kerberosmansour/hulumi / skills/hulumi-threat-model
hulumi-threat-model
FlaggedRun an AWS or GitHub cloud / platform threat model for a specific Hulumi scenario. Produces a structured markdown threat-model document at docs/threat-model-<scenario>-<date>.md in the user's working directory, citing CSA CCM v4.1, NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, NIST SP 800-218A, MITRE ATLAS v5.1, CIS AWS Foundations v5.0.0, CIS GitHub Benchmark v1.2.0, NIST SSDF v1.1, OpenSSF Scorecard, MITRE ATT&CK T1195, and GitHub Well-Architected SSDF by framework ID only (no verbatim control text). Use when the user asks for a threat model for an AWS or GitHub scenario, wants to ground IaC design decisions in standard controls, or wants to see which @hulumi/baseline components apply.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 8.0 KB |
| package.json | manifest | 572 B |
| scenarios/aws-multi-account-baseline.json | config | 5.5 KB |
| scenarios/eks-cluster-baseline.json | config | 5.0 KB |
| scenarios/eks-runtime-and-backup.json | config | 4.6 KB |
| scenarios/github-actions-supply-chain.json | config | 5.9 KB |
| scenarios/github-app-token-exposure.json | config | 5.5 KB |
| scenarios/github-oidc-trust-cloud-account.json | config | 5.4 KB |
| scenarios/github-self-hosted-runner.json | config | 5.3 KB |
| scenarios/iam-least-privilege.json | config | 4.7 KB |
| scenarios/lambda-secrets-access.json | config | 5.0 KB |
| scenarios/operations-audit-pipeline-broken.json | config | 4.3 KB |
| scenarios/operations-detective-services-disabled.json | config | 4.1 KB |
| scenarios/operations-patch-compliance-lapse.json | config | 4.0 KB |
| scenarios/rds-encryption-at-rest.json | config | 4.7 KB |
| scenarios/s3-public-bucket-hardening.json | config | 4.9 KB |
| scripts/generate-threat-model.mjs | script | 22.7 KB |
| scripts/list-scenarios.mjs | script | 2.0 KB |
| templates/threat-model.template.md | markdown | 1.1 KB |
| tsconfig.json | config | 289 B |
scenarios/operations-patch-compliance-lapse.json
View on GitHub{
"id": "operations-patch-compliance-lapse",
"title": "Operations — Patch Compliance Lapse via Silent Un-Patching",
"description": "An engineer (or AI agent) configures `Ec2PatchBaseline` with `rebootOption: { kind: \"NoReboot\" }` at startup-hardened tier, intending to avoid disrupting tenants. The component refuses construction (M7 invariant), but the threat path remains real: a sandbox-tier consumer might accept silent un-patching, leaving a kernel CVE exposed for sixty days. Target end state matches Hulumi's `Ec2PatchBaseline` (M7) + `Ec2PatchWaves` (M7) + `HulumiOperationsHardeningPack`'s `O_PATCH_1` (M10). Threats focus on the gap between an EC2 patch announcement and the cluster reboot that activates it.",
"requiredFrameworks": ["CCM", "NIST-800-53-r5", "ATLAS", "CIS-AWS-v5.0.0"],
"actors": [
"Platform Engineer (trusted)",
"AI Coding Agent (trusted, but may suggest NoReboot for tenant-stability reasons)",
"External Attacker (post-patch-announcement, racing to exploit before reboot)"
],
"assets": [
"EC2 instance kernel and userspace package state",
"SSM Patch Compliance metric (per Patch:Group)",
"Patch:Group tag (load-bearing for wave membership)"
],
"stride": [
{
"type": "T",
"name": "Tampered Patch:Group tag bypasses the wave-composer",
"description": "An attacker (or a misconfigured IaC author) sets a Patch:Group value outside {dev, staging, production} on an EC2 instance. The MaintenanceWindowTarget no longer matches; the instance is silently excluded from patching. Mitigation: `O_PATCH_1` (M10) rejects the tag value at preview; SCP-style guardrails on `ec2:CreateTags` for that tag complement at runtime.",
"controls": ["CCM:CEK-08", "CIS-AWS-v5.0.0:1.20", "NIST-800-53-r5:CM-2"]
},
{
"type": "R",
"name": "Repudiation via missing compliance metric",
"description": "Without `complianceMetric.topicArn` wired to a real SNS, patch-compliance regressions surface as a CloudWatch metric nobody reads. Mitigation: `Ec2PatchBaseline` requires the SNS ARN (M7 invariant); the alarm fires when non-compliant instance count >= 1.",
"controls": ["CCM:LOG-01", "NIST-800-53-r5:AU-6"]
},
{
"type": "I",
"name": "Information disclosure via NoReboot pile-up",
"description": "A `NoReboot` posture at startup-hardened tier means kernel CVEs accumulate without activation. `Ec2PatchBaseline` refuses this combination at construction (M7 type system); the sandbox-only escape requires a written `hulumi_decision_comment` (>= 8 chars) tagged on the resource for audit.",
"controls": ["CCM:VUL-01", "NIST-800-53-r5:RA-5", "ATLAS:AML.T0001"]
},
{
"type": "D",
"name": "Denial via synchronized-reboot storm",
"description": "Without CRC32-bucket staggering, all instances reboot at the maintenance window's start, taking the service offline simultaneously. Mitigation: `staggering.bucketCount` defaults to 4 and is bound at 16; max-concurrency on the run-command task scales inversely with bucket count.",
"controls": ["CCM:UEM-09", "NIST-800-53-r5:CP-2"]
},
{
"type": "E",
"name": "Elevation via unpatched root-exploit kernel",
"description": "An unpatched local-privilege-escalation kernel exploit lets a compromised non-root process become root. Sixty days is the empirical compromise window. Mitigation: tier-aware patch approval delay (3 days at startup-hardened, 7 at sandbox).",
"controls": ["CCM:VUL-01", "ATLAS:AML.T0001"]
}
],
"abuseCases": [
{
"id": "tm-hulumi-ops-abuse-noreboot-without-decision",
"title": "NoReboot at startup-hardened tier",
"description": "Mitigation: M7 constructor refuses the combination.",
"controls": ["CCM:VUL-01"]
},
{
"id": "tm-hulumi-ops-abuse-patch-group-tag-tamper",
"title": "Free-form Patch:Group tag bypasses wave-composer",
"description": "Mitigation: `O_PATCH_1` (M10) at preview.",
"controls": ["CCM:CEK-08"]
}
]
}
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