kerberosmansour/hulumi / skills/hulumi-threat-model
hulumi-threat-model
FlaggedRun an AWS or GitHub cloud / platform threat model for a specific Hulumi scenario. Produces a structured markdown threat-model document at docs/threat-model-<scenario>-<date>.md in the user's working directory, citing CSA CCM v4.1, NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, NIST SP 800-218A, MITRE ATLAS v5.1, CIS AWS Foundations v5.0.0, CIS GitHub Benchmark v1.2.0, NIST SSDF v1.1, OpenSSF Scorecard, MITRE ATT&CK T1195, and GitHub Well-Architected SSDF by framework ID only (no verbatim control text). Use when the user asks for a threat model for an AWS or GitHub scenario, wants to ground IaC design decisions in standard controls, or wants to see which @hulumi/baseline components apply.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 8.0 KB |
| package.json | manifest | 572 B |
| scenarios/aws-multi-account-baseline.json | config | 5.5 KB |
| scenarios/eks-cluster-baseline.json | config | 5.0 KB |
| scenarios/eks-runtime-and-backup.json | config | 4.6 KB |
| scenarios/github-actions-supply-chain.json | config | 5.9 KB |
| scenarios/github-app-token-exposure.json | config | 5.5 KB |
| scenarios/github-oidc-trust-cloud-account.json | config | 5.4 KB |
| scenarios/github-self-hosted-runner.json | config | 5.3 KB |
| scenarios/iam-least-privilege.json | config | 4.7 KB |
| scenarios/lambda-secrets-access.json | config | 5.0 KB |
| scenarios/operations-audit-pipeline-broken.json | config | 4.3 KB |
| scenarios/operations-detective-services-disabled.json | config | 4.1 KB |
| scenarios/operations-patch-compliance-lapse.json | config | 4.0 KB |
| scenarios/rds-encryption-at-rest.json | config | 4.7 KB |
| scenarios/s3-public-bucket-hardening.json | config | 4.9 KB |
| scripts/generate-threat-model.mjs | script | 22.7 KB |
| scripts/list-scenarios.mjs | script | 2.0 KB |
| templates/threat-model.template.md | markdown | 1.1 KB |
| tsconfig.json | config | 289 B |
scenarios/eks-cluster-baseline.json
View on GitHub{
"id": "eks-cluster-baseline",
"title": "EKS Cluster Baseline — control plane, RBAC, network defaults, audit",
"description": "An engineer is standing up an EKS cluster baseline: control-plane endpoint posture, audit logging, default-deny NetworkPolicy + IMDS egress restrictions, no-wildcard RBAC, and explicit selectors on AuthorizationPolicies. Target end state matches Hulumi's `NamespaceFoundation` (M4), `HulumiK8sHardeningPack` + `HulumiK8sRbacPack` + `HulumiEksClusterPack` (M3). Threats focus on the graph edges from the public internet to a pod, from a pod to the API server, from a pod to AWS IMDS, and from a compromised SA to cluster admin.",
"requiredFrameworks": ["CCM", "NIST-800-53-r5", "ATLAS", "CIS-K8S", "CIS-EKS"],
"actors": [
"Platform Engineer (trusted)",
"AI Coding Agent (trusted, authoring K8s IaC)",
"External Attacker (via exposed control-plane endpoint or pod-network egress)",
"Compromised Workload (semi-trusted, could escalate via secrets / IMDS / RBAC)"
],
"assets": [
"EKS control-plane endpoint",
"Audit log stream (control-plane events)",
"Cluster RBAC bindings (ClusterRole / ClusterRoleBinding)",
"Workload Secrets (especially CSI / SM-derived)",
"EKS node IAM role and IMDS-derived credentials"
],
"stride": [
{
"type": "S",
"name": "Spoofed identity via wildcard RBAC binding",
"description": "A consumer-authored ClusterRoleBinding to `cluster-admin` (or a Role with `verbs: [\"*\"]`) effectively grants any subject full control of the cluster. Mitigation: `HulumiK8sRbacPack`'s RBAC-1 (no wildcard verbs) and RBAC-3 (no cluster-admin binding) reject these at preview time.",
"controls": ["CCM:IAM-09", "NIST-800-53-r5:AC-6", "CIS-K8S:5.1.1", "CIS-K8S:5.1.3"]
},
{
"type": "T",
"name": "Tampered IRSA chain via untrusted OIDC provider",
"description": "An IRSA-style ServiceAccount whose annotations point at an attacker-controlled OIDC issuer can be assumed by an attacker workload. Mitigation: the cluster OIDC provider is configured at AccountFoundation level and IRSA bindings are pinned to that issuer's URL.",
"controls": ["CCM:IAM-10", "NIST-800-53-r5:IA-5", "CIS-EKS:3.1.2"]
},
{
"type": "R",
"name": "Repudiation via missing audit logs",
"description": "If the EKS control-plane `audit` log type is disabled (or never enabled) the runtime detection lane and the K8s drift adapters lose their primary event source. Mitigation: `HulumiEksClusterPack`'s EKS-CL-2 enforces audit logging at preview; `EksRuntimeDetectionFoundation` (M5) wires CW alarms keyed off audit events.",
"controls": ["CCM:LOG-01", "NIST-800-53-r5:AU-2", "CIS-EKS:2.1.2"]
},
{
"type": "I",
"name": "Information disclosure via Secret list/watch RBAC",
"description": "A Role granting `list` or `watch` on `secrets` allows any pod bound to it to read every Secret in scope. Mitigation: RBAC-2 rejects unsuppressed `list`/`watch` on secrets in the core API group; legitimate operators (external-secrets) opt in via a suppression with reason.",
"controls": ["CCM:DSP-12", "NIST-800-53-r5:AC-6", "CIS-K8S:5.1.2"]
},
{
"type": "D",
"name": "Denial of service via missing resources / privileged escape",
"description": "Pods without `resources.limits` can starve neighbors; pods with `securityContext.privileged: true` can compromise the node. Mitigation: WL-1 (privileged) and WL-4 (resources advisory) — paired, they keep neighbor-scheduling and node integrity intact.",
"controls": ["CCM:UEM-09", "CCM:CEK-08", "CIS-K8S:5.2.1"]
},
{
"type": "E",
"name": "Elevation of privilege via host namespace / IMDS",
"description": "A pod with `hostNetwork: true` bypasses all NetworkPolicy enforcement; a pod that can reach `169.254.169.254` can steal node-IAM credentials. Mitigation: WL-2 (host namespace) blocks the pod shape; `NamespaceFoundation` (M4) emits a default-deny + IMDS-deny NetworkPolicy. CNI must enforce.",
"controls": ["CCM:UEM-09", "NIST-800-53-r5:SC-7", "CIS-K8S:5.2.4", "CIS-EKS:4.4.1"]
}
],
"abuseCases": [
{
"id": "tm-eks-public-endpoint-abuse",
"title": "EKS public endpoint with `0.0.0.0/0` enables global control-plane reachability",
"description": "Default `endpointPublicAccess: true` with unset `publicAccessCidrs` resolves to `0.0.0.0/0`. Mitigation: EKS-CL-1 rejects this shape at preview unless suppressed with a reason.",
"controls": ["CCM:DSP-04", "NIST-800-53-r5:SC-7", "CIS-EKS:2.1.1"]
},
{
"id": "tm-k8s-rbac-star-abuse",
"title": "Wildcard RBAC enables lateral escalation",
"description": "A `verbs: [\"*\"]` rule grants `escalate` and `bind` primitives. Mitigation: RBAC-1.",
"controls": ["CCM:IAM-09", "CIS-K8S:5.1.1"]
},
{
"id": "tm-k8s-privileged-pod-abuse",
"title": "Privileged pod is root on the node",
"description": "Mitigation: WL-1.",
"controls": ["CCM:UEM-09", "CIS-K8S:5.2.1"]
}
]
}
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