kerberosmansour/hulumi / skills/hulumi-threat-model
hulumi-threat-model
FlaggedRun an AWS or GitHub cloud / platform threat model for a specific Hulumi scenario. Produces a structured markdown threat-model document at docs/threat-model-<scenario>-<date>.md in the user's working directory, citing CSA CCM v4.1, NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, NIST SP 800-218A, MITRE ATLAS v5.1, CIS AWS Foundations v5.0.0, CIS GitHub Benchmark v1.2.0, NIST SSDF v1.1, OpenSSF Scorecard, MITRE ATT&CK T1195, and GitHub Well-Architected SSDF by framework ID only (no verbatim control text). Use when the user asks for a threat model for an AWS or GitHub scenario, wants to ground IaC design decisions in standard controls, or wants to see which @hulumi/baseline components apply.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 8.0 KB |
| package.json | manifest | 572 B |
| scenarios/aws-multi-account-baseline.json | config | 5.5 KB |
| scenarios/eks-cluster-baseline.json | config | 5.0 KB |
| scenarios/eks-runtime-and-backup.json | config | 4.6 KB |
| scenarios/github-actions-supply-chain.json | config | 5.9 KB |
| scenarios/github-app-token-exposure.json | config | 5.5 KB |
| scenarios/github-oidc-trust-cloud-account.json | config | 5.4 KB |
| scenarios/github-self-hosted-runner.json | config | 5.3 KB |
| scenarios/iam-least-privilege.json | config | 4.7 KB |
| scenarios/lambda-secrets-access.json | config | 5.0 KB |
| scenarios/operations-audit-pipeline-broken.json | config | 4.3 KB |
| scenarios/operations-detective-services-disabled.json | config | 4.1 KB |
| scenarios/operations-patch-compliance-lapse.json | config | 4.0 KB |
| scenarios/rds-encryption-at-rest.json | config | 4.7 KB |
| scenarios/s3-public-bucket-hardening.json | config | 4.9 KB |
| scripts/generate-threat-model.mjs | script | 22.7 KB |
| scripts/list-scenarios.mjs | script | 2.0 KB |
| templates/threat-model.template.md | markdown | 1.1 KB |
| tsconfig.json | config | 289 B |
scenarios/github-self-hosted-runner.json
View on GitHub{
"id": "github-self-hosted-runner",
"title": "Self-hosted runner risk — ephemeral runners, runner-image hardening, runner-group scoping, exfil-via-runner threat model",
"description": "A platform engineer adopts self-hosted runners for the org's GitHub Actions workloads (cost optimization or specialized hardware). Self-hosted runners are a known backdoor surface — Sysdig's November 2025 report on self-hosted-runner backdoors and Praetorian's TensorFlow analysis both demonstrate that long-lived runners with broad access become persistent C2 endpoints once compromised. Hulumi recommends ephemeral runners (one-job-per-runner-image), runner-image hardening (locked-down container or VM image), and runner-group scoping (no public-fork access by default).",
"requiredFrameworks": [
"CCM",
"NIST-SSDF-v1.1",
"OpenSSF-Scorecard",
"MITRE-ATTCK",
"GitHub-Well-Architected",
"CIS-GitHub-v1.2.0"
],
"actors": [
"Platform Engineer (trusted, provisions and maintains the runner pool)",
"Workflow Author (semi-trusted, picks runner labels — could pick a sensitive label by mistake)",
"Compromised Pull-Request Author (untrusted, runs code on the runner via PR-triggered workflow)",
"Runner Image Maintainer (trusted; the runner OS image is itself a supply-chain surface)"
],
"assets": [
"Self-hosted runner machine / container",
"Runner registration token (short-lived, used at runner-pool join time)",
"`ActionsRunnerGroup` configuration (which workflows can target this group)",
"Filesystem state on the runner between jobs (if not ephemeral)",
"Network access from the runner (private VPC vs public Internet)"
],
"stride": [
{
"type": "T",
"name": "Persistent backdoor on long-lived runner (Sysdig pattern)",
"description": "A PR-triggered workflow runs attacker-controlled code on a long-lived self-hosted runner; the code drops a backdoor in the runner's filesystem (e.g. modifies `~/.bashrc` or installs a cron job). Subsequent legitimate jobs run on the same runner, where the backdoor exfils secrets or build artifacts. Mitigation: ephemeral runners (one job per runner image, then destroy); never reuse a runner across two jobs.",
"controls": [
"CCM:DSI-01",
"NIST-SSDF-v1.1:PW.6",
"OpenSSF-Scorecard:Maintained",
"MITRE-ATTCK:T1195",
"GitHub-Well-Architected:PO.5"
]
},
{
"type": "I",
"name": "Network exfil via runner with broad VPC access",
"description": "A self-hosted runner has access to the full VPC for legitimate reasons (e.g., to talk to private databases for integration tests). A compromised job uses that access to scan / exfil internal services. Mitigation: runner-pool scoping by workflow purpose (a PR-validation runner pool has zero VPC access; a deploy-runner pool has scoped access to deploy targets only); egress allowlist at the network layer.",
"controls": ["CCM:IVS-09", "NIST-SSDF-v1.1:PO.5", "GitHub-Well-Architected:PW.5"]
},
{
"type": "E",
"name": "Runner-group misconfiguration grants broader workflow access",
"description": "An `ActionsRunnerGroup` is configured with `allowsPublic: true` (or analogous), letting fork PRs from outside the org target the runner. An attacker fork PR triggers a workflow on a runner that should not have been reachable. Mitigation: `OrgFoundation` defaults runner groups to `allowsPublic: false` at startup-hardened; explicit `Suppression` required to override.",
"controls": [
"CCM:IAM-07",
"NIST-SSDF-v1.1:PO.3",
"GitHub-Well-Architected:PO.3",
"CIS-GitHub-v1.2.0:PENDING-WORKBENCH"
]
},
{
"type": "S",
"name": "Runner-registration-token leak → rogue runner joins the pool",
"description": "The runner registration token is leaked (e.g., via a misconfigured Terraform output, a logged secret, or a typo in a Pulumi `pulumi.Output` print). An attacker registers a rogue runner in the org's pool; the rogue runner picks up legitimate jobs and exfils their content. Mitigation: short-lived registration tokens (default ~1h); audit-log monitoring for runner-registered events (M4 webhook fallback adapter listens to `member` events as a proxy at non-GHEC tiers).",
"controls": [
"CCM:IAM-10",
"NIST-SSDF-v1.1:PW.7",
"OpenSSF-Scorecard:Token-Permissions",
"MITRE-ATTCK:T1195"
]
}
],
"recommendedComponents": [
{
"name": "@hulumi/baseline.github.OrgFoundation",
"availability": "Shipped in Hulumi v1.1.0 M2",
"rationale": "Provisions `ActionsRunnerGroup` resources with `allowsPublic: false` defaults at startup-hardened tier; runtime rejects misconfigured groups."
},
{
"name": "@hulumi/policies.github.HulumiGithubHardeningPack",
"availability": "Shipped in Hulumi v1.1.0 M3",
"rationale": "Declaratively rejects runner-group configurations that loosen the safe default at preview-time."
},
{
"name": "@hulumi/drift.adapters.GithubWebhookFallbackAdapter",
"availability": "Shipped in Hulumi v1.1.0 M4",
"rationale": "Listens to `member` and `organization` webhook events to detect rogue-runner registrations on non-GHEC tiers; audit-log REST adapter (v1.1+ deferral) gives full fidelity on GHEC."
}
]
}
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