Kartik-Doye/Ravengard-AI-Recruiter / agent/skills/harden
harden
VerifiedThreat-model, review, or reduce exploitable risk in software you are authorized to assess, including application code, APIs, identities, data flows, dependencies, CI/CD, configuration, cloud/IaC, and agentic capabilities. Use for security-sensitive changes, feature threat models, security audits, or evidence-backed remediation and retesting.
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
| SKILL.md | skill md | 18.0 KB |
| references/attack-surface.md | markdown | 5.1 KB |
| references/research.md | markdown | 6.0 KB |
references/research.md
View on GitHub# harden research ledger
This ledger records the sources that alter this skill's behavior. It is not a
claim that every control, risk category, or testing method applies to every
system.
## Application Security Verification Standard
Title: Application Security Verification Standard
Author / Organization: OWASP Foundation
Publication date: 2025
Version: 5.0.0
URL: https://owasp.org/projects/asvs
Source type: standard
What it establishes:
ASVS provides a versioned basis for specifying and verifying web application
security controls, including architecture/threat modeling, authentication,
access control, validation, cryptography, and logging.
What this skill adopts:
Select control families from the threat model, version any ASVS identifiers in
reports, and require evidence plus retesting rather than checklist completion.
What it does NOT establish:
It does not determine a system's threat model, prove a scanner finding is
reachable, or produce a universal severity score.
Numbers taken from source:
Version 5.0.0 is the reviewed stable reference.
Reverify when:
OWASP releases a newer stable ASVS or a regulated scope imposes another control
baseline.
## API and authorization risks
Title: OWASP API Security Top 10 and Authorization Cheat Sheet
Author / Organization: OWASP Foundation
Publication date: 2023-2026
Version: API Security Top 10 2023 and current cheat-sheet guidance
URL: https://api-security.owasp.org/editions/2023/en/0x00-header/
Source type: official docs
What it establishes:
Object/property/function authorization, business-flow access, resource use,
configuration, inventory, and unsafe upstream API consumption are material API
risk classes. Authorization should be deny-by-default and least-privilege.
What this skill adopts:
Map subject, object, action, context, and enforcement point for sensitive paths;
require controlled negative authorization checks where safely possible.
What it does NOT establish:
It does not prescribe a specific authorization model, response code, ORM, or
database policy for every application.
Numbers taken from source:
The Top 10 category count is not used as an audit score.
Reverify when:
OWASP updates the API risk edition or the system's identity model changes.
## Threat-modeling method
Title: Threat Modeling Cheat Sheet
Author / Organization: OWASP Foundation
Publication date: 2026
Version: Current Cheat Sheet Series guidance
URL: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Threat_Modeling_Cheat_Sheet.html
Source type: official docs
What it establishes:
Threat modeling benefits from identifying assets, actors, boundaries, and attack
scenarios. STRIDE is one illustrative method among multiple valid approaches.
What this skill adopts:
Model assets, actors, boundaries, entry points, assumptions, and attack chains
before using category checklists. Treat STRIDE as a prompt set, not a ritual.
What it does NOT establish:
It does not make every STRIDE category relevant to every component or replace
authorized testing and concrete implementation evidence.
Numbers taken from source:
None.
Reverify when:
The system gains a new trust boundary or a more specific domain threat model is
available.
## Secure software development lifecycle
Title: Secure Software Development Framework
Author / Organization: National Institute of Standards and Technology
Publication date: 2022-02
Version: SP 800-218 Revision 1.1
URL: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/218/final
Source type: standard
What it establishes:
SSDF describes high-level secure software development practices that can be
integrated with existing lifecycle approaches to reduce vulnerabilities and
improve response to them.
What this skill adopts:
Treat security as design, implementation, verification, deployment, and
remediation evidence rather than a final scanner-only stage.
What it does NOT establish:
It does not mandate a particular CI provider, scanning product, evidence format,
or release decision.
Numbers taken from source:
Version 1.1 identifies the reviewed publication.
Reverify when:
NIST supersedes SP 800-218 or the organization's secure-development policy
changes.
## Agentic and generative AI security
Title: OWASP Top 10 for LLM and Generative AI Applications
Author / Organization: OWASP Gen AI Security Project
Publication date: 2025
Version: 2025 edition
URL: https://genai.owasp.org/llm-top-10/
Source type: official docs
What it establishes:
Prompt injection, improper output handling, supply-chain risks, data/model
poisoning, excessive agency, and unbounded consumption are relevant risk areas
for LLM and agentic systems.
What this skill adopts:
Treat retrieved content, prompts, model output, memory, and tool results as
untrusted; minimize tool functionality, permissions, and autonomy; enforce
authorization in downstream systems; bound cost and side effects.
What it does NOT establish:
It does not mean every AI feature needs a separate platform, that prompt filters
are sufficient authorization, or that all agents require human approval for
every reversible action.
Numbers taken from source:
The top-ten list is not used as a maturity score.
Reverify when:
The agent/tool architecture, model provider, or OWASP GenAI guidance changes.
## Security telemetry
Title: ASVS Security Events guidance
Author / Organization: OWASP Foundation
Publication date: 2025
Version: ASVS 5.0 taxonomy
URL: https://cornucopia.owasp.org/taxonomy/asvs-5.0/16-security-logging-and-error-handling/03-security-events
Source type: official docs
What it establishes:
Authentication operations and failed authorization attempts are relevant
security events; sensitive data should not be logged merely to make events rich.
What this skill adopts:
Require security-review findings to consider both observable security signals
and log-data minimization.
What it does NOT establish:
It does not require logging every user action or retaining logs indefinitely.
Numbers taken from source:
None.
Reverify when:
The system's logging/privacy policy or relevant ASVS guidance changes.
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