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hulumi-threat-model

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Run an AWS or GitHub cloud / platform threat model for a specific Hulumi scenario. Produces a structured markdown threat-model document at docs/threat-model-<scenario>-<date>.md in the user's working directory, citing CSA CCM v4.1, NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, NIST SP 800-218A, MITRE ATLAS v5.1, CIS AWS Foundations v5.0.0, CIS GitHub Benchmark v1.2.0, NIST SSDF v1.1, OpenSSF Scorecard, MITRE ATT&CK T1195, and GitHub Well-Architected SSDF by framework ID only (no verbatim control text). Use when the user asks for a threat model for an AWS or GitHub scenario, wants to ground IaC design decisions in standard controls, or wants to see which @hulumi/baseline components apply.

scenarios/aws-multi-account-baseline.json

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{
  "id": "aws-multi-account-baseline",
  "title": "AWS Multi-Account Baseline — Day-Zero Account Foundation",
  "description": "A platform engineer stands up a new AWS account (or a collection of accounts under an Organization) with Hulumi. The target end state: CloudTrail centralised, AWS Config recording, GuardDuty enabled, Security Hub enabled with CIS AWS Foundations v5.0 subscribed, IAM baseline (password policy, no inline admin), and a KMS key ring with automatic rotation. Cross-account topology uses org-delegated services for GuardDuty and Security Hub.",
  "requiredFrameworks": ["CCM", "NIST-800-53-r5", "ATLAS", "CIS-AWS-v5.0.0", "NIST-800-218"],
  "actors": [
    "Platform Engineer (trusted)",
    "AI Coding Agent (trusted, authoring IaC via Claude Code)",
    "External Attacker (untrusted)",
    "Malicious Insider (semi-trusted)"
  ],
  "assets": [
    "AWS Organization root credentials",
    "Member account IAM roles",
    "CloudTrail log bucket and KMS key",
    "Config aggregator data",
    "Security Hub findings"
  ],
  "stride": [
    {
      "type": "S",
      "name": "Root credential spoofing",
      "description": "An external attacker acquires an AWS root account credential (e.g., via phishing a maintainer) and assumes that identity to reconfigure services out-of-band.",
      "controls": [
        "CCM:IAM-01",
        "CCM:IAM-10",
        "CIS-AWS-v5.0.0:1.4",
        "CIS-AWS-v5.0.0:1.5",
        "NIST-800-53-r5:IA-2"
      ]
    },
    {
      "type": "T",
      "name": "CloudTrail tampering",
      "description": "A privileged principal (or a compromised IAM role) disables CloudTrail or modifies trail configuration to blind the incident-response pipeline. Prevention: multi-region CloudTrail with log-file validation and CMK-encrypted destination bucket.",
      "controls": [
        "CCM:LOG-02",
        "CIS-AWS-v5.0.0:3.1",
        "CIS-AWS-v5.0.0:3.2",
        "CIS-AWS-v5.0.0:3.7",
        "NIST-800-53-r5:AU-9",
        "NIST-800-53-r5:AU-12"
      ]
    },
    {
      "type": "R",
      "name": "Repudiation via untagged IaC principal",
      "description": "An IaC action appears in CloudTrail but the assumed role does not carry a distinguishing Hulumi tag (`hulumi:iac-role=true`). Without the tag, console break-glass looks identical to IaC deploys, degrading forensic attribution.",
      "controls": ["CCM:IAM-06", "NIST-800-53-r5:AU-12"]
    },
    {
      "type": "I",
      "name": "Information disclosure via misconfigured KMS policies",
      "description": "An overly permissive KMS key policy lets a broader principal set decrypt data encrypted at rest. Hulumi's `AccountFoundation` KMS ring (shipped in M3) applies `deny-without-tag` policies in Startup-Hardened tier.",
      "controls": [
        "CCM:CEK-03",
        "CCM:CEK-04",
        "CIS-AWS-v5.0.0:3.7",
        "CIS-AWS-v5.0.0:3.8",
        "NIST-800-53-r5:SC-12",
        "NIST-800-53-r5:SC-28"
      ]
    },
    {
      "type": "D",
      "name": "Denial-of-service via unchecked resource creation",
      "description": "A compromised IAM role creates thousands of expensive resources (EC2, NAT gateways, SageMaker endpoints), racking up cost and exhausting service quotas. Mitigations: budget alerts, SCPs restricting resource types, Security Hub findings reviewed promptly.",
      "controls": ["CCM:LOG-04", "NIST-800-53-r5:SI-4"]
    },
    {
      "type": "E",
      "name": "LLM-authored elevation via stale AWS API knowledge",
      "description": "Claude Code or another AI agent produces IaC that applies broad IAM permissions (`Resource: *`, `Action: *`) because its training data predates newer least-privilege defaults. Hulumi's baseline components cap these defaults; the `HulumiHardeningPack` (shipped in M2) blocks wildcard IAM policies at preview time.",
      "controls": [
        "CCM:IAM-07",
        "CIS-AWS-v5.0.0:1.22",
        "NIST-800-53-r5:AC-6",
        "ATLAS:AML.T0080",
        "ATLAS:AML.T0099",
        "NIST-800-218A:RV.1.1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "recommendedComponents": [
    {
      "name": "hulumi.baseline.aws.AccountFoundation",
      "availability": "Shipped in M3 (v0.3)",
      "rationale": "Composes CloudTrail + Config + GuardDuty + Security Hub + IAM baseline + KMS ring with tier-differentiated defaults (Sandbox / Startup-Hardened). Delivers this scenario's target end state as a single ComponentResource invocation."
    },
    {
      "name": "hulumi.policies.aws.CisV5Pack",
      "availability": "Shipped in M3 (v0.3; sections 1-3 full, 4-5 advisory stub)",
      "rationale": "CrossGuard policy pack subscribing to CIS AWS Foundations v5.0.0. Provides preventive policy checks complementing Security Hub's detective findings."
    },
    {
      "name": "hulumi.policies.aws.HulumiHardeningPack",
      "availability": "Shipped in M2 (v0.2; H3 iac-role-tag rule mandatory at v1.0)",
      "rationale": "Blocks raw `aws.s3.BucketV2`, file:// state backends, and IAM policies with `Resource: '*'` outside `iam:*` reads. The `hulumi:iac-role=true` tag check (advisory in M2, mandatory at v1.0.0 paired with the SCP template) is the compensating control for the repudiation threat above."
    },
    {
      "name": "hulumi.drift.DriftClassifier",
      "availability": "Shipped in M4 (v0.4)",
      "rationale": "Post-deployment drift triage — distinguishes provider-API churn from console break-glass from genuine IaC drift using four pluggable local adapters. TLA+-verified verdict matrix; cache file mode 0600; CloudTrail filter requires hulumi:iac-role=true (full namespace)."
    }
  ]
}
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