lidge-jun/codexclaw / plugins/codexclaw/skills/dev-security
cxc-dev-security
FlaggedUse for security and trust boundaries. Triggers: auth, secrets, XSS, CSRF, SQL injection, JWT, OAuth, OWASP, PII, uploads, payments, supply chain, CI integrity, agent security, threat model.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 4.0 KB |
| agents/openai.yaml | config | 158 B |
| references/01-threat-model.md | markdown | 1.3 KB |
| references/02-access-controls.md | markdown | 3.3 KB |
| references/03-runtime-controls.md | markdown | 3.6 KB |
| references/04-agent-integrity.md | markdown | 3.3 KB |
| references/05-security-review.md | markdown | 4.9 KB |
| references/agent-skill-integrity.md | markdown | 2.2 KB |
| references/agentic-ai-security.md | markdown | 6.0 KB |
| references/asvs-checklist.md | markdown | 3.1 KB |
| references/language-quirks.md | markdown | 5.0 KB |
| references/llm-supply-chain.md | markdown | 7.4 KB |
| references/mcp-supply-chain.md | markdown | 6.9 KB |
| references/owasp-top10.md | markdown | 11.1 KB |
| references/static-analysis.md | markdown | 4.8 KB |
| references/supply-chain-sbom.md | markdown | 6.7 KB |
references/01-threat-model.md
View on GitHub# Threat Model Procedure
Required order before implementation:
1. Assets: accounts, sessions, payment state, admin actions, uploaded files, secrets, PII, audit logs, build artifacts.
2. Entrypoints: forms, URLs, headers, cookies, APIs, webhooks, uploads, queues, CLIs, prompts, tool calls, CI jobs.
3. Trust boundaries: browser ↔ API, public API ↔ internal service, app ↔ database, agent prompt ↔ tool execution, CI runner ↔ production artifact.
4. Attacker capability: anonymous user, authenticated user, tenant peer, malicious insider, compromised browser, compromised CI, poisoned dependency, hostile retrieved text/prompt.
5. Assumptions: runtime surface vs CI/dev tooling, identity source, tenant model, data sensitivity, deployment environment, and what evidence supports each assumption.
6. Controls: validation, authn/authz, rate limits, isolation, logging/redaction, secret handling, scans, and tests.
If an assumption materially changes severity or priority, pause and ask 1-3 targeted questions before claiming the threat model is good enough. If the change touches auth, payment, file upload, logging, or PII, write the must-pass checks after the model and before coding.
This skill owns security policy.
Domain skills own architecture and implementation details.
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