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kerberosmansour/hulumi / skills/hulumi-threat-model

hulumi-threat-model

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Run an AWS or GitHub cloud / platform threat model for a specific Hulumi scenario. Produces a structured markdown threat-model document at docs/threat-model-<scenario>-<date>.md in the user's working directory, citing CSA CCM v4.1, NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, NIST SP 800-218A, MITRE ATLAS v5.1, CIS AWS Foundations v5.0.0, CIS GitHub Benchmark v1.2.0, NIST SSDF v1.1, OpenSSF Scorecard, MITRE ATT&CK T1195, and GitHub Well-Architected SSDF by framework ID only (no verbatim control text). Use when the user asks for a threat model for an AWS or GitHub scenario, wants to ground IaC design decisions in standard controls, or wants to see which @hulumi/baseline components apply.

scenarios/operations-detective-services-disabled.json

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{
  "id": "operations-detective-services-disabled",
  "title": "Operations — Detective Services Disabled / Routes Broken",
  "description": "An engineer wires up GuardDuty + Inspector v2 + Access Analyzer + Cost Anomaly Detection through `DetectiveServicesEnable` (M8), but the EventBridge route to MonitoringFoundation's SNS topic was never tested end-to-end. KEV findings (CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities) flow through the primary topic instead of a pager-targeted secondary topic — the M8 dual-routing path. Threats focus on detection gaps and the route that exists in IaC but doesn't actually deliver.",
  "requiredFrameworks": ["CCM", "NIST-800-53-r5", "ATLAS", "CIS-AWS-v5.0.0"],
  "actors": [
    "Platform Engineer (trusted)",
    "On-call SRE (consumer of the SNS topic)",
    "External Attacker (post-compromise; objective: delay detection)"
  ],
  "assets": [
    "GuardDuty findings stream",
    "Inspector v2 KEV findings (CISA-tagged code vulnerabilities)",
    "Cost Anomaly Detection daily report",
    "MonitoringFoundation SNS topic ARNs (primary + KEV pager)"
  ],
  "stride": [
    {
      "type": "S",
      "name": "Spoofed EventBridge target",
      "description": "An attacker with `events:PutTargets` permission can swap the SNS target on the primary route, redirecting findings to an attacker-controlled topic. Mitigation: SCP-style guardrails on `events:PutTargets` in production accounts; EventBridge target ARNs are visible in CloudTrail.",
      "controls": ["CCM:IAM-09", "NIST-800-53-r5:AC-6"]
    },
    {
      "type": "T",
      "name": "Tampered Inspector v2 enabler — partial coverage",
      "description": "An attacker (or careless author) reconfigures `aws.inspector2.Enabler.resourceTypes` to drop LAMBDA. Lambda-layer CVEs go undetected. Mitigation: `O_INSPECTOR_1` (M10) refuses partial coverage at preview; suppression with reason is auditable.",
      "controls": ["CCM:VUL-01", "NIST-800-53-r5:RA-5"]
    },
    {
      "type": "R",
      "name": "Repudiation via KEV findings buried in primary topic",
      "description": "Without `findingsKevRoutingSnsArn`, KEV (Known Exploited) findings are interleaved with low-priority Inspector findings on the primary topic. On-call rotation skims past the KEV alert. Mitigation: M8 dual routing pattern + the typed `kevDualRoutingActive: Output<true>` operator-confirmation flag.",
      "controls": ["CCM:LOG-01", "ATLAS:AML.T0006"]
    },
    {
      "type": "I",
      "name": "Information disclosure via Cost Anomaly to wrong subscriber",
      "description": "Cost Anomaly Subscriptions specify the SNS topic in plain text. A misconfigured subscriber reveals service-level cost patterns to the wrong tenant. Mitigation: `findingsRoutingSnsArn` is required (no default); KMS encryption on the SNS topic is the consumer's responsibility.",
      "controls": ["CCM:DSP-04", "NIST-800-53-r5:SC-28"]
    },
    {
      "type": "D",
      "name": "Denial via Access Analyzer disabled in a fresh account",
      "description": "Newly-onboarded accounts that skip `enableAccessAnalyzer: true` have no external-access analyzer. Mitigation: M8 default-on flag.",
      "controls": ["CCM:IAM-09", "CIS-AWS-v5.0.0:1.19"]
    },
    {
      "type": "E",
      "name": "Elevation via unmonitored cross-account assume-role",
      "description": "Without Access Analyzer, cross-account assume-role chains accumulate without external-access review. Mitigation: M8's Access Analyzer + the `IdentityAlarms.iam-role-policy-change` event firing on every assume-role-policy edit.",
      "controls": ["CCM:IAM-10", "NIST-800-53-r5:CA-7"]
    }
  ],
  "abuseCases": [
    {
      "id": "tm-hulumi-ops-abuse-detective-route-untested",
      "title": "Detective EventBridge route exists in IaC but is never delivered",
      "description": "Mitigation: real-AWS sandbox integration test (deferred from M8); periodic delivery probe.",
      "controls": ["CCM:LOG-01"]
    },
    {
      "id": "tm-hulumi-ops-abuse-kev-buried",
      "title": "KEV findings buried in the primary topic",
      "description": "Mitigation: M8 dual-routing pattern.",
      "controls": ["CCM:LOG-01"]
    }
  ]
}
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