kerberosmansour/hulumi / skills/hulumi-threat-model
hulumi-threat-model
FlaggedRun an AWS or GitHub cloud / platform threat model for a specific Hulumi scenario. Produces a structured markdown threat-model document at docs/threat-model-<scenario>-<date>.md in the user's working directory, citing CSA CCM v4.1, NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, NIST SP 800-218A, MITRE ATLAS v5.1, CIS AWS Foundations v5.0.0, CIS GitHub Benchmark v1.2.0, NIST SSDF v1.1, OpenSSF Scorecard, MITRE ATT&CK T1195, and GitHub Well-Architected SSDF by framework ID only (no verbatim control text). Use when the user asks for a threat model for an AWS or GitHub scenario, wants to ground IaC design decisions in standard controls, or wants to see which @hulumi/baseline components apply.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 8.0 KB |
| package.json | manifest | 572 B |
| scenarios/aws-multi-account-baseline.json | config | 5.5 KB |
| scenarios/eks-cluster-baseline.json | config | 5.0 KB |
| scenarios/eks-runtime-and-backup.json | config | 4.6 KB |
| scenarios/github-actions-supply-chain.json | config | 5.9 KB |
| scenarios/github-app-token-exposure.json | config | 5.5 KB |
| scenarios/github-oidc-trust-cloud-account.json | config | 5.4 KB |
| scenarios/github-self-hosted-runner.json | config | 5.3 KB |
| scenarios/iam-least-privilege.json | config | 4.7 KB |
| scenarios/lambda-secrets-access.json | config | 5.0 KB |
| scenarios/operations-audit-pipeline-broken.json | config | 4.3 KB |
| scenarios/operations-detective-services-disabled.json | config | 4.1 KB |
| scenarios/operations-patch-compliance-lapse.json | config | 4.0 KB |
| scenarios/rds-encryption-at-rest.json | config | 4.7 KB |
| scenarios/s3-public-bucket-hardening.json | config | 4.9 KB |
| scripts/generate-threat-model.mjs | script | 22.7 KB |
| scripts/list-scenarios.mjs | script | 2.0 KB |
| templates/threat-model.template.md | markdown | 1.1 KB |
| tsconfig.json | config | 289 B |
scenarios/eks-runtime-and-backup.json
View on GitHub{
"id": "eks-runtime-and-backup",
"title": "EKS Runtime Detection and Backup — GuardDuty, audit alarms, AWS Backup vault lock",
"description": "An engineer is wiring up the EKS detection + DR lane: GuardDuty EKS Audit Logs + Runtime Monitoring, CloudWatch metric filters + alarms for secret-read and pods/exec, an AWS Backup vault (KMS-encrypted) with optional immutable vault lock. Target end state matches Hulumi's `EksRuntimeDetectionFoundation` (M5) + `EksBackupFoundation` (M5). Threats focus on detection gaps (Fargate runtime-monitoring limitation), backup deletion (privileged AWS principal + irreversibility), and unencrypted recovery points.",
"requiredFrameworks": ["CCM", "NIST-800-53-r5", "ATLAS", "CIS-EKS"],
"actors": [
"Platform Engineer (trusted)",
"AI Coding Agent (trusted)",
"External Attacker (post-compromise; objective: persist + cover tracks)",
"Compromised AWS principal with `backup:*` (could delete recovery points)"
],
"assets": [
"EKS audit log stream",
"GuardDuty findings",
"AWS Backup recovery points",
"AWS Backup vault (and its KMS key)"
],
"stride": [
{
"type": "S",
"name": "Spoofed source on backup-delete API call",
"description": "An attacker with `backup:DeleteRecoveryPoint` and `backup:DeleteBackupVault` permissions can erase recovery points before exfil. Mitigation: vault lock (immutable, with the M5 operator-confirmation gate); IAM scoping for backup-management principals.",
"controls": ["CCM:IAM-09", "NIST-800-53-r5:CP-9"]
},
{
"type": "T",
"name": "Tampered audit-log JSON shape",
"description": "If the EKS audit log JSON shape drifts (e.g. EKS adds `objectRef.subresource` placement), the M5 metric-filter patterns silently miss `pods/exec` events. Mitigation: kind/EKS integration tests against a real cluster; alarm coverage tracking via Hulumi/Drift adapter (M6).",
"controls": ["CCM:LOG-01", "NIST-800-53-r5:AU-7"]
},
{
"type": "R",
"name": "Repudiation via Fargate runtime blindness",
"description": "GuardDuty Runtime Monitoring is unsupported on EKS-on-Fargate. A compromised Fargate pod has no kernel-level introspection. Mitigation: `EksRuntimeDetectionFoundation` exposes `runtimeMonitoringUnsupported: Output<true>` so operators see the gap; control-plane audit events remain the detection backstop.",
"controls": ["CCM:LOG-01", "NIST-800-53-r5:AU-2"]
},
{
"type": "I",
"name": "Information disclosure via unencrypted backup vault",
"description": "AWS Backup defaults to AWS-managed KMS keys. A vault encrypted with an AWS-managed key is readable by any AWS-managed-key-using principal in the account, defeating cross-account isolation. Mitigation: `EksBackupFoundation` requires an explicit `kmsKeyArn` (no AWS-managed default).",
"controls": ["CCM:CEK-04", "NIST-800-53-r5:SC-28"]
},
{
"type": "D",
"name": "Denial of recovery via deleted recovery points",
"description": "Without vault lock, a privileged attacker can delete recovery points faster than the team detects the breach. Mitigation: `enableImmutableVaultLock` + the 3-day `changeableForDays` window leaves a confirmation gate without making the lock instantly irreversible.",
"controls": ["CCM:CP-09", "NIST-800-53-r5:CP-9"]
},
{
"type": "E",
"name": "Elevation via cross-tenant backup vault access",
"description": "A backup IAM role over-scoped to `backup:*` on `*` can read any vault. Mitigation: scope the role to the specific vault ARNs; the component does NOT validate the role for the consumer (limitation noted in the M5 completion summary).",
"controls": ["CCM:IAM-09", "NIST-800-53-r5:AC-6"]
}
],
"abuseCases": [
{
"id": "tm-eks-runtime-blindness-abuse",
"title": "Fargate runtime blindness — compromised Fargate pod has no kernel-level detection",
"description": "Mitigation: M5 component exposes the unsupported flag; kind tests verify the warning fires.",
"controls": ["CCM:LOG-01"]
},
{
"id": "tm-eks-backup-delete-abuse",
"title": "Backup deletion before exfil detection",
"description": "Mitigation: vault lock + the 72h confirmation window in M5.",
"controls": ["NIST-800-53-r5:CP-9"]
},
{
"id": "tm-eks-secret-read-detection-abuse",
"title": "Mass-secret-read evades detection without metric filter",
"description": "Mitigation: the secret-read metric filter + alarm pair in `EksRuntimeDetectionFoundation`.",
"controls": ["CCM:DSP-12", "NIST-800-53-r5:AU-2"]
}
]
}
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