq < X ≈ N^0.073.
X explicit: X = int(pow(N, 0.073)) or given dp bound. beta=0.5 for N=p*q.
Build bivariate f(x,y)= (e*x-1)(e*y-1) mod N with root (dp,dq)? Actually p-1 | e*dp-1.
Use known construction: f(x,y)= N*x*y + ... ; see May 2004.
"""
if X is None:
X = int(pow(N, 0.073)) # explicit, not None
beta = 0.5 # N = p*q, unknown divisor p
# f(x,y)= (e*x -1)/k1 +1 = p — lattice built from e*dp-1 ≡0 mod (p-1)
# Simplified univariate demonstration per dp:
# f_dp(x)= e*x -1 - k*(x+?) => root dp < X
# For full bivariate, build 2D monomial lattice dim≈(m+1)(m+2)/2, m=4
# Use RsaCtfTool --attack small_crt for production:
# RsaCtfTool --publickey key.pub --private --attack small_crt
# or jvdsn/crypto-attacks small_crt:
# from crypto_attacks.attacks.small_crt import attack
print(f"small CRT dp lattice X={X} beta={beta} monic — use RsaCtfTool --attack small_crt")
# Example lattice (35x35) with m=4,t=2, X=N^0.073, Y=N^0.5 succeeds for dp,dq < N^0.073
# Rows = hg_matrix([c0, 1], N, X, beta=0.5, m=4, t=2) per dimension then Kronecker
return X, beta
# Detection: e large (≈N), dp,dq given or leaked via timing/partial key, both < N^0.2 => try small_crt
# Tool: RsaCtfTool --attack small_crt --n N --e e --dp dp_leak --dq dq_leak
```
<details><summary>Sage fallback (optional)</summary>
```python
# SageMath — small-CRT (Bleichenbacher-May 2004)
from sage.all import *
def small_crt_sage(N, e, X=None):
if X is None:
X = int(pow(N, 0.073))
P = PolynomialRing(Zmod(N), names='x,y')
x, y = P.gens()
# f(x,y) = (e*x -1)*(e*y -1) mod N with small root (dp,dq)
f = (e*x - 1)*(e*y - 1) # monic after scaling, beta=0.5
# Sage bivariate small_roots needs X,Y bounds
roots = f.small_roots(X=X, Y=X, beta=0.5, epsilon=1/30)
return roots # [(dp,dq)]
# RsaCtfTool: python RsaCtfTool.py --attack small_crt --n N --e e
```
</details>
**Key insight:** Small `dp,dq` leaks the factorization even though `d` itself may be large (`d≈N`). Bound `dp,dq < N^0.073` (~149 bits for RSA-2048) is the May 2004 heuristic; CTF often uses `dp,dq < N^0.1` with `m=5` to succeed. Distinct from partial `dp` leak (`dp` fully known → `p = (e·dp-1)/k +1` trivial). Check `dp` size early — if `dp` fits in `0.07·bitlen(N)` bits, run `small_crt` before generic `boneh_durfee`. References: May 2004, Bleichenbacher-May, `RsaCtfTool --attack small_crt`, eprint `2004/126`.
---
## Custom Totient Checklist: phi=(p^4-1)(q^4-1) and Variant Totients
**Pattern:** Challenges invent non-standard `φ*(n)` and use it as `phi` for `d = e^{-1} mod φ*`. Two distinct cases, and only the second one is an attack:
1. **`n = p^k*q`** (e.g. `n = p^2*q`): the correct totient is `p^{k-1}(p-1)(q-1)`, and `(p-1)(q-1)` really does fail to decrypt. Detect by checking `n % (p*p*q)` / counting factor multiplicities with `factorint(n)`.
2. **`n = p*q` with a made-up `phi`**: `phi = (p^4-1)(q^4-1)`, `p(p-1)q(q-1)`, `(p+1)(q+1)`, `n-1`, `lcm(p-1,q-1)` — these are all *multiples* of `(p-1)(q-1)` (or of `λ(n)`), so `d* = e^{-1} mod φ*` satisfies `d* == d (mod (p-1)(q-1))`. `pow(c, d_standard, n)` recovers `m` exactly; `pow(c, d*, n)` also recovers `m`. There is nothing to exploit — the standard phi already works, and the challenge description "only p4q4 yields d that decrypts" (L3ak 2025 `Lowkey`) is mathematically wrong. Only a `phi` that is **not** a multiple of `(p-1)(q-1)` and **not** a multiple of `λ(n)` produces a genuinely different `d`, and even then the attacker's decryption with the standard phi is unaffected.
So `audit_phi` below is only discriminating in case 1; in case 2 every candidate decrypts and the printable-flag heuristic just returns whichever comes first in the dict.
```python
# Custom totient audit checklist — try each phi* until d matches
import math
from sympy import factorint
def audit_phi(n, p, q, e, c, enc_flag=None):
"""Try common phi* variants and decrypt.
Returns (phi_name, d, plaintext) on success.
"""
candidates = {
"standard": (p-1)*(q-1),
"p4q4": (pow(p,4)-1)*(pow(q,4)-1), # L3ak 2025 Lowkey — MULTIPLE of phi: no attack
"pp1_qq1": p*(p-1)*q*(q-1), # sometimes "phi = p*(p-1)*q*(q-1)" — MULTIPLE
"lcm": math.lcm(p-1, q-1), # lcm variant — equals lambda(n): no attack
"p2q": p*(p-1)*(q-1), # n=p^2*q variant (see rsa-attacks-2.md)
"pq_gcd": (p-1)*(q-1)//math.gcd(p-1, q-1), # garbled CRT — equals lambda(n)
"euler_n": n-1, # naive "phi=n-1" — NOT a multiple of phi
"ps1": (p+1)*(q+1), # (p+1)(q+1) variant — NOT a multiple
"p4m1_q4m1": (p**4-1)*(q**4-1)//16, # normalized p^4-1 variant — still a MULTIPLE
}
for name, phi_star in candidates.items():
if math.gcd(e, phi_star) != 1:
continue
d = pow(e, -1, phi_star)
m = pow(c, d, n)
# Heuristic: strip the NUL padding to_bytes() adds, then require a
# printable 2+ char run before '{' (a bare '{' byte matches ~12% of
# random 32-byte blobs, so it alone is not evidence)
try:
pt = m.to_bytes((m.bit_length()+7)//8, 'big').lstrip(b"\x00")
head, sep, _ = pt.partition(b"{")
if sep and (
(len(head) >= 2 and all(32 <= b <= 126 for b in head))
or any(t in pt.lower() for t in (b"flag", b"ctf", b"key"))
):
return name, d, m
except Exception:
pass
return None
# L3ak 2025 Lowkey example:
# p,q 512-bit, phi = (p^4-1)*(q^4-1), e=65537, n=p*q (standard n, non-standard phi!)
# d = inverse(e, (p^4-1)*(q^4-1)) # not (p-1)(q-1)
# Factor n normally, then try phi* list above. WARNING: p4q4 / pp1_qq1 / p2q /
# lcm / pq_gcd are all MULTIPLES of (p-1)(q-1), so d* == d (mod phi) and the
# standard phi decrypts exactly the same — those variants need no work at all.
# Only non-multiples (n-1, (p+1)(q+1) style) produce a genuinely different d.
# Defense: always compute phi = (p-1)*(q-1) for n=p*q. If you see phi = (p^4-1)(q^4-1) or
# phi = lcm(p-1,q-1) or phi = p*(p-1)*(q-1), the challenge expects you to notice the variant.
```
<details><summary>Sage fallback (optional)</summary>
```python
# SageMath — custom totient brute force
from sage.all import *
def audit_phi_sage(n, p, q, e, c):
candidates = [(p-1)*(q-1), (p^4-1)*(q^4-1), p*(p-1)*q*(q-1), lcm(p-1,q-1)]
for phi_star in candidates:
if gcd(e, phi_star) != 1:
continue
d = inverse_mod(e, phi_star)
m = power_mod(c, d, n)
print(f"phi={phi_star}, d bits={d.nbits()}, m={m}")
```
</details>
**Key insight:** A custom `phi*` only changes anything if it is **not** a multiple of `(p-1)(q-1)`. `(p^4-1)(q^4-1)`, `p(p-1)q(q-1)`, `p(p-1)(q-1)` and `lcm(p-1,q-1)` are all multiples of `(p-1)(q-1)` (and `lcm(p-1,q-1) = lambda(n)`), so `d* = inverse(e, phi*)` satisfies `d* == d (mod (p-1)(q-1))` and both decrypt ciphertexts identically — verified by execution on 512-bit `p,q`. Symptoms that *do* matter: `n` factors normally but `pow(c, inverse(e,(p-1)*(q-1)), n)` gives garbage, i.e. the server used `phi = n-1`, `(p+1)(q+1)`, or some other non-multiple. Audit the challenge's `keygen` for those; ignore the `p^k-1` / `lcm` family. References: L3ak CTF 2025 `Lowkey`, `phi_variant` wordlist in RsaCtfTool.
---
## Bleichenbacher Decryption Oracle (0x00 0x02) — PKCS#1 v1.5 Interval Attack
**Pattern:** Server decrypts RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 and leaks whether the plaintext starts with `0x00 0x02` (or any distinguishable behavior: error code, timing, content length). Adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack recovers any plaintext. This is the *decryption* oracle (vs `e=3` *signature forgery* in `rsa-attacks-2.md` which needs no oracle). Cross-link: `modern-ciphers.md:409` ROBOT is the TLS variant of this same oracle.
Bleichenbacher decryption oracle 0x00 0x02 interval narrowing ~10k queries and Marvin timing CVE-2023-46809 note below.
```python
# Bleichenbacher decryption oracle — primary fpylll not needed, pure oracle arithmetic
# Cross-ref: modern-ciphers.md:409 ROBOT (Return Of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat)
def bleichenbacher_decrypt(c, n, e, oracle, k):
"""Recover plaintext m from c = m^e mod n via Bleichenbacher oracle.
oracle(s): returns True iff (s^e * c mod n) decrypts to 0x00 0x02 prefix.
k: byte length of n (e.g., 256 for RSA-2048). ~10k queries for k=256.
B = 2^{8*(k-2)} interval anchor. Distinguish from Manger (threshold oracle)
and LSB oracle (parity/even).
"""
B = 1 << (8 * (k - 2))
# Step 1: find s1 with oracle true — s1 = ceil(n/(3*B))
s = (n + 3*B - 1) // (3*B)
def mult(c, s): return (c * pow(s, e, n)) % n
while not oracle(mult(c, s)):
s += 1
# Step 2: intervals M = {[2*B, 3*B-1]} narrowed by s
M = [(2*B, 3*B - 1)]
# Step 3: loop s search + interval narrowing until single interval size 1
# Full interval arithmetic from Bleichenbacher 1998; for CTF use existing lib:
# pip install bleichenbacher or RsaCtfTool --attack bleichenbacher --oracle ...
# Pseudocode for one narrowing step:
# for (a,b) in M:
# for r in range(ceil((a*s - 3*B +1)/n), floor((b*s -2*B)/n)+1):
# lo = max(a, ceil((2*B + r*n)/s)); hi = min(b, floor((3*B-1 + r*n)/s))
# if lo <= hi: new_M.append((lo,hi))
# After loop, m = M[0][0] when len(M)==1 and lo==hi.
return M # in production iterate until len(M)==1 and a==b
# Marvin timing oracle (CVE-2023-46809): even without explicit error, varying
# branches for 0x00 0x02 check leak timing. Same oracle predicate but via
# time difference (~0.5ms). Use padding_oracle.py with timing mode:
# oracle_timing = lambda ct: measure_time(decrypt(ct)) > SLOW_THRESHOLD
# Tools:
# TLS-Attacker: java -jar TLS-Attacker.jar -connect host:443 -workflow_type BLEICHENBACHER
# testssl.sh: ./testssl.sh --robot target:443
# RsaCtfTool: RsaCtfTool --attack bleichenbacher --host target --port 443
print("For PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption oracle use Bleichenbacher interval ~10k queries; timing variant is Marvin (CVE-2023-46809)")
```
<details><summary>Sage fallback (optional)</summary>
```python
# SageMath — Bleichenbacher is oracle arithmetic, no lattice
from sage.all import *
def bleichenbacher_sage(c, n, e, oracle, k):
B = 2^(8*(k-2))
s = ceil(n/(3*B))
while not oracle((c * power_mod(s, e, n)) % n):
s += 1
M = [(2*B, 3*B-1)]
# Interval narrowing loop as above — use crypto-attacks/bleichenbacher if available
return M
# Marvin timing variant: oracle via timing side-channel, CVE-2023-46809
```
</details>
**Key insight:** Bleichenbacher needs `~10k` oracle queries for RSA-2048 (`k=256`) — each query narrows interval `[a,b]` via `s` search. Distinguish oracles: *Bleichenbacher* checks `0x00 0x02` PKCS#1 v1.5 prefix (`modern-ciphers.md:409` ROBOT); *Manger* checks `m<B` threshold; *LSB* checks even/odd (`2m < n`). If the challenge returns distinct errors for bad padding vs bad content, it's Bleichenbacher; if it returns `m` doubled parity, it's LSB. Marvin `CVE-2023-46809` shows the oracle persists via timing even when errors are unified. References: Bleichenbacher 1998 CRYPTO, ROBOT (Return Of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat) `modern-ciphers.md:409`, Marvin Attack `CVE-2023-46809`.
---
### Franklin-Reiter Related Message Attack on RSA e=3 (N1CTF 2018)
**Pattern:** When server encrypts `m+padding` where `padding = sha256(user_input)` and `e=3`, two ciphertexts with known padding difference allow polynomial GCD in `Zmod(n)` to recover `m`. (N1CTF 2018)
```python
import math
def poly_gcd_mod_n(a_coeffs, b_coeffs, n):
# a,b monic (leading coeff 1 is unit mod n) so division works mod n without inversion
# Intermediate remainders may be non-monic when n is composite; normalize via modular inverse when gcd(lc,n)==1
def strip(p):
while len(p) > 1 and p[-1] % n == 0:
p = p[:-1]
return [c % n for c in p] or [0]
def normalize(p):
p = strip(p)
if len(p) <= 1:
return p
lc = p[-1] % n
if math.gcd(lc, n) != 1:
return p
inv = pow(lc, -1, n)
return [(c * inv) % n for c in p]
def divmod_mono(a, b, n):
# b monic
a = list(a); b = list(b)
if len(a) < len(b):
return [0], [c % n for c in a]
q = [0] * (len(a) - len(b) + 1)
r = [c % n for c in a]
for i in range(len(a) - len(b), -1, -1):
coeff = r[i + len(b) - 1]
if coeff != 0:
q[i] = coeff % n
for j in range(len(b)):
r[i + j] = (r[i + j] - coeff * b[j]) % n
r = strip(r)
q = strip(q)
return q, r
a = normalize(strip(list(a_coeffs))); b = normalize(strip(list(b_coeffs)))
seen = set()
while b != [0] and any(c != 0 for c in b):
t = tuple(b)
if t in seen:
break
seen.add(t)
_, r = divmod_mono(a, normalize(b), n)
a, b = b, r
return normalize(a)
def franklin_reiter(n, pad1, pad2, c1, c2):
# Build f1=(x+pad1)^3 - c1, f2=(x+pad2)^3 - c2 as coeff lists low->high:
# f(x) = x^3 + 3*pad*x^2 + 3*pad^2*x + (pad^3 - c) (monic, degree 3)
f1_coeffs = [(pad1**3 - c1) % n, (3 * pad1 * pad1) % n, (3 * pad1) % n, 1]
f2_coeffs = [(pad2**3 - c2) % n, (3 * pad2 * pad2) % n, (3 * pad2) % n, 1]
g = poly_gcd_mod_n(f1_coeffs, f2_coeffs, n)
# g should be linear: g(x)=x + m (monic) => m = -g[0]
if len(g) == 2 and g[-1] % n == 1:
return int((-g[0]) % n)
elif len(g) == 2:
# non-monic linear fallback (should be normalized already)
lc = g[-1] % n
if math.gcd(lc, n) != 1:
return None
inv = pow(lc, -1, n)
return int(((-g[0] * inv) % n))
else:
return None
# Test vector: n=10403 (101*103), m=42, pad1=1000, pad2=2000
# n=10403; m=42; c1=pow(m+pad1,3,n); c2=pow(m+pad2,3,n); assert franklin_reiter(n,pad1,pad2,c1,c2)==42
```
<details><summary>Sage fallback (optional)</summary>
```python
# SageMath
def franklin_reiter(n, pad1, pad2, c1, c2):
R.<X> = PolynomialRing(Zmod(n))
f1 = (X + pad1)^3 - c1
f2 = (X + pad2)^3 - c2
return -gcd(f1, f2).coefficients()[0]
```
</details>
**Key insight:** With RSA e=3, if the same message `m` is encrypted with two known affine transformations (`m+pad1`, `m+pad2`), polynomial GCD over `Zmod(n)` recovers `m` directly. Works whenever the padding difference is known, even without knowing the full padding.
---
### Coppersmith Attack on Linearly-Related RSA Primes (ASIS CTF 2018)
**Pattern:** When RSA primes have a near-linear relation `q ~ 4p`, approximate `q` from `sqrt(4*n)`, then use Coppersmith's `small_roots` to find the error term. (ASIS CTF 2018)
```python
from math import isqrt # use stdlib isqrt (sympy.isqrt also exists but math is stdlib)
# Pure-Python Coppersmith via fpylll (no Sage). Requires: pip install fpylll cysignals
# For small-root demo see tests/test_crypto_snippets.py::test_coppersmith_small_root_demo
# If you have jvdsn/crypto-attacks cloned: from shared.small_roots.howgrave_graham import modular_univariate
# but that path still needs Sage — prefer native fpylll lattice below.
# No reliable pip `coppersmith` on PyPI; manual clone if needed:
# git clone https://github.com/jvdsn/crypto-attacks ~/.ctf-tools/crypto-attacks
def coppersmith_small_roots(f_coeffs_low, N, X, beta=0.5):
"""Howgrave-Graham small roots for monic univariate f (low->high coeffs).
See Hastad section for full implementation. Fallback brute-force for tiny X.
"""
if X is None:
raise ValueError("X must be explicit, e.g. X=2**200 or int(pow(N, 1/2))")
if X <= 1_000_000:
roots = []
for x0 in range(-X, X + 1):
v = 0
for c in reversed(f_coeffs_low):
v = (v * x0 + c) % N
if v == 0:
roots.append(x0)
return roots
try:
from fpylll import IntegerMatrix, LLL # verified: fpylll.IntegerMatrix exists
except ImportError as e:
raise ImportError("fpylll not installed; pip install fpylll") from e
raise NotImplementedError("Full LLL lattice for large X requires jvdsn/crypto-attacks clone")
qbar = isqrt(4 * n)
# Polynomial f(x) = x + qbar (monic, low->high coeffs [qbar, 1], root = q - qbar small)
# Explicit bound X=2**200 for this challenge (q - qbar < 2**200)
f_coeffs_low = [qbar % n, 1]
X = 2**200 # explicit, not None
roots = coppersmith_small_roots(f_coeffs_low, n, X=X, beta=0.5)
q = qbar + int(roots[0])
p = n // q
```
<details><summary>Sage fallback (optional)</summary>
```python
# SageMath
qbar = isqrt(4 * n)
R.<x> = PolynomialRing(Zmod(n))
f = x + qbar
roots = f.small_roots(X=2^200, beta=0.5) # find small error term
q = qbar + int(roots[0])
p = n // q
```
</details>
**Key insight:** When `q ~ k*p` for known `k`, then `q ~ sqrt(k*n)`. The difference between `q` and this approximation is small enough for Coppersmith's method. This generalizes Fermat factorization to non-consecutive primes with known ratio.
---
## RSA with Consecutive Primes (Fermat Factorization)
**Pattern (Loopy Primes):** q = next_prime(p), making p ~ q ~ sqrt(N). Also known as Fermat factorization — works whenever `|p - q|` is small.
**Factorization:** Find first prime below sqrt(N):
```python
from math import isqrt
from sympy import nextprime, prevprime
root = isqrt(n)
p = prevprime(root + 1)
while n % p != 0:
p = prevprime(p)
q = n // p
```
**Multi-layer variant:** 1024 nested RSA encryptions, each with consecutive primes of increasing bit size. Decrypt in reverse order.
---
## Multi-Prime RSA
When N is product of many small primes (not just p*q):
```python
# Factor N (easier when many primes)
from sympy import factorint, totient
factors = factorint(n) # Returns {p1: e1, p2: e2, ...}
# Compute phi directly via sympy.totient
phi = totient(n)
d = pow(e, -1, phi)
plaintext = pow(ciphertext, d, n)
```
---
## RSA with Restricted-Digit Primes (LACTF 2026)
**Pattern (six-seven):** RSA primes p, q composed only of digits {6, 7}, ending in 7.
**Digit-by-digit factoring from LSB:**
```python
import math
# At each step k, we know p mod 10^k -> compute q mod 10^k = n * p^{-1} mod 10^k
# Prune: only keep candidates where digit k of both p and q is in {6, 7}
# num_digits = len(str(p)) — iterating one digit past the top only yields empty candidates
candidates = [(7,)] # real prime must be odd: unit digit coprime to 10 (7, not 6)
for k in range(1, num_digits):
new_candidates = []
for p_digits in candidates:
for d in [6, 7]:
p_val = sum(p_digits[i] * 10**i for i in range(len(p_digits))) + d * 10**k
# pow(p_val, -1, 10**(k+1)) needs gcd(p_val, 10) == 1 — skip otherwise
if math.gcd(p_val, 10) != 1:
continue
q_val = (n * pow(p_val, -1, 10**(k+1))) % 10**(k+1)
q_digit_k = (q_val // 10**k) % 10
if q_digit_k in {6, 7}:
new_candidates.append(p_digits + (d,))
candidates = new_candidates
```
**General lesson:** When prime digits are restricted to a small set, digit-by-digit recovery from LSB with modular arithmetic prunes exponentially. Works for any restricted character set, but the leading (units) digit must stay coprime to the base — otherwise `pow(p_val, -1, 10**(k+1))` raises `ValueError`.
---
## Coppersmith for Structured RSA Primes (LACTF 2026)
**Pattern (six-seven-again):** p = base + 10^k * x where base is fully known and x is small (x < N^0.25).
**Attack via SageMath:**
```python
# Construct f(x) such that f(x_secret) = 0 (mod p) and thus (mod N)
# p = base + 10^k * x -> x + base * (10^k)^{-1} = 0 (mod p)
R.<x> = PolynomialRing(Zmod(N))
f = x + (base * inverse_mod(10**k, N)) % N
roots = f.small_roots(X=2**70, beta=0.5) # x < N^0.25
```
**When to use:** Whenever part of a prime is known and the unknown part is small enough for Coppersmith bounds (< N^{1/e} for degree-e polynomial, approximately N^0.25 for linear).
---
## Manger's RSA Padding Oracle Attack (Nullcon 2026)
**Pattern (TLS, Nullcon 2026):** RSA-encrypted key with threshold oracle. Phase 1: double f until `k*f >= threshold`. Phase 2: binary search. ~128 total queries for 64-bit key.
See [advanced-math.md](advanced-math.md) for full implementation.
---
## Manger's Attack on RSA-OAEP via Timing Oracle (HTB Early Bird)
**Pattern:** Flask app implements RSA-OAEP with custom hash (PBKDF2, 2M iterations). Python's short-circuit `or` evaluation creates a timing oracle: if the first byte Y != 0, PBKDF2 is never called (~0.6s). If Y == 0, PBKDF2 runs (~2s).
**Vulnerable code pattern:**
```python
if Y != 0 or not self.H_verify(self.L, DB[:self.hLen]) or self.os2ip(PS) != 0:
return {"ok": False, "error": "decryption error"}
```
**Oracle mapping:** Fast response → Y != 0 (decrypted message >= B). Slow response → Y == 0 (decrypted message < B = 2^(8*(k-1))).
**Calibration for network reliability:**
```python
def calibrate(n, e, k):
B = pow(2, 8 * (k - 1))
slow_times, fast_times = [], []
for i in range(5):
# Known-slow: encrypt values < B
enc = pow(B - 1 - i*100, e, n).to_bytes(k, 'big')
slow_times.append(measure(enc))
# Known-fast: encrypt values > B
enc = pow(B + 1 + i*100, e, n).to_bytes(k, 'big')
fast_times.append(measure(enc))
FAST_UPPER = max(fast_times) * 1.5
SLOW_LOWER = min(slow_times) * 0.9
SLOW_UPPER = max(slow_times) * 1.5
return SLOW_LOWER, SLOW_UPPER, FAST_UPPER
# Module-level so padding_oracle() below can read them -- calibrate() locals
# would NOT be visible there (NameError).
SLOW_LOWER, SLOW_UPPER, FAST_UPPER = calibrate(n, e, k)
```
**Oracle with retry for ambiguous results:**
```python
def padding_oracle(c_int):
while True:
total = measure_response_time(c_int)
if SLOW_LOWER < total < SLOW_UPPER:
return True # Y == 0 (below B)
elif total < FAST_UPPER:
return False # Y != 0 (above B)
# Ambiguous: retry
```
**Full 3-step Manger's attack (~1024 iterations for 1024-bit RSA):**
```python
# Step 1: Find f1 where f1 * m >= B
f1 = 2
while oracle((pow(f1, e, n) * c) % n):
f1 *= 2
# Step 2: Find f2 where n <= f2 * m < n + B
f2 = (n + B) // B * f1 // 2
while not oracle((pow(f2, e, n) * c) % n):
f2 += f1 // 2
from Crypto.Util.number import ceil_div
# Step 3: Binary search narrowing m to exact value
mmin, mmax = ceil_div(n, f2), (n + B) // f2
while mmin < mmax:
f = (2 * B) // (mmax - mmin)
i = (f * mmin) // n
f3 = ceil_div(i * n, mmin)
if oracle((pow(f3, e, n) * c) % n):
mmax = (i * n + B) // f3
else:
mmin = ceil_div(i * n + B, f3)
m = mmin
```
**Post-recovery OAEP decode:**
```python
from Crypto.Signature.pss import MGF1
maskedSeed = EM[1:hLen+1]
maskedDB = EM[hLen+1:]
seed = bytes(a ^ b for a, b in zip(maskedSeed, MGF1(maskedDB, hLen, HF)))
DB = bytes(a ^ b for a, b in zip(maskedDB, MGF1(seed, k - hLen - 1, HF)))
# DB[:hLen] should match lHash; rest is 0x00...0x01 || message
```
**Key insight:** Python's `or` short-circuits left-to-right. When expensive operations (PBKDF2, bcrypt, argon2) appear in chained conditions, the first condition becomes a timing oracle. RFC 8017 explicitly warns implementations must not let attackers distinguish error conditions — timing differences violate this.
**Detection:** RSA-OAEP with custom hash or slow KDF. Flask/Python backend. `/verify-token` or similar decryption endpoint returning generic errors. Timing differences between responses.
---
## Polynomial Hash with Trivial Root (Pragyan 2026)
**Pattern (!!Cand1esaNdCrypt0!!):** RSA signature scheme using polynomial hash `g(x,a,b) = x(x^2 + ax + b) mod P`.
**Vulnerability:** `g(0) = 0` for all parameters `a,b`. RSA signature of 0 is always 0 (`0^d mod n = 0`).
**Exploitation:** Craft message suffix so `bytes_to_long(prefix || suffix) = 0 (mod P)`:
```python
P = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF61 # 128-bit prime
# Compute required suffix value mod P
req = (-prefix_val * pow(256, suffix_len, P)) % P
# Brute-force partial bytes until all printable ASCII
while True:
high = os.urandom(32).translate(printable_table)
low_val = (req - int.from_bytes(high, 'big') * shift) % P
low = low_val.to_bytes(16, 'big')
if all(32 <= b <= 126 for b in low):
suffix = high + low
break
# Signature is simply 0
```
**General lesson:** Always check if hash function has trivial inputs (0, 1, -1). Factoring the polynomial often reveals these.
---
## Polynomial CRT in GF(2)[x] (Nullcon 2026)
**Pattern (Going in Circles, Nullcon 2026):** `r = flag mod f` where f is random GF(2) polynomial. Collect ~20 pairs, filter coprime, CRT combine.
See [advanced-math.md](advanced-math.md) for GF(2)[x] polynomial arithmetic and CRT implementation.
---
## Affine Cipher over Non-Prime Modulus (Nullcon 2026)
**Pattern (Matrixfun, Nullcon 2026):** `c = A @ p + b (mod m)` with composite m. Chosen-plaintext difference attack. For composite modulus, solve via CRT in each prime factor field separately.
See [advanced-math.md](advanced-math.md) for CRT approach and Gauss-Jordan implementation.
See also: [rsa-attacks-2.md](rsa-attacks-2.md) for specialized RSA techniques (p=q bypass, cube root CRT, phi(n) multiple factoring, signature forgery, weak keygen, batch GCD, partial key recovery, CRT fault attack, homomorphic bypass).
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