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hulumi-threat-model

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Run an AWS or GitHub cloud / platform threat model for a specific Hulumi scenario. Produces a structured markdown threat-model document at docs/threat-model-<scenario>-<date>.md in the user's working directory, citing CSA CCM v4.1, NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, NIST SP 800-218A, MITRE ATLAS v5.1, CIS AWS Foundations v5.0.0, CIS GitHub Benchmark v1.2.0, NIST SSDF v1.1, OpenSSF Scorecard, MITRE ATT&CK T1195, and GitHub Well-Architected SSDF by framework ID only (no verbatim control text). Use when the user asks for a threat model for an AWS or GitHub scenario, wants to ground IaC design decisions in standard controls, or wants to see which @hulumi/baseline components apply.

scenarios/github-oidc-trust-cloud-account.json

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{
  "id": "github-oidc-trust-cloud-account",
  "title": "GitHub Actions OIDC trust to a cloud account — three-axis sub claim, UNC6426 mitigation",
  "description": "A platform engineer wires GitHub Actions to assume a role in AWS / Azure / GCP via OIDC federation. The cloud-side trust policy must validate the GitHub-issued token's `sub` claim against a three-axis shape (`repo:{org}/{repo}:job_workflow_ref:{org}/{repo}/.github/workflows/{workflow}@{ref}:environment:{environment}`). UNC6426 (March 2026, ~500 vulnerable role ARNs across 275 AWS accounts per CSA Labs / Unit 42 OH-MY-DC analyses) weaponized exactly the wildcard `repo:{org}/{repo}:*` shape that Pulumi's GitHub provider accepts as default. Hulumi's `OrgFoundation` (M2) ships the safe template; the M3 `G_OIDC_1` policy declaratively rejects `StringLike` / wildcard `sub` conditions on AWS / Azure / GCP trust policies.",
  "requiredFrameworks": [
    "CCM",
    "NIST-SSDF-v1.1",
    "OpenSSF-Scorecard",
    "MITRE-ATTCK",
    "GitHub-Well-Architected",
    "CIS-GitHub-v1.2.0"
  ],
  "actors": [
    "Platform Engineer (trusted)",
    "AI Coding Agent (trusted, authoring IaC via Claude Code)",
    "External Attacker controlling a fork or a separate repo in the same org",
    "Compromised third-party Action (semi-trusted, via supply-chain compromise)"
  ],
  "assets": [
    "GitHub Actions OIDC issuer URL (token.actions.githubusercontent.com)",
    "Cloud-side IAM role assumed by the workflow",
    "`sub` claim shape in the cloud trust policy",
    "`ActionsOrganizationOidcSubjectClaimCustomizationTemplate` (org-level IaC)",
    "Production cloud resources downstream of the assumed role"
  ],
  "stride": [
    {
      "type": "S",
      "name": "OIDC sub-claim wildcard impersonation (UNC6426)",
      "description": "An attacker who can run any workflow in the same org (e.g. via a fork or a dev repo) requests an OIDC token; the cloud trust policy uses `StringLike` on `sub` with wildcard `repo:{org}/{repo}:*`; the attacker's token is accepted and the role is assumed. Mitigation: Hulumi's `G_OIDC_1` policy rejects `StringLike` and any `*` in the `sub` axis on AWS / Azure / GCP at preview-time; `OrgFoundation` ships the three-axis safe default for the GitHub-side `ActionsOrganizationOidcSubjectClaimCustomizationTemplate`.",
      "controls": [
        "CCM:IAM-10",
        "NIST-SSDF-v1.1:PO.5",
        "OpenSSF-Scorecard:Token-Permissions",
        "MITRE-ATTCK:T1195",
        "GitHub-Well-Architected:PO.3"
      ]
    },
    {
      "type": "T",
      "name": "Trust policy tampering via console",
      "description": "An admin clicks in the AWS / Azure / GCP console and broadens the OIDC trust policy's `sub` condition for a one-off use case, leaving the broadened condition in place after the use case closes. Drift detection (M4 webhook fallback adapter) cannot see cloud-side changes; the cloud-side IaC tag (`hulumi:iac-role=true`) carries forward. Mitigation: `G_OIDC_1` re-evaluates the trust policy on every `pulumi up`; cloud-side audit log cross-check against the Hulumi-managed expected shape.",
      "controls": [
        "CCM:IAM-06",
        "NIST-SSDF-v1.1:PW.7",
        "GitHub-Well-Architected:RV.1",
        "CIS-GitHub-v1.2.0:PENDING-WORKBENCH"
      ]
    },
    {
      "type": "I",
      "name": "Information disclosure via over-scoped role",
      "description": "The role assumed by the GitHub Actions workflow has broader permissions than the workflow needs (e.g. read-only on a PR-validation workflow but the role allows writes). A pwn-request-style exploit (compromised PR diff) gains write capability beyond the workflow author's intent.",
      "controls": [
        "CCM:IAM-07",
        "NIST-SSDF-v1.1:PO.3",
        "OpenSSF-Scorecard:Token-Permissions",
        "GitHub-Well-Architected:PW.5"
      ]
    },
    {
      "type": "E",
      "name": "Privilege escalation via job_workflow_ref spoofing",
      "description": "An attacker triggers a reusable workflow in a sibling repo whose `job_workflow_ref` matches what the trust policy permits, but the calling repo is not the intended one. Without an `environment` axis, the trust policy cannot distinguish prod-deploy from non-prod-deploy callers. Mitigation: include `environment` in the `sub` axis; require explicit `environment: prod` on prod-deploy workflows; AWS `StringEquals` (not `StringLike`) on the full three-axis string.",
      "controls": [
        "CCM:IAM-10",
        "NIST-SSDF-v1.1:PO.5",
        "GitHub-Well-Architected:PO.3",
        "MITRE-ATTCK:T1195"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "recommendedComponents": [
    {
      "name": "@hulumi/baseline.github.OrgFoundation",
      "availability": "Shipped in Hulumi v1.1.0 M2",
      "rationale": "Ships the GitHub-side `ActionsOrganizationOidcSubjectClaimCustomizationTemplate` with the three-axis safe default. Runtime rejects custom templates containing `*`."
    },
    {
      "name": "@hulumi/policies.github.G_OIDC_1",
      "availability": "Shipped in Hulumi v1.1.0 M3",
      "rationale": "Declarative CrossGuard rule rejecting `StringLike` / wildcard `sub` conditions on AWS / Azure / GCP trust policies at preview-time. Covers AWS IAM, Azure Workload Identity Federation, and GCP Workload Identity Federation."
    },
    {
      "name": "@hulumi/baseline.aws.AccountFoundation",
      "availability": "Shipped in Hulumi v1.0.0 M3",
      "rationale": "Provides the cloud-side IAM role tagged `hulumi:iac-role=true` so audit logs distinguish IaC-originated assumes from console break-glass."
    }
  ]
}
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