kerberosmansour/hulumi / skills/hulumi-threat-model
hulumi-threat-model
FlaggedRun an AWS or GitHub cloud / platform threat model for a specific Hulumi scenario. Produces a structured markdown threat-model document at docs/threat-model-<scenario>-<date>.md in the user's working directory, citing CSA CCM v4.1, NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, NIST SP 800-218A, MITRE ATLAS v5.1, CIS AWS Foundations v5.0.0, CIS GitHub Benchmark v1.2.0, NIST SSDF v1.1, OpenSSF Scorecard, MITRE ATT&CK T1195, and GitHub Well-Architected SSDF by framework ID only (no verbatim control text). Use when the user asks for a threat model for an AWS or GitHub scenario, wants to ground IaC design decisions in standard controls, or wants to see which @hulumi/baseline components apply.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 8.0 KB |
| package.json | manifest | 572 B |
| scenarios/aws-multi-account-baseline.json | config | 5.5 KB |
| scenarios/eks-cluster-baseline.json | config | 5.0 KB |
| scenarios/eks-runtime-and-backup.json | config | 4.6 KB |
| scenarios/github-actions-supply-chain.json | config | 5.9 KB |
| scenarios/github-app-token-exposure.json | config | 5.5 KB |
| scenarios/github-oidc-trust-cloud-account.json | config | 5.4 KB |
| scenarios/github-self-hosted-runner.json | config | 5.3 KB |
| scenarios/iam-least-privilege.json | config | 4.7 KB |
| scenarios/lambda-secrets-access.json | config | 5.0 KB |
| scenarios/operations-audit-pipeline-broken.json | config | 4.3 KB |
| scenarios/operations-detective-services-disabled.json | config | 4.1 KB |
| scenarios/operations-patch-compliance-lapse.json | config | 4.0 KB |
| scenarios/rds-encryption-at-rest.json | config | 4.7 KB |
| scenarios/s3-public-bucket-hardening.json | config | 4.9 KB |
| scripts/generate-threat-model.mjs | script | 22.7 KB |
| scripts/list-scenarios.mjs | script | 2.0 KB |
| templates/threat-model.template.md | markdown | 1.1 KB |
| tsconfig.json | config | 289 B |
scenarios/rds-encryption-at-rest.json
View on GitHub{
"id": "rds-encryption-at-rest",
"title": "RDS Encryption at Rest — CMK policy, backup encryption, parameter-group defaults",
"description": "An engineer is provisioning an RDS instance (or Aurora cluster) for a production workload. Target end state: storage encryption with a customer-managed KMS CMK, backup encryption using the same CMK, TLS-in-transit enforced at the parameter group, IAM database authentication enabled for appropriate engines, deletion protection on, and logs (general / error / slow / audit depending on engine) exported to CloudWatch Logs encrypted with a separate CMK.",
"requiredFrameworks": ["CCM", "CIS-AWS-v5.0.0", "NIST-800-53-r5", "ATLAS"],
"actors": [
"Platform Engineer (trusted)",
"Application workload (semi-trusted — acts on behalf of end users)",
"External Attacker (untrusted, targeting data)",
"Backup operator (trusted, but scoped)"
],
"assets": [
"RDS instance storage",
"Automated and manual snapshots",
"Database logs (may contain PII in query strings)",
"KMS CMK encrypting storage + snapshots"
],
"stride": [
{
"type": "I",
"name": "Unencrypted storage disclosure",
"description": "An RDS instance created without storage encryption leaves the underlying EBS plaintext; a snapshot sharing attack (or account compromise) reveals all data. Hulumi components (shipped in M3) default to SSE-KMS with the `AccountFoundation` data-key CMK.",
"controls": [
"CCM:CEK-04",
"CIS-AWS-v5.0.0:2.3.1",
"NIST-800-53-r5:SC-28",
"NIST-800-53-r5:SC-12"
]
},
{
"type": "I",
"name": "Unencrypted backup disclosure",
"description": "Even with encrypted primary storage, automated/manual snapshots may be created without encryption if the CMK policy excludes the backup service principal. Mitigation: KMS key policy explicitly grants `kms:CreateGrant` to `backup.rds.amazonaws.com` and deny any non-encrypted snapshot creation via SCP.",
"controls": [
"CCM:CEK-03",
"CIS-AWS-v5.0.0:3.7",
"NIST-800-53-r5:CP-9",
"NIST-800-53-r5:SC-28"
]
},
{
"type": "T",
"name": "Plaintext TLS-in-transit bypass",
"description": "Without parameter-group-enforced TLS, application clients may connect over plaintext. Mitigation: parameter group sets `rds.force_ssl=1` (PostgreSQL) / equivalent per engine; Hulumi baseline applies the engine-appropriate flag.",
"controls": ["CCM:CEK-01", "NIST-800-53-r5:SC-8"]
},
{
"type": "E",
"name": "Overly broad DB authentication",
"description": "Without IAM database authentication (where supported: MySQL, PostgreSQL, MariaDB), credentials live in Secrets Manager / app code. IAM auth + Secrets Manager rotation is the hardened path; `AccountFoundation.secretsManager` namespace supports rotation hooks.",
"controls": ["CCM:IAM-07", "NIST-800-53-r5:IA-2", "NIST-800-53-r5:AC-6"]
},
{
"type": "R",
"name": "Missing audit logs",
"description": "RDS audit logs (PostgreSQL `pgaudit` / MySQL general log / Aurora audit) are off by default. Without them, SQL-level attribution is impossible. Hulumi Startup-Hardened tier flips audit on and exports to CloudWatch Logs with CMK encryption.",
"controls": ["CCM:LOG-01", "CCM:LOG-02", "NIST-800-53-r5:AU-2", "NIST-800-53-r5:AU-12"]
},
{
"type": "D",
"name": "Accidental drop via IaC bug",
"description": "Deletion protection off + a broken `pulumi refresh` could propose a destroy for an RDS instance. Mitigation: deletion protection on in both tiers; Hulumi `DriftClassifier` (shipped in M4) flags the provider-plan diff before apply.",
"controls": ["CCM:BCR-01", "NIST-800-53-r5:CP-9"]
}
],
"recommendedComponents": [
{
"name": "hulumi.baseline.aws.SecureRds",
"availability": "Planned for v1.1+ (post-v1.0.0; not yet shipped)",
"rationale": "Planned ComponentResource covering storage encryption, backup CMK, TLS parameter group, IAM auth, deletion protection. For v1 users, compose raw `aws.rds.Instance` with the KMS keys from `AccountFoundation.kmsRing` as an interim pattern."
},
{
"name": "hulumi.baseline.aws.AccountFoundation.kmsRing",
"availability": "Shipped in M3 (v0.3)",
"rationale": "Per-service CMKs (`data`, `logs`, `secrets`, `config`). The RDS instance consumes the `data` key; its CloudWatch logs consume the `logs` key."
},
{
"name": "hulumi.policies.aws.CisV5Pack",
"availability": "Shipped in M3 (v0.3)",
"rationale": "Includes CIS v5.0.0 §2.3.1 (RDS encryption at rest) as a preventive CrossGuard check, complementing Security Hub's detective finding."
}
]
}
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